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STATEMENT OF INFORMATION SUBMITTED
ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT NIXON

HEARING S

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

H. Res. 803

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AND DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER SUFFICIENT
GROUNDS EXIST FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO
EXERCISE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO IMPEACH
RICHARD M. NIXON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BOOK I

EVENTS FOLLOWING
THE WATERGATE BREAK-IN

June 19, 1972-March 1, 1974

MAY-JUNE 1974

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
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FOREWARD

By Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.,
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary

On February 6, 1974, the House of Representatives adopted by a vote of 410-4 the following House Resolution 803:

RESOLVED, That the Committee on the Judiciary acting as a whole or by any subcommittee thereof appointed by the Chairman for the purposes hereof and in accordance with the Rules of the Committee, is authorized and directed to investigate fully and completely whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise its constitutional power to impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America. The committee shall report to the House of Representatives such resolutions, articles of impeachment, or other recommendations as it deems proper. On May 9, 1974, as Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, I convened the Committee for hearings to review the results of the Impeachment Inquiry staff's investigation. The hearings were convened pursuant to the Committee's Impeachment Inquiry Procedures adopted on May 2, 1974.

(III)
These Procedures provided that President Nixon should be accorded the opportunity to have his counsel present throughout the hearings and to receive a copy of the statement of information and related documents and other evidentiary material at the time that those materials are furnished to the members.

Mr. James D. St. Clair, Special Counsel to the President, was present throughout the initial presentation by the Impeachment Inquiry staff. Following the completion of the initial presentation the Committee resolved, in accordance with its Procedures, to invite the President's counsel to respond in writing to the Committee's initial evidentiary presentation. The Committee decided that the President's response should be in the manner of the Inquiry staff's initial presentation before the Committee, in accordance with Rule A of the Committee's Impeachment Inquiry Procedures, and should consist of information and evidentiary material, other than the testimony of witnesses, believed by the President's counsel to be pertinent to the inquiry. Counsel for the President was likewise afforded the opportunity to supplement its written response with an oral presentation to the Committee.

(IV)
President Nixon's response was presented to the Committee on June 27 and June 28.

One notebook was furnished to the members of the Committee relating to Watergate and its aftermath. In this notebook a statement of information relating to a particular phase of the investigation was immediately followed by supporting evidentiary material which included copies of documents and testimony (much already on the public record) and transcripts of Presidential conversations.

The Committee on the Judiciary is working to follow faithfully its mandate to investigate fully and completely "whether or not sufficient grounds exist" to recommend that the House exercise its constitutional power of impeachment.

Consistent with this mandate the Committee voted to make public the President's response in the same form and manner as the Inquiry staff's initial presentation.

July, 1974

(v)
Foreward...........
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Introductory Note. ...-

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The material contained in this volume is presented in two sections. Section 1 contains a statement of information footnoted with citations to evidentiary material. Section 2 contains the same statement of information followed by the supporting material.

Each page of supporting evidence is labeled with the footnote number and a description of the document or the name of the witness testifying. Copies of entire pages of documents and testimony are included, with brackets around the portions pertaining to the statement of information.

In the citation of sources, "SSC" has been used as an abbreviation for the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.

(IX)
STATEMENT OF INFORMATION
SUBMITTED ON BEHALF
OF THE PRESIDENT
EVENTS FOLLOWING
THE WATERGATE BREAK-IN
June 19, 1972 -- March 1, 1974

(1)
1. On Monday, June 19, 1972, two days after the break-in of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters, Dean contacted Liddy and Liddy told Dean the men caught in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters were Liddy's men and that Magruder had pushed him to do it. Dean asked Liddy if anyone from the White House was involved and Liddy told Dean no.
2. John Dean testified that on June 18, 1972, one day after the break-in of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters, "the cover-up was already in effect, in being. " Dean testified he was in on the cover-up from the very beginning. Dean concurred with Senator Gurney that the cover-up "grew like Topsy, and Dean was a part of it. " When questioned if he advised the President of what was going on, Dean responded that the first time he ever talked to the President was September 15, 1972, some three months later.

2a Dean 4 SSC, 1357

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2b Dean 3 SSC, 1026, 43

(4)
3. Dean did not meet with the President until approximately three months after the Democratic National Committee Headquarters break-in. The allegation that Dean informed the President of an illegal cover-up on September 15, 1972, is based exclusively on the testimony of Dean. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee, Dean stated he was "certain after the September fifteenth meeting that the President was fully aware of the cover-up." However, in answering questions of Senator Baker, he modified this by agreeing that it was an "inference" of his. Later Dean admitted he had no personal knowledge that the President knew on September fifteenth about a cover-up of Watergate.

3a Dean 4 SSC 1435.........................

3b Dean 4 SSC 1475.........................

3c Dean 4 SSC 1482.........................

(5)
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47
48
4. On May 22, 1973, the President stated that the bugging, and burglary of the Democratic National Committee was a complete surprise and that he had no prior knowledge that persons associated with his campaign had planned such activities. On March 21, 1973, John Dean told the President that no one at the White House knew of the plans to break in the Democratic National Committee.

4a_ President's statement, May 22, 1973
(9 Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents

4b Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m.

1 / Reference to transcripts are to submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations of April 30, 1974.

(6)
5. H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman testified before
the Senate Select Committee that they did not believe the President had prior
knowledge of the break in plans. On March 21, 1973, John Ehrlichman told the
President that, on the basis of information he had, no one in the White House had
been involved, had notice, had knowledge, participated nor aided or abetted in any
way in the Democratic National Committee burglary.
John Mitchell testified before the Senate Select Committee that the President did not know of either the burglary plans or the cover-up.

Richard Moore testified before the Senate Select Committee that as a result of his meetings with the President and Dean on March 20, 1973, he concluded that the President had no knowledge that anyone in the White House was involved in the Watergate affair and John Dean told him as they departed that he had never told the President.

-4a Mitchell 4 SSC 1628*

6b Moore 5 SSC 1944, 1945, 2067........... 59

(8)
7. After the second meeting in Mitchell's office on February 4, 1972, the modified Liddy
plan was turned down and Dean concluded the plan was at end. Dean later met with
Haldeman and advised Haldeman that the White House should have nothing to do with
any such activity. Haldeman agreed.

7a_ Dean 3 SSC 931

7b Dean 3 SSC 930

(9)

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65
Magruder reported to Strachan that a "sophisticated political intelligence gathering system" had been approved. Strachan included this item in a memo containing approximately 30 other items directed to Haldeman. Attached at tab "H" of this report were examples of the type information being developed and identified by the code name "Sedan Chair." Magruder and

Reisner testified "Sedan Chair" involved a disgruntled campaign worker from the Humphrey Pennsylvania Organization who passed information to Committee to Re-Elect the President. Porter deemed this activity surreptitious but not illegal.
9. Dean told the President on March 21, 1973 that Haldeman was assuming that the Committee to Re-Elect the President had an intelligence gathering operation conducted by Liddy that was proper. Dean told the President there was nothing illegal about "Sedan Chair".

9a Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m. pp. 178-179

9b Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m. p. 180

(11)

Page 78
10. Political Matters Memo ... was prepared by Strachan and submitted to Haldeman on March 31, 1972. On April 1972 Strachan prepared a talking paper including the mention of the "sophisticated intelligence gathering operation" for use by Haldeman in a meeting he was having with Mitchell on that day. The paper was returned to Strachan and filed with Memo #18 after Haldeman met with Mitchell. Strachan testified the subject of intelligence gathering was never raised again by Haldeman. Strachan is certain none of the Political Matters Memo had the "P" with a check mark through the "P" which was the procedure used for memos discussed in that form with the President.
11. Haldeman has testified that he and Mitchell did not discuss intelligence gathering activities with the President on April 4, 1972, and that he and Mitchell only reviewed with the President matters relating to the ITT-Kleindienst hearings and arguments of regional campaign responsibilities. Haldeman's notes of the meeting show no political intelligence gathering operations were discussed. The transcript of April 4, 1972, meeting between the President, Haldeman, and John Mitchell confirms that there was no discussion of campaign intelligence gathering activities.

(transcript, April 4, 1972, 4:13-4:50 p.m., p. 1-31
(submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary on June 5, 1974)
12. ! The President had no knowledge of an attempt by the White House to cover-up involvement in the Watergate affair. Dean told the President that there were things Dean knew the President had no knowledge of.

NOTE: Objection has been raised by Congressman SeiberZing that the first sentence is a conclusion rather than a statement of information within the Rules of Procedure of the Committee.

(14)
13. The testimony of Gray before the Senate Select Committee establishes that the origin of the theory of Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the break-in of the DNC was in the FBI and that Gray communicated the theory to Dean on June 22, 1972. Dean confirmed that Gray informed him on June 22, 1972 that one of the EBI theories of the case was that it was a CIA operation and Dean testified that he reported this to Haldeman and Ehrlichman on June 23.

>, Gray 9 SSC, 3451 ;

13b Dean 3 SSC, 943 ;.

NOTE: Objection has been raised by Congressman SeiberZing that the first sentence is a conclusion rather than a statement of information within the Rules of Procedure of the Committee.
Haldeman's testimony before the Senate Select Committee confirms that Dean reported to him the FBI's concern about CIA involvement, and that Haldeman in turn reported this to the President, who ordered Haldeman and Ehrlichman to meet with the CIA officials to insure that the FBI investigation not expose any unrelated covert operation of the CIA. The uncertainty regarding the possibility of uncovering CIA activities was recognized in a memo dated June 28, 1972 from Helms to Walter s.

AL Memo from Director Helms to Deputy Walters, June 1972.
15 The President stated on May 22, 1973, that it did seem possible to him that because of the involvement of former CIAO personnel, the investigation could lead to the uncovering of covert CIA operations totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in. The President stated he was also concerned that the Watergate investigation might lead to an inquiry into the activities of the Special Investigations Unit. Gray testified that on July 6, 1972, the President told him to continue to conduct his aggressive and thorough investigation of the Watergate affair.
16. The President indicated that he was unaware that Gray had destroyed documents found in Hunt's safe when told by Henry Peterson on April 17, 1973.
17. Dean did not disclose until November 2, 1973, while being questioned by attorneys of the Special Prosecutor's office, that he had personally destroyed documents from Hunt's safe.

Page

17a Hearing, before the Honorable John J. Sirica in U. S. District Court Criminal No 1827-72, November 5, 1973, 142
18. The President was unaware prior to March 21, 1973, that Magruder and Porter perjured themselves to a grand jury.

On April 17, 1973, the President advised Ehrlichman and Haldeman against perjury.

18a Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m. pp. 182-183

18b Transcript, April 17, 1973, 12:35-2:20 p. m.

p. 10022

NOTE: Objection has been raised by Congresswomen BoZtzman end Congressmen Seiberling that the first sentence is a conclusion rather than a statement of information within the Rules of Procedure of the Committee.
John Dean advised the President on March 21, 1973, of Hunt's demand for approximately $120,000 for legal fees and family support. The President explored the option of meeting Hunt's demands so as to secure the time needed to consider alternative courses. The President was not concerned with the possible Watergate related disclosures, but rather which disclosure of the National Security matters Hunt had been involved in as a member of the Plumbers.

The President advised Dean that the money could not be paid because it would look like a cover-up. At another point in the conversations the President requested advice as to whether or not the money should be paid. Later the President concludes that Hunt will blow the whistle no matter what is done for him.
20. At the March 21, 1973, meeting the President after considering several options seized on the possibility of calling a new grand jury, thereby delaying Hunt's sentencing and making the immediate payment unnecessary as a means of buying time. Not once after this option was explored was there any suggestion that Hunt's demand be met.

The concluding page of the transcript of the March 21, 1973, morning meeting clearly demonstrates that the President recognizes that any blackmail and cover-up activities then in progress could not continue.

20a Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m.,

sage

20b Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11-55 a.m.,
p. 249 160

NOTE: Objection has been raised by Congresswoman Holtzman and Congressman Seiberling as to whole statement being a conclusion rather than a statement of information within the Rules of Procedure of the Committee.

(22)
21. Neither of the participants of the March 21, 1973, morning meeting came away with any opinion that the President authorized payments to Hunt. Haldeman concluded that the President rejected payments to Hunt. Dean testified: "The money matter was left very much hanging at the meeting. Nothing was resolved."

Page

21a Transcript, April 17, 1973, 12:35-2:20 p.m.  
   p. 1034............................... 162

21b Dean 4 SSC, 1423.

(23)
22. At the March Z1, 1973, morning meeting while discussing the practicality of getting another grand jury the President told Dean and Haldeman to get Mitchell to come to Washington, so that Mitchell could meet with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean.

22a Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m., Page (24)
23. Haldeman and Dean left the meeting with the President
at approximately 11:55 a.m. on March 21, 1973. Pursuant to
the President's request Haldeman called Mitchell at approximately
12:30 p.m. and requested Mitchell come to Washington. Dean's
testimony confirms this.

23a Haldeman's Telephone Log ......................

23b Haldeman, Watergate Grand Jury Testimony.

January 30, 1974, p. 4-7.. ............

23c Dean 3 SSC, ....................................

(25)

Page

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176
24. On March 21, 1973 Dean had a telephone conversation with LaRue concerning Hunt's request for money and Dean suggested LaRue call Mitchell. LaRue called Mitchell in the early afternoon of March 21, 1973 and advised Mitchell that he had a request for $75,000 for Hunt's legal fees. Mitchell acknowledges that he advised LaRue to pay the money for attorney fees. During the March 21, 1973 late afternoon meeting with the President, Dean denied that he had spoken to either LaRue or Mitchell, when in fact he had spoken to both.

24a 1 Dean, Watergate Grand Jury Testimony, February 14, 1974, 16

24b if February 13, 1974, 7-10

24c Mitchell, 4 SSC, 1630, 1631

24d Transcript, March 21, 1973, 5:20-6:01 p.m.
25. Having received information on March 21, 1973 of possible obstruction of justice having taken place following the break-in of the DNC, the President promptly undertook an investigation into the facts. The record discloses that the President started his investigation the night of his meeting with Dean on March 21st, as confirmed by Dean in his conversation with the President on April 16, 1973. At the meeting with Mitchell and the others on the afternoon of March 22nd, the President instructed Dean to prepare a written report of his earlier disclosures.

Page

25a Transcript, April 16, 1973 10:00-10:40 p. 801

25b Transcript, March 22, 1973, 1:57-3:43 p.m., p. 282-283

25c Transcript, p. 309

... 189

..................191

(27)
26. Although Dean was instructed to go to Camp David and write a report on March 22, 1973 by the President, Dean denied this and later testified before the Senate Select Committee that he was never requested to write a report until Haldeman called him after he arrived at Camp David.

26a Dean 4 SSC 1385......

(28)
27. Just six days after Dean's disclosures, on March 27, 1973, the President met with Ehrlichman and Haldeman to discuss the evidence thus far developed and how best to proceed. Again the President stated his resolve that White House officials should appear before the grand jury. They confirmed to the President, as Dean had, that no one at the White House had prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in. Ehrlichman told the President that there wasn't scintilla of a hint that Dean knew about this. "The President asked about the possibility of Colson having prior knowledge and Ehrlichman stated that Colson's response was "of total surprise. . . He was totally non-plussed, as the rest of us. "

Transcript, March 27, 1973, 11:10-1:30 p. m. p. 315 . . 196

27b Transcript,

27c

" p. 331

198

(29)
On April 8, 1973, the President met with Ehrlichman and Haldeman on board Air Force One and directed them to meet with Dean and urge him to go to the grand jury. Haldeman and Ehrlichman met with Dean that afternoon and at 7:33 p.m., Ehrlichman reported to the President that Dean indicated he would agree to go before the grand jury.
29.

Dean did in fact communicate his intention to testify
before the grand jury to A/Mitchell and Magruder and told them he
would not agree to support Magruder's previous testimony to the
grand jury. Thereafter on April 14, 1973, Magruder appeared
before the U. S. Attorneys and cooperated with them fully.

29a Dean 3 SSC, 1006 .............................. 204

29b Magruder 2 SSC, 808 .............................. 205

(31)
30. On April 14, 1973, the President again met with Ehrlichman and Haldeman to review the results of three weeks investigation and to determine the future course of action. Based on Ehrlichman's report, the President concluded Mitchell should go before a grand jury. The President instructed Ehrlichman to see Magruder and tell him that he did not serve the President by remaining silent. The President told Ehrlichman that when he met with Mitchell to advise him that "the President has said let the chips fall where they may. He will not furnish cover for anybody." The President told Ehrlichman to tell Magruder to purge himself and tell this whole story.

30a Transcript, April 14, 1973, 8:55-11:31 a.m., p. 445

30b Transcript, April 14, 1973, 8:55-11:31 a.m., p. 478

30c Transcript, April 14, 1973, 8:55-11:31 a.m., p. 507

(32)
on April 15, 1973, the President met with Attorney
General Kleindienst. They considered who should be in charge
of the continuing investigation. The President met with Assistant Attorney
General Petersen on the afternoon of April 15, 1973, in his EOB office. At this
meeting Petersen indicated there was no criminal case on Haldeman and
Ehrlichman at this time. Having been told Liddy would not talk unless
authorized by "higher authority" the President instructed Petersen to tell Liddy's
counsel the President would confirm his urging of Liddy to cooperate.
32. The President met with Dean on the morning of April 16, 1973, discussed with Dean his resignation, and advised him to be totally truthful in his explanations. The President asked Dean not to lie about the President either.

At this same meeting Dean explained to the President that O'Brien had been the one who relayed Hunt's demand, that Dean had informed Ehrlichman and Ehrlichman advised Dean to inform Mitchell which Dean did. Dean told the President that all along he had tried to make sure that anything he passed to the President didn't cause the President any personal problems.

32a Transcript, April 16, 1973, 10:00-10:40 a.m.,

Page

32b p. 810

32c Transcript, April 16, 1973, 10:00-10:40 a.m., .. 219

(34)
On April 27, Petersen reported to the President that Dean's lawyer was threatening that unless Dean got immunity, they would bring "the President in--not this case but in other things." The President told Petersen to use immunity if he needed to get the facts, but there would be no blackmail. It was not until June 25, 1973, while testifying before the Senate Select Committee that Dean stated the President had prior knowledge of the cover-up.

33a  Transcript, April 27, 1973, 5:37-5:43 p.m., p. 1261, 1276... 224

(35)
On March 1, 1974, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against seven individuals charging all defendants with one count of conspiracy in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371 and charging some of the defendants with additional charges of perjury, making false declarations to a grand jury or court, making false statements to agents of the FBI and obstruction of justice.

34a Indictment, U. S. District Court for D. C.,
U. S. v. John N. Mitchell et al., Cr. 74-110,
STATEMENT OP INFORMATION

AND

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

SUBMITTED ON BEHALF

OF THE PRESIDENT

EVENTS FOLLOWING

THE WATERGATE BREAK-IN

June 19, 1972 -- March 1, 1974

(37)
1. On Monday, June 19, 1972, two days after the break-in of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters, Dean contacted Liddy and Liddy told Dean the men caught in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters were Liddy's men and that Magruder had pushed him to do it. Dean asked Liddy if anyone from the White House was involved and Liddy told Dean no.

la Dean 3 SSC 933.

(39)
fensive and stated that he was merely on his payroll as a consultant because Ehrlichman had so requested. He asked me to determine if Hunt was still on his payroll and I said I would check. Colson also expressed concern over the contents of Hunt's safe. Several weeks later—probably 4 or 5—I learned from Brien, who was representing the reelection committee, that he had learned from Air. Hunt's attorney, Mr. William Bittman, that Hunt and Colson spoke on the telephone over the weekend of June 18, and that Hunt had told Colson to get the materials out of his-Hunt's—safe.

Air. Thur Sloan called me to tell me he was worried. At that time I knew of no reason why Sir. Sloan should be worried so I told him not to worry. He told me that he would like to meet with me and I told him that I was trying to find out what had happened and requested we meet in a few days I do not recall the precise date we did meet.

I next contacted Liddy and asked him to meet with me. He said he would come to my office. As he came into the office I was on my way out. I suggested we take a walk. It was shortly before noon and we walked down 16th Street toward the Corcoran Gallery.

I will try to reconstruct the conversation to the best of my memory. While I cannot recall every detail, I do indeed recall the major items we discussed.

Mr. Liddy told me that the men who had been arrested in the DSC were his men and he expressed concern about them. I asked him why he had men in the DSC and he told me that Magruder had pushed him into doing it. He told me that he had not wanted to do it but Magruder had complained about the fact that they were not getting good information from a bug they had placed in the DISC sometime earlier. He then explained something about the steel structure of the Watergate Office Building that was inhibiting transmission of the bug and that they had gone into the building to correct this problem. He said that he had reported to Magruder that during the earlier entry of the DSC offices they had seen documents—which I believe he told me were either Government documents or classified documents—and Magruder had told him to make copies of those documents.

Liddy was very apologetic for the fact that they had been caught and that Mr. McCord was involved. He told me that he had used Mr. McCord only because Magruder had cut his budget so I did not. I asked him why one of the men had a check from Mr. Howard Hunt and he told me that these men were friends of Hunt and Hunt had put him in touch with them. I do not ret all Liddy discussing any further involvement of Hunt, other than Hunt's putting him in touch with the Cubans. I asked him if anyone from the White House was involved and he told me no.

As the conversation ended he again expressed his apology and his concern about the men in jail. I told him I couldn't help and he said he understood. He also told me that he was a soldier and would never talk. He said if anyone wished to shoot him on the street, he was ready. As we parted I said I would be unable to discuss this with him further. He said he understood and I returned to my office.

After returning to my office I arranged a meeting with Ehrlichman in his office for mid-afternoon. (Torsion Strachan came to my office shortly after I had met with Liddy. Strachan told me that he had been
2. John Dean testified that on June 18, 1972, one day after the break-in of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters, 'the cover-up was already in effect, in being. " Dean testified he was in on the cover-up from the very beginning. Dean concurred with Senator Gurney that the cover-up "grew like Topsy, and Dean was a part of it. " When questioned if he advised the President of what was going on, Dean responded that the first time he ever talked to the President was September 15, 1972: some three months

2a Dean 4 SSC, 1357.
2b Dean 3 SSC, 1026*
Would you tell how you inherited the coverup?

Mr. DEAN didn't hear the Senator. Inherited?

Senator GURNEY. YOU said yesterday in response to questioning from Sir. Dash, you said that you inherited the coverup of Watergate.

Mr. DENN. I had heard or inherited?

Senator GURNEY. I understand inherited.

Mr. DEAN. That is correct.

When I came back to the office on the 18th and talked to Mr. Strachan, I realized that the coverup already in effect, in being, and I realized that when Mr. Strachan told me of the documents that he had destroyed and Mr. Haldemans instruction, that there certainly wasn't going to be a revelation of the White House involvement in the matter. I didn't at that point in time know the potentials of the White House involvement.

Senator GURNEY. Was not one of the first meetings of the coverup held in John Mitchell's apartment on the 19th of June?

Mr. Ha. Senator, I would say that the day of, to my knowledge, the day of the 19th at the White House was a very busy day. That the calls I received from Mr. Ehrlichman, from Mr. Colson, the meetings I had with Mr. Ehrlichman and then again later with Mr. Colson about the, s3fe were long before I went to the meeting at Mr. Mitchell apartment, which I do not recall was on the 19th or 20th. I do recall a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, but I do not recall specifically which day it was I recall arriving late at the meeting, and I cannot recall with any specificity any of the discussions at the meeting.

Senator GURNEY. Well, what you are saying is then that these several phone calls you had with all of these people really had to do with at least the beginnings of the coverup, is that right?

Mr. DEAN. That is correct. I recall arriving late at the meeting, and I cannot recall with any specificity any of the discussions at the meeting.

Senator GURNEY. Well, what you are saying is then that these several phone calls you had with all of these people really had to do with at least the beginnings of the coverup, is that right?

Mr. DEAN. That is correct.

Senator GURNEY. Well, what you are saying is then that these several phone calls you had with all of these people really had to do with at least the beginnings of the coverup, is that right?

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Senator GURNEY. Well, what you are saying is then that these several phone calls you had with all of these people really had to do with at least the beginnings of the coverup, is that right?
that certainly was not an occasion to tall; to the President about anything because his former law partners were in the office, Firs. Nixon was in the office, there were several notaries or one notary there, some
Arr. DEAN. Well, YOU would have to go back into the time sequence again. There was a request for any and all available cash far before they started speaking of the $350,000 cash fund, when Mr. Kalmbach was collecting the cash. Arr. Stans had some money that was used. They were looking any-where they could look to find any available cash. It •. as at this point, I knew that I had the 615,00(} in my safe and I decided at that time that I was not going to let that money be used for that purpose, because I did not want to become further involved in that particular aspect of the coverup.

Mr. DASH. And you made that decision despite the fact that you had been a key figure in getting Afr. Kalmbach involved in the original payof-.

Mr. DEAN. That is correct. ~ ; ~

Mr. DASH. Now, in your statement you have described a number of meetings and activities occurring immediately after the arrest of the CRP burglars in the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate on June 17,197°, and continuing for several months thereafter, involving such persons as Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Colson, Mr. Mardian, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, Mr. Magruder, yourself, and others. Isn't it your testimony that this flurry of activity represented a massive coverup operation to prevent the prosecutors, the FBI, and the, public from learning of the involvement of high White House or CRP officials, either in the Watergate break-in or embarrassing earlier illegal activities of a similar nature such as the Ellsberg break-in?

Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Afr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. And did not this coverup require a number of strategies such as perjury and subordination of perjury of Ma gruder, Porter, and others, and the undermining of the judicial process and payoffs to indicted defendants to maintain their silence thereby limiting the FBI inquiry so they would not stumble on other illegal intelligence activities of the White House ?

Mr. DEAN. That is correct.

Mr. ~DASz. And is it not true that you played a role in all of these coverup activities?

Mr. DEAN. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Did you do these things on your own initiative, Afr. Dean, or at the direction of an, body else ? ;

Air. Dean. I would have to say that to describe it I inherited a situation. The coverup was in operation when I returned to my office on Monday, the ninth, and it just became the instant way of life at that point in time. and I participated in that and engaged in these activities along with the others.
Atr. Ehrlichman, I was taking instructions and suggestions from Air. Mitchell and Mr. Mardian.

I was a conveyor of messages back and forth between each group and at times. I was making suggestions myself.

Mr. DASH. Afr. Dean. I don't think the record is clear from the statement. You held an impressive title Counsel to the Presidents and I understand had quite a big office. But could you tell us just what in
3. Dean did not meet with the President until approximately three months after the Democratic National Committee Headquarters break-in. The allegation that Dean informed the President of an illegal cover-up on September 15, 1972, is based exclusively on the testimony of Dean. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee, Dean stated he was "certain after the September fifteenth meeting that the President was fully aware of the cover-up." However, in answering questions of Senator BainerJ he modified this by agreeing that it was an "inference" of his. Later Dean admitted he had no personal knowledge that the President knew on September fifteenth about a cover-up of Watergate.

3a Dean 4 SSC 1435............
3b Dean 4 SSC 1475...........................
3c Dean 4 SSC 1482......................

(45)
Senator Is-orYE.

Why,, sir X

Air. DEAN. I thought they were very incriminating to the President of the United States.

Senator Is-osYE. Mr., Chairman, this is not part of the questioning, but could you advise this committee what sort of information your received 7

Mr. Dean-. Well, I have recalled most of it in my testimony regarding the conversation on clemency for Mr. Hunt, the million dollar conversation, when the President told me that it would be no problem to raise ~.1 million on the 13th. I did not think documents like this should be around the White House, because the White House had a similar problem as far as information getting out.

Senator Isolate. Did you discuss this September 1a meeting with anyone at that time or at any time since e

Atr. DEAN-. I believe when I came out of the meeting I told Mr. Fielding of my office that I had spent about 30 or 40 minutes with the President and Mr. Fielding did not have full knowledge of my activities at this time. But I told him that fact that the meeting had occurred and that the President seemed very pleased with the job that I had been doing thus far. I think Air. Fielding probably had a general awareness about the specifics of the fact that I was involved in assisting with the coverup.

Senator INOUYE. You have indicated in your testimony that you were certain after the September 1a meeting that the President was fully aware of the coverup, did you not?

Mr. DE Em. Yes, sir. s

Senator INOUYE. And you further testified that you believed that you had on your spurs in handling the cover up by February 97, m-hen
you were told by the President that you would report to him directly.

Is that not correct?

Mr. Dean-. I do not believe I used the word "my spurs." I think that another characterization. I said I thought I had earned my stripes.

Senator INOUYE. If that was the case, why did you feel it necessary on February 27 to tell the President that you had been participating in a coverup and, therefore, might be chargeable with obstruction of justice?

Mr. DEAN. Because on the preceding day, he had indicated to me that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were principals and I was wrestling with what he meant by that. I wanted him to know that I felt also that I was a principal. So I wanted him to be able to assess whether it could be objective in reporting directly to him on the matter.

Senator INOUYE. If the President was aware on September 1a of the coverup, was he not aware that you were implicated also?

Mr. DEAN. I would think so, but I did not understand his remark at the time.

Senator INOUYE. Then, why was it necessary on February 27 to advise him that you were guilty of obstruction of Justice?

Mr. DEAN. Because as I said Senator, when he mentioned the fact that Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman were principals, I did not understand what he meant. I wanted to make it clear to him that I felt I also had legal problems and I had been involved in obstruction of justice. Any time I was in the oval office, I did not want to withhold anything from the President at any time and felt that and informa

(46)
Mr. DEAN. The call came to my secretary, as I recall, and she said, "You have been asked to come to the oval office" so I do not recall who made the call but it was one of the secretaries who conveyed those types of messages.

Senator BARER. ~11 right, go ahead, sir.

Mr. DEAN-. When I entered the office I can recall that—you have been in the office, you know the way there are two chairs at the side of the President's desk.

Senator BAKER. You are speaking of the oval office?

Mr. DEAN-. Of the oval office. As you face the President on the lefthand chair Atir. Haldeman was sitting and they had obviously been immersed in a conversation and the President asked me to come in and I stood there for a moment.

He said, "Sit down n" and I sat on a chair on the other side.

Senator BAKER. You sat in the right-hand chair?

Atir. DE &X. I sat on the right-hand chair.

Senator BARER. That is the one he usually says no to, but go ahead.

Mr. DEAN. I was unaware of that. [Laughter.

Senator BAKER. Go ahead, Mr. Dean.

Mr. DEAN.-. As I tried to describe in my statement, the reception was very warm and very cordial. There was some preliminary pleasantries, and then the next thing that I recall the President very clearly saying to me is that he had been told by Atir. Haldeman that he had been kept posted or made aware of my handling of the various aspects of the Watergate case and the fact that the case, you know, the indictments had now been handed down, no one in the White House had been indicted, they had stopped at Liddy.

Senator BARER. Stop, stop, stop just for one second. Let's examine those particular words just for a second. That no one in the White House had been indicted. Is that as near the exact language—I don't know so I am not laing a trap for you, I just want to know.

Atir. DEAN-. Yes, there was a reference to the fact the indictments had been handed down and it was quite obvious that no one in the White House had been indicted on the indictments that had been handed down.

Senator BARER. Did he say that, though?

Sir. DEAN-. Did he say that no one in the White House had been handed down? I can't recall it. I can recall a reference to the fact that the indictments were now handed down and he was aware of that and the status of the indictments and expressed what to me was a pleasure to the fact that it had stopped at Mr. Liddy.

Senator BARER. Tell me what he said.

Mr. DEAN. Well, as I sax, he told me I had done a good job—

Senator BARER. No., let's talk about the pleasure. He expressed pleasure the indictments had stopped at Mr. Liddy.

Can you just for the purposes of our information tell me the language that he used?
Air. DE.AN. Senator, let me make it very clear the pleasure that it had stopped there is an inference of mine based on as I told Senator Gurney yesterday, the impression I had as a result of the, of his, complimenting me.

(47)
Senator BAKER. But in an effort to summarize it and, believe me, I am not trying to distort the meaning of your testimony by summary, but, in effect, you drew inferences from the totality of this conversation and the circumstances and relationships as you knew it, you drew inferences from that that led you to believe that on September 15 the President knew something about at least the efforts to counter the Watergate and possibly, in fact, about Watergate itself.

Mr. DEAN. That is correct.

Senator BAKER. But there is no direct statement about Watergate, CRP involvement, the President's knowledge of there is no category 1 information about that?

Air. DEAN. Other than as I have recited and I have chosen not to place interpretations on these, Senator.

Senator BAKER. Thank you, Sir. Dean.

- I think that that information is very useful, then. You understand, Mr. Dean, that in the course of things, we are going to explain further the content of that meeting and the perceptions that the other parties had of that meeting.

Mr. DEAN-. I understand.

Senator BARR. AS YOU know, Stir. Haldeman will be a witness before this committee. The only other person present was the President. I am not prepared to say at this point how we may be able to gain access to the President's knowledge and perception of that meeting. But in a three-way meeting I think it is important to this committee that we have all the information we can t et. So the information you; have just given me in rather good detail will now be structured alongside!S~:sid. with the rest of the record to test against the testimony of Mr. Haldeman and hopefully against statements by the President, in whatever manner that can be arranged.

Now,. what is the time of your next meeting with the President?

Sir. DEAN-. On this subject ?

Senator BAKER. I would like to go into that.

Before you do, let me reiterate, the focus of my inquiry is on what did the President know

Mr. DEAN. As I say, this agenda went directly to the President.

Senator BAKER (continuing)]. And when did he know it.

Mr. DEAN-. That is correct.

Senator BARR. SO as you go into your testimony and as you refer to the several documents that I believe you have before you. try to keep in mind that I am not at this moment talking about other matters and details. I am not talking about F, Ellsberg at this point. or the enemy list.
I am talking about what the President knew.
So tell me what
4. On May 22, 1973, the President stated that the bugging
and burglary of the Democratic National Committee was a complete
surprise and that he had no prior knowledge that persons
associated with his campaign had planned such activities. On
March 21, 1973, John Dean told the President that no one at the
White House **knew of the plans to break** in the Democratic
National Committee.
records having been removed with the change of administra-
tions and which bore directly on the negotiations then in
progress. Additional assignments included tracing down
other national security leaks, including one that seriously
compromised the U.S. negotiating position in the SALT
negotiations.

The work of the unit tapered off around the end of
1971. The nature of its work was such that it involved
matters that, from a national security standpoint, were
highly sensitive then and remain so today.

These intelligence activities had no connection with
the break-in of the Democratic headquarters, or the
aftermath.

I considered it my responsibility to see that the
Watergate investigation did not impinge adversely upon
the national security area. For example, on April 18,
1973, when I learned that Mr. Hunt, a former member of
the Special Investigations Unit at the White House, was to
be questioned by the U.S. Attorney, I directed Assistant
Attorney General Petersen to pursue every issue involving
Watergate but to confine his investigation to Watergate
and related matters and to stay out of national security
matters. Subsequently, on April 90, 1973, Attorney
General Kleindienst informed me that because the
Government had clear evidence that Air. Hunt was
involved in the break-in of the office of the psychiatrist
who had treated Afr. Ellsberg, he, the Attorney General,
believed that, despite the fact that no evidence had been
obtained

. n Hunt's acts, a report should nevertheless be made
to the court trying the Ellsberg case I concurred, and
directed that the information be transmitted to Judge
Byrne immediately.

WATERGATE

The burglary and bugging of the Democratic National
Committee headquarters came as a complete surprise to
me. I had no inkling that any such illegal activities had
been planned by persons associated with my campaign; if
I had known, I would not have permitted it. My
immediate reaction was that those guilty should be
brought to justice, and, with the five burglars
themselves already in custody, I assumed that they would
be.

Within a few days, however, I was advised that there
was a possibility of CIA involvement in some way.

It did seem to me possible that, because of the
involvement of former CIA personnel, and because of
some of their apparent associations, the investigation
could lead to the uncovering of covert CIA operations
totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in.

In addition, by this time, the name of Mr. Hunt had
surfaced in connection with Watergate, and I was alerted
to the fact that he had previously been a member of the
Special Investigations Unit in the White House. There
was also concerned that the Watergate investigation
might well lead to an inquiry into the activities of the
Special Investigations Unit itself.
In this area, I felt it was important to avoid disclosure of the details of the national security matters with which the group was concerned. I knew that once the existence of the group became known, it would lead inexorably to a discussion of these matters, some of which remain, 
**even today, highly sensitive.**

I wanted justice done with regard to Watergate; but in the scale of national priorities with which I had to deal—and not at that time having any idea of the extent of political abuse which Watergate reflected—I also had to be deeply concerned with ensuring that neither the covert operations of the CIA nor the operations of the Special Investigations Unit should be compromised. Therefore, I instructed Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman to ensure that the investigation of the break-in not expose either an unrelated covert operation of the CIA or the activities of the White House investigations unit—and to see what this was personally coordinated between General Walters, the Deputy Director of the CIA, and Atr. Gray of the FBI. It was certainly not my intent, nor my wish, that the investigation of the Watergate break-in or of related acts be impeded in any way.

On July 6, 1972, I telephoned the Acting Director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray, to congratulate him on his successful handling of the hijacking of a Pacific Southwest Airlines plane the previous day. During the conversation Mr. Gray discussed with me the progress of the Watergate investigation, and I asked him whether he had talked with General Walters. Atr. Gray said that he had, and that General Walters had assured him that the CITY was not involved. In the discussion, Mr. Gray suggested that the matter of Watergate might lead higher. I told him to press ahead with his investigation.

It now seems that later, through whatever complex of individual motives and possible misunderstandings, there were apparently wide-ranging efforts to limit the investigation or to conceal the possible involvement of members of the Administration and the campaign committee.

I was not aware of any such efforts at the time. Neither, until after I began my own investigation, was I aware of any fundraising for defendants convicted of the break-in at Democratic headquarters, much less authorize any such fundraising. Nor did I authorize any offer of executive clemency for any of the defendants.

In the weeks and months that followed Watergate, I asked for, and received, repeated assurances that Atr. Dean's own investigation (which included reviewing files and sitting in on FBI interviews with White House Enronnel) had cleared everyone then employed by the White House of involvement.

In summary, then:

1. I had no prior knowledge of the Watergate bugging operation, or of any illegal surveillance activities for political purposes.
2. Long prior to the 1972 campaigns I did set in motion certain internal security measure, including legal
14 were going to be confronted with and Liddy was charged with doing this. We had no knowledge that he was going to bug the DNC. The point is, that is not true? That's right. Magruder did know it was going to take place? Magruder gave the instructions to be back in the DNC. He did? Yes. You know that? Yes. I see. O.K, I honestly believe that no one over here knew that. I know that as God is my maker, I had no knowledge that they were going to do this.

P Bob didn't either, or wouldn't have known that either. You are not the issue involved. Had Bob known, he would be.

D Bob -- I don't believe specifically knew that they were going in there.

P I don't think so.

D I don't think he did. I think he knew that there was a capacity to do this but he was not-given the specific direction.

P Did Strachan know?

(51)

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5. H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman testified before the Senate Select Committee that they did not believe the President had prior knowledge of the break in plans. On March 21, 1973, John Ehrlichman told the President that, on the basis of information he had, no one in the White House had been involved, had notice, had knowledge, participated nor aided or abetted in any way in the Democratic National Committee burglary.

5a Haldeman 7 SSC, 2883...........

5b Ehrlichman 6 SSC, 2769, • • • ............• ........................................................................ 55

5c Transcript, March 21, 1973, 5:20-6:01 p.m.
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been involved in Watergate I was not at all surprised to hear the President say this at the press conference since it was thoroughly consistent with everything that Dean had told me, and I, therefore, find it hard to understand why Mr. Dean now professes to have had such great surprise when he heard this statement.

**COVERUP**

In these hearings and in the general discussion of Watergate, the word "coverup" has come to have a broad and very ill-defined meaning. As John Dean said, the coverup had a broad range. Anything that might cause a problem came within the coverup.

Definition by usage has now come to connote illegal or improper activities — although some steps were taken to contain the Watergate case in several perfectly legal and proper aspects.

One, as the President has stated, was to avoid the Watergate investigation possibly going beyond the facts of the Watergate affair itself and into national security activities totally unrelated to Watergate.

Another was to avoid or at least reduce adverse political and publicity fallout from false charges heearay and so on, arising from various activities in connection with Watergate, such as the Justice Department investigation, the Democratic National Committee suit, the Common Cause suit, the Patman hearings, and the Ervin Committee hearings.

A third was concern for distortion or fabrication of facts in the heat of a political campaign that would unjustly condemn the innocent or prevent discovery of the guilty.

The containment effort, as I would use the term, did not contemplate or involve any acts in obstruction of justice. To the contrary, while hoping to contain the Watergate inquiry to the facts of Watergate, there was a concurrent effort to try to get into the public the true facts of Watergate and get them out to the public. The President frequently cautioned against any coverup of Watergate or even the appearance of a coverup.

On the basis of testimony now before this committee, it appears that there was an effort to cover up, as well as to contain. This coverup appears to have involved illegal and improper activities, such as perjury, payments to defendants for their silence, promises of Executive clemency, destruction of evidence, and other acts in an effort to conceal the truth regarding the planning and commission of crimes at the Watergate.

The critical question then becomes the determination of who committed these acts, who directed them, who was aware of them.

I committed no such acts and directed no such acts and I was aware of no such acts until March of this year, when the President intensified his personal investigation into the facts of Watergate. I am convinced that the President had no awareness of any such acts until March of this year.

The question is asked: How could the President not have known?

Very easily reverse the question. How could the President have known?

Only if he were directly involved himself or if he were told by someone who was either directly involved or had knowledge. The fact...
Mr. EHRLICHMAN?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN?

Senator AIONTOYS. AY11 right. Then how man) interviews did you conduct as a result of your being commissioned by the President to go into this?

Ak. EHRLICHMAN. Well, let me refer to my list again. Ten.

Senator SIOXTOY \. Ten ?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTOYA. How long did it take you to conduct these interviews ?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, I did this in the period between April 5 and April 14.

Senator MONTOYA The President indicated that he had also—

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Excuse me, I am sorry, Senator, A-

April 15, I bet your pardon because I saw Mr. Strachan at 9 oclock on Sunday morning the 15th.

Senator MONTOYA.- All right.

Nova, what was this statement of the President all about when he stated that on March 91 as a result of serious charges ' which came to my attention, some of which were publicly reported, I began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter.

What did he mean by that ?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, I think what he meant by that was the series of events starting March 21 and culminating April 17 which would have been his conversation with Mr. Dean on the 21st; the McCord letter to Judge Sirica on what, the 23d or whatever it was; his sending Mr. Dean to Camp David to write out his statement; Mr. Dean's return without the statement; his turning the investigation over, taking it from Mr. Dean, his turning the inquiry over to me; my efforts to talk to witnesses through this time: the parallel efforts. and I don't mean to in any way diminish the efforts of the investigators in the Department of Justice and in the prosecutor's office who were doing an extrodinarily effective job right at this time.

You see, when I talked to Afr. Magruder. for instance, he had already been to see the U.S.. attorney and told him everything as a result of their efforts. So these were all parallel efforts going on and there was a lot of reporting The President had his meeting with the Attorney General and Afr. Petersen on that Sunday, and they compared notes as to all of these investigations, and then this all came to a head on that following Tuesday.

Senator MONTOYA. Would you then say that up until March you were convinced, and the President was convinced in the White House that there was no White House involvement ?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTOYA. You were convinced up to that time ?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes, sir, and I was saying that all across the country because I believed it.

Senator MONTOYA And you kept saying this to the President on the basis of information which you were receiving from Mr. Dean and others ?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. In the best of faith,
Right, right. However in terms of this, what about a solution? We are damned by the courts before Ervin even gets started.

E The only thing we can say is that we have investigated it backwards and forwards in the White House, and have been satisfied on the basis of the report we had that nobody in the White House has been involved in a burglary, nobody had notice of it, knowledge of it, participated in the planning, or aided or abetted it in any way. And it happens to be true as for that transaction.

P John, you don't think that is enough?

D No, Mr. President.

E

P

H

Let's try another concomitant to that. Supposing Mitchell were to step out on that same day to say, "I have been doing some investigation at 1701 and I find - so and so and so and so." Such as what? I don't know what he would say, but that he wanted to be some kind of a spokesman for 1701. What the hell does one disclose that isn't doing to blow something? I don't have any time. I am sorry. I have to leave. Well, goodbye. You meet what time tomorrow? I am not sure. In the morning probably.
John Mitchell testified before the Senate Select Committee that the President did not know of either the burglary plans or the cover-up. Richard Moore testified before the Senate Select Committee that as a result of his meetings with the President and Dean on March 20, 1973, he concluded that the President had no knowledge that anyone in the White House was involved in the Watergate affair and John Dean told him as they departed that he had never told the President.
I know the individual, I know his reactions to things and I have a very strong feeling that during the period of time in which | I was in association with him and did I talk to him on the telephones that I just do not believe that he had that information or had that knowledge.~e; otherwise, I think the type of conversations we had would have brought it out.

Air. D.~sl~. Generally is it fair to say that much of your opinion that you express is based on your faith in the President and your knowledge of the man, rather than any specific statement the President made to you or that you made to the President?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I subscribe to the first two. I do have faith in the President and I do think I have knowledge of the man and I do think there were enough discussions in the area in the general area, to the point where I think the general subject matter would have come out if the President had had knowledge.

Mr. DASH. Well, non, Mr. Mitchell, you did become aware, as you have indicated, somewhere around June 21 or 22, when you were briefed or debriefed by Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian about the so-called—as you described it, the White House horrors of the Liddy operation and the break-in. Did you, yourself as the President's ad and counselor, tell the President what you knew or what you learned?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir, I did not.

Air. DASH. Why didn’t you?

MITCHELL. Because I did not believe that it was appropriate for him to have that type of knowledge, because I knew the actions that he would take and it would be most detrimental to his political campaign.

Mr. DASH. Could it have been actually helpful or healthy, do you think?

Mr. MITCHELL. That was not my opinion at the particular time. He was not involved; it wasn’t a question of deceiving the public as far as Richard Nixon was concerned, and it was the other people that were involved in connection with these activities, both in the White House horrors and the Watergate. I believed at that particular time, and maybe in retrospect, I was wrong, but it occurred to me that the best thing to do was just to keep the lid on through the election.

Air. DASH. Then it is your testimony that you in fact did not say anything to the President at that time

Mr. MITCHELL. o. sir, I did not.

Mr. DASH. SO whether the President had any knowledge of it, it certainly couldn’t have come from his lack of knowledge or knowledge, from any statement that you made to him?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct, Mr. Dash.

MR. DASH. NOW, were you an-aré of the fact that actually prior to Magruder’s testimony Mr. Dean rehearsed Magruder for his testimony before the grand jury?

Air. MITCHELL. I do not recall that. Mr. Dash, if you are talking about the testimony that too’s place on the—

Sir. DASH. In August.

MITCHELL. the second appearance.

Sir. DASH. The second appearance.
On March 10, I was called to meet with the President and Air. Dean
in the President’s Executive Office Building office. The President
reiterated his desire to get out a general statement in advance of the
hearings. He asked us to be thinking about ways that this could be
done. This would include or could include issuing a full statement or
"White Paper"; he was also interested in our thoughts about ways to
resell our story to the Senate in terms of possible depositions,
affidavits, or possible conferences or meetings which would give the
Senate all the information it wished but which would not cut across
the separation of powers. He asked Dean and me to consider ways to
do this.

Now, late on March 19, or possibly on March before we met
later that day with the President—Mr. Dean told me that Howard Hunt
was demanding that a large sum of money be given to him before
his sentencing on March 3, and that he wanted the money by
Wednesday, the 9th. If the payment were not made, Dean said, Hunt
had threatened to say things that would be very serious for the
White House. I replied that this was pure blackmail, and that Dean
should turn it off and have nothing to do with it. I could not imagine I
said, that anything that Hunt could say would be as bad as entering
into a blackmail arrangement. I don’t recall Mr. Dean’s exact words,
but he expressed agreement.

This revelation was the culmination of several other guarded
comments Air. Dean had made to me in the immediately preceding
days. He had said that he had been present at two meetings attended by
Messrs. Mitchell, Magruder, and Liddy before the bugging arrests,
during which Liddy had proposed wild schemes that had been turned
down—specifically espionage electronics surveillances and even
kidnapping. He said that the Watergate location had not been
mentioned, and that he had turned off the wild schemes. I believed
then and believe today that Air. Dean had no advance knowledge of
the Watergate bugging and break-in. In addition, he said that if he ever
had to testify before the grand jury, his testimony would conflict with
Mr. Magruder, and that he had heard that if Magruder faced a
perjury charge he would take others with him.

Mr. Dean had also mentioned to me in these days in March that
earlier activities of Messrs. Hunt and Liddy—not directly related to
Watergate—were seriously embarrassing to the administration if they ever
came to light. He had also implied to me that he knew of payments
being made to the defendants for litigation expenses, and Hunt’s
explicit blackmail demand raised serious questions in my mind as to
the purpose of these payments.

This brings me to the afternoon of March 20, when Mr. Dean and I
met with the President in the Oval Office. The meeting lasted about
half an hour. The President again stated his hope that we could put out
a full statement in advance of the hearings. and again he expressed his
desire that we be forthcoming, as he put it. He made some comparisons
as to our attitude and the attitude of previous administrations, and he
wanted us to make sure that we were the most forthcoming of all.

As I sat through the meetings of March 20 with the President and
Air. Dean in the Oval Office, I came to the conclusion in my own mind that the President could not be aware of the things that Dean was
worried about or had been hinting, to me, let alone Howard Hunt’s
blackmail demand. Indeed (as the President talked about getting the whole story out)—as he had repeatedly in the recent meeting— it seemed crystal clear to me that he knew of nothing that was inconsistent with the previously stated conclusion that the White House was UNINVOLVED in the Watergate affair before or after the event.

As we closed the door of the Oval Office and turned into the hall I decided to raise the issue directly with 31:1 Dean. I said that I had the feeling that the President had no knowledge of the things that were going on. Dean replied that he had not, and I asked whether anyone else had. Dean said he didn’t think so. He said, and I use quotation marks to indicate the substance, and I think; these are almost my precise words—I said: "Then the President isn’t being served, he is reaching a point where he is going to have to make critical decisions and he simply has to know all the facts. I think you should go in and tell him what you know, you will feel better, it will be right for him, and it will be good for the country."

I do not recall whether Dean told me he would take action or not, but I certainly had the impression that he was receptive. In any event, the question was resolved that very evening! when I received a call at home sometime after dinner and it was Mr. Dean, who said that the President had just phoned him and that he had decided that this was the moment to speak up. He said that he told the President that things had been going on that the President should know about and it was important that Dean see him alone and tell him. Dean said that the President readily agreed and told Dean to come in the following morning I congratulated Mr. Dean and wished him well.

The next day, March 01. Mr. Dean told me that he had indeed met with the President at 10 o’clock and had talked with him for 2 hours and had in his words: 'Let it all out. I said, 'Did you tell him about the Howard Hunt business?' Dean replied that he had told the President every single thing I asked him if the President had been surprised and he said yes. I say he said yes in terms of his response; whether yes is the exact words, but it was an affirmative statement.

Following this critical on March 21, I had several subsequent meetings and telephone conversations with Mr. Dean alone, as well as several meetings with the President which Arr. Dean did not attend. I do not dispute Mr. Deans account of the meetings between us on any substantive point, and I have no direct knowledge of what transpired in Mr. Dean’s subsequent meetings with the President. But nothing plausible in my meetings or conversations with Mr. Dean or my meetings with the President suggests any way that before March the President had known—or that Mr. r. Dean believed he had known—o, of any insiders’ clues of IVIite white personnel in the bugging or the cover-up. Indeed, Al r. B)ean’s own account that he and I agreed on the importance of persuading the President to make a prompt disclosure of all that the President had just learned is hardly compatible with a belief on At r. Dean’s part that the President himself had known the critical facts all along. In one of my talks with the President, the President said he had kept asking himself whether there had been an, sign or clue which should have led him to discover the true facts earlier. I told him that I wished that I had been more skeptical and inquisitive so that I could have served the Presidency better.
Now, are you saying that this entry is not an accurate reflection of that
meting, +rt?

Mr., AIOC(RE). Axl ell. some of it is reasonably accurate and some
of it I can t recall.

For instance, it does refer to that suggestion about challeng:ilct the
committee to its own investigation. which I stated. I think; I stated in
various languages, various words(1s at various times, that the President
indicated his desire to ~~~~~,et the whole statement out about the
whole thing an(l that we agreed. I think; probably—I don’t know
whether Al r. bean raised the question about waiting until after the
sentencing, but there was. I recall no firm decision on that.

Mitchell’s problems with the grand jury—grand jury and Vesco—I
don’t think there was any discussion of that. I don’t know- about whether
Mr., Dean reporte(i something going up there or something. I don’t
know. I don’t recall at that meeting and I wonder whether the lon r an(l
short of it was whether Atr. Dean s logs show whether Ak. Dean had
another meeting with the Presi(lellt that day. Maybe you have
something there. And I am not sure whether we got there) at the
same time.

Arr. LENZNER. Let me ask you this. MR...

MOORE.

You did( testif) that when you left the Oval Office on March ()0. I
concluded the President could not be aware of the things that Mr. r.
Dean was worried about. Norr. did that include, for example, the threat
by Atr. Hunt to blackmail the White House.? ?

Mr., MOORE. Yes.

LENZNER, ExXzER Did it also include the earlier activities of Hunt—m and
Sk. Liddy that Mr., Dean had also indicated could be embar rassing
to the White House 2

Mr., MOORE. I had no laundry list in my mind. I had—except the
Howard Hunt matter. but the t ener al feeling that the man in that Oval
Office who was telling, us so stron,tly that anything,r anybody knew
should be disclosed as soon as possible and we should ret the story out,
and he had said it before, that this was utterly incompatible with his
having knowledge. prior knowledge.+re of any of these things, and that
is what I said. when I left I said, "John," I pointed into that room. I said,
"the President doesn’t know the kind of things that you are talking,
about and worrying about. Have you told him)" and so forth.

You have heard the story.

Mr., LENZNER Tes. sir.

Mr., MOORE. And it was a sense that this man with this this frame of
mind and with a desire to tell the wh()le story whatever it was, didn’t t
know the whole story, didn t have an,>thin<~~~~ of the whole story.
That was my conviction.

A[r]I{Z}:XZXER An {L take it inclu(ling the things done.
He was telling you about Hunt and Liddy’s s activities I think

Mr., Moore. TlIE whole field of suspicion and knowledge,te and( l)roblem that
seem to be lying there.

Mr., LENZNER. Mr. MOORE. do you a(gree now that your understanding of the Presi(lent s
information and knowle(kre was basically inco rect? That he did, in
fact. have information by that meetin(> on March ’20 concerning Mr.,
Strachan and also l)ossil----ie involvement in Watergate
7. After the second meeting in Mitchell's office on February 19, 1972, the modified Liddy plan was turned down and Dean concluded the plan was at an end. Dean later met with Haldeman and advised Haldeman that the White House should have nothing to do with any such activity. Haldeman agreed.
--I assumed the Liddy plan was dead in that it would never be approved. I recall Liddy coming into my office in late February or early March on a matter relating to the election laws. He started to tell me that he could not get his plan approved and I reminded him that I would not discuss it with him. He stopped talking about it, and we went on with our business.

I have thought back over the sequence of events and tried to determine if I in any way encouraged Mr. Liddy and his intelligence plans.

I am certain of this did not encourage him to develop illegal techniques, because I was unaware he was developing such plans.

Between the meeting in Mitchell’s office on February 1, 1972, and June 19, 1972, I had no knowledge of what had become of Liddy’s proposal. I did receive a memorandum from Magruder on March 26, 1972 that indicated that Liddy was doing some investigative work for Magruder, but nothing that appeared illegal. Let me explain.

During the first week of March 1972, Larry Hirshman, Assistant to the President, called me to request for Haldeman any information that Caulfield could come up with regarding the funding of the Democratic Convention in Miami. On March 1a, 1972, I forwarded a newspaper article that Caulfield had discovered on subjects later that day Magruder brought, that to me a copy of a memorandum from Liddy to Mitchell regarding an investigation Liddy had conducted—using Howard Hunt—in Florida. I called Higby and he said that Magruder had already given him a copy. I told Higby that I did not see anything illegal by the Democrats based on the information in the memorandum. I made a notation on the bottom of the memorandum from Mr. Liddy, but I did nothing further and heard nothing further from Higby on the subject.

I have submitted to the committee the documents I have just referred to.

(The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 31 14*.*]

Mr. DEAN— I shall now turn to the events following the Watergate incident of June 17, 1972 and begin by telling the committee how I first learned of the incident.

I will skip the first part here explaining how I ended up being out of the country when the decision was made in late May and returned on June 18, from the Far East.

FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF WATERGATE INCIDENT

In late MAY of 1972 the Bureau of NARCOTICS and Dangerous Drugs asked me to deliver a graduation address at its Training School in Manila, Philippines, on Saturday, June 1 (1972). I notified Mr. Alex Butterfield, pursuant to White House procedures for staff contemplating foreign travel, on June a, and I informed Mr. Butterfield that I planned to depart on June 14 and return on June 18 and that the trip had been cleared by the State Department, the National Security Council, and Bud Krogh (who had responsibility for the drug program on the White House Domestic Council). Mr. Butterfield also approved the trip and I departed for Manila on June 14.

See p. 1151.
Mr. Liddy concluded his presentation by saying that the plan would cost approximately $1 million.

I do not recall Magruder's reaction during the presentation plan because he was seated beside me but I do recall Mitchell's reaction to the Mission Impossible plan. He was amazed. At one point I gave him a look of bewilderment and he winked. Knowing Mitchell, I did not think he would throw Liddy out of the office or tell him he was out of his mind, rather he did what I expected. When the presentation was completed, he took a few long puffs on his pipe and told Liddy that the plan he had developed was not quite what he had in mind and the cost was out of the question. He suggested to Liddy he go back and revise his plan, keeping in mind that he was most interested in the demonstration problem.

I remained Mitchell's office for a brief moment after the meeting ended, as the charts were being taken off the easel and disassembled and Mitchell indicated to me that Mr. Liddy's proposal was out of the question. I joined Magruder and Liddy and as we left the office I told Liddy to destroy the charts. Mr. Liddy said that he would revise the plans and submit a new proposal. At that point I thought the plan was dead because I doubted if Mitchell would reconsider the matter. I rode back to my office with Liddy and Magruder but there was no further conversation of the plan.

The next time I became aware of any discussions of such plans occurred, I believe, on February 4, 1972. Magruder had scheduled another meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office on a revised intelligence plan. I arrived at the meeting very late and when I came in, Mr. Liddy was presenting a scaled down version of his earlier plan. I listened for a few minutes and decided I had to interject myself into the discussions. Arr. Mitchell, I felt, was being put on the spot. The only polite way I thought I could end the discussions was to inject that these discussions could not go on in the Office of the Attorney General of the United States and that the meeting should terminate immediately.

At this point the meeting ended. I do not know to this day who kept pushing for these plans. Whether Liddy was pushing or whether Magruder was pushing or whether someone was pushing Mr. Liddy, I do not know. I do know, in hindsight, that I should have been as polite as I was in merely suggesting that Liddy destroy the charts after the first meeting. Rather, I should have said forget the plan completely. After I ended the second meeting I told Liddy that I would never again discuss this matter with him. I told him that if any such plan were approved, I did not want any part of it, nor would I have any part of it.

After this second meeting in Mitchell's office, I sought a meeting with Mr. Haldeman to tell him what was occurring but it took me several days to get to see him. I recall that Higby got me into Haldeman's office when another appointment had been canceled or postponed. I told Haldeman what had been presented by Liddy and told him I felt it was incredible, unnecessary, and unwise. I told him that no one at the White House should have anything to do with this. I said that the reelection committee will need an ability to deal with demonstrations, it did not need burglars, muggers, prostitutes, and kidnappers. Haldeman agreed and told me I should have no further dealings on the matter.
Magruder reported to Strachan that a sophisticated political intelligence gathering system" had been approved.

Strachan included this item in a memo containing approximately 30 other items directed to Haldeman. Attached at tab "H" of this report were examples of the type information being developed and identified by the code name "Sedan Chair. " Magruder and Reisner testified "Sedan Chair" involved a disgruntled campaign worker from the Humphrey Pennsylvania Organization who passed information to Committee to Re-Elect the President. Porter deemed this activity surreptitious but not illegal.

8a. Strachan 6 SSC, 2441,........2452,

8b

8c Reisner 2 SSC, 499, 500

8d Porter 2 SSC, 6,0-671
that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean were shocked by Liddy's plan; Mr. Magruder's staff man Gordon Lid(lV~~~ was apparentl,Sr quite humiliated, and nothing was approved. In other words, if those meetings were routinely reported to Mr.. Haldeman as evi(lence of Sir. Magruder's administrative ability and judg)inent, the January and February meetings would not very likely inspire the confidence of Mr.. Haldeman or the President.

Yet, Mr. Magruder testified that "as he recalled" he returned to his office after both these embarrassing meeting and routinev called Sir. Haldemans staff assistant, me. and told me about his blunder, presumably so that I could inform Sllr. Haldeman. That testimony is difficult to reconcile with good sense. Presumably, Mr. Magruder knew that Mr.. Dean would report on the meetin gs to Air. Haldeman—as Air. Dean has testified he did—why would Mr.. Magruder want two people reporting the same disaster to Mr.. Haldeman.

It is true, however, that Mr.. Ma gruder called me after he returned from the March 30, 19 f 2. meeting at Key Biscayne with Mr.. Mitchell and Mr.. LaRue and reported 011 about 30 major campaign decisions. Each of these decisions was briefly described in that rather short phone conversation. During this call, he told me, and I am repeating his words rather precisely: " & sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system has been approved with a budget of 300." Unfortunately he neither gave me, nor did I ask for any further details about the subject.

Soon thereafter I- wrote one of my regular "political matters" memos for Air. Haldeman. This particular memo for early April was,^s 8 to 10 pages long with more than a dozen tabs or attachments, but it contained only one three-line paragraph on political intelligence. That paragraph read almost verbatim as Mr.. Magruder had indicated to me over the phone. I wrote in the memo to Mr.. Haldeman—Again this is almost a quote:

Magruder reports that 1701 now has a sophisticated political intelligence- system with a budget of 300. A sample of the type of information they are developing is attached at tab "H".

At tab ", I enclosed a political intelligence report which had been sent to me from the committee. It was entitled Sedan Chair II. This report, and two others somewhat like it that I had received began with a statement such as, 'i t confidential source reveals" or "a reliable source confidentially reports." This was followed by a summary of some political information.

In April 1972, I was mainly interested in reporting to Mr. Haldeman on those 30 campaign decisions and other relevant political items. I did not give much thought to what Sir. Magruder meant by "sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system." Nor did I give much thought to the real identity of Sedan Chair II, but I remember that the information dealt with Senator Humphrey's Pennsylvania organization. •'

However, on June 17. 1972, and afterward, as the news began unfolding about the break-in at the Democratic National Committee, I certainly- began to wonder w ho else but people from 1701 could have been involved. I suspected that maybe the Watergate break-in was part of

the sophisticated political intelligence operation Mr.. Magruder had
that would strike me as far more sensitive a matter to send through the normal messenger channels than some file which other witnesses have indicated was not patently illegai on its face.

Mr. DASH. In other words, what you are saying is that you never did see the Gemstone file, Mr. Magruder never invited you over to see it, and that prior to March 30, you had no knowledge of any so-called Liddy intelligence plan?

Mr. STRACHAN. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Now, did that change, at least a march 30?

If it did, could you tell us how it changed?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes; I was aware that Mr. Magruder would be going down to Key Biscayne to review several campaign decisions that had accumulated during John Mitchell's working on the ITT problem. He called me up in an apparently fairly brief telephone conversation and reviewed the 30 or so pending campaign decisions. I took notes on that telephone conversation and prepared shortly thereafter a political matters memorandum for Mr. Haldeman, summarizing that telephone conversation as well as other information.

Mr. DASH. And what did that include? I mean did it include a Liddy intelligence plan? ;

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes; Mr. Magruder told me that a sophisticated political intelligence gathering system had been approved and I reported that to Mr. Haldeman.

Mr. DASH. Were you aware that that was one of the items for decision that went down to Key Biscayne with Mr. Magruder?

Mr. STRACHAN. No; I was not.

Mr. DASH. So that it was after he came back that he reported that to you?

Mr. STRACHAN. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Can you recall approximately when he made that, to you?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, it was shortly thereafter, I would guess either Friday, March 31, maybe Saturday. My secretary recalls having typed the memorandum on Friday.

Mr. DASH. And it is clear in your mind that Mr. Magruder reported that Mr. Mitchell had in fact approved a sophisticated intelligence plan?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well. I concluded that Mitchell had approved it. I believe that when Mr. Magruder was going through the decisions and the way I would usually report it to Mr. Haldeman would be that Mr. Magruder reports that Mr. Mitchell has approved the following matters and I would put a colon, and then I would list the items.

Mr. DASH. But did you do it with regard to this plan?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes; that was one of the items.
Mr. DVSH. I think: in your statement you referred to a sophisticated intelligence system with a budget of 300. Three hundred what?

Mr. STRACHAN SS. Well. it is $300,000. On almost all of the memorandum that I wrote to Mr. Haldeman I would leave off the last three zeroes, because usually the figures that we were dealing with were very, very large.

Afr. DASII. Now, you say that you then prepared a political matters memorandum for Mr. Haldeman, and you included this approved
Mr. DASH. Now did you testify before the grand jury under immunity provision?

Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir.

Mr. DASH. When did you most recently testify before the grand jury?

Mr. MAGRUDER. That would have been probably 2 weeks after the April 14 discussion with the prosecutors.

Mr. DASH. What understanding do you have with the prosecutors with regard to your self at this point?

Mr. MAGRUDER. As I understand it, I will plead guilty to a one-count felony charge of conspiracy.

Mr. DASH. And will you be a witness at the criminal trial?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. I have no further questions, Afr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Baker.


As we did on yesterday, we made an effort to rotate the questioning among members of the committee so that the sequence is not exactly the same. We intended to try that again today with the chairman's concurrence and to rearrange the sequence of things in a different way. I will now follow Mr. Dash, I will yield then in our turn to Senator Weicker and Senator Gurney, and instead of minority counsel following after majority counsel, minority counsel will conclude the questioning of this witness.

Mr. Magruder, I am not clear in my mind about who originated the idea of the clandestine intelligence operation and when that was done.

Mr. SI. AGR. Well. Mr. Liddy was brought over to me at the committee in December and I was told that he would handle our intelligence operations, by Mr. Dean. He indicated that Mr. Mitchell had approved this. We did not discuss all detail at that meeting what these operations would be.

Senator B. BAKER. Did you discuss electronic eavesdropping?

Mr. MAGRUDER. No, we did not.

Senator BAKER. Did you discuss the Democratic National Committee?

Mr. MAGRUDER. No, we did not.

Senator BAKER. But the chain of events is that Arr. Dean recommended to you Mr. Liddy.

Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir.

Senator BAKER. It is your understanding that Mr. Mitchell had recommended Mr. Liddy?

Arr. MAGRUDER. My understanding is they had met in November, November 24, Arr. Liddy, Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell and at that time it was agreed he would become our counsel and handle our intelligence operations.

Senator BAKER. What was the nature of your concept of intelligence operations at that point?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, concept of

Senator BAKER. Yes; or Mr. Dean or Mr. Mitchell; if you [~~~n~~~ Mr'. MAGRUDER. I do not know- what their concept was. My concept was simply one of gathering as much information through sources in

the opposition's committee would have been my concept at that time.
- Senator MONTOYA. Now, Mr. Magruder, would you say that you were ac\(lt)aillted with most of these projects that, especially those 011 which you kept a little file known as Gemstone?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, M when you say ac\(lt)aillted

Senator MONTOYA. or\(lt)aillted\(lt)olulvalo of the projects.

Mr. AI\(AG\(RUDER. Well, specifically the Watergate break-in, yes I was specifically aware of that project.

Senator MONTOYA. Did you have anything in your files with respect to Ruby 1?

Mr. MAGRUDER. My recollection of, I think; Ruby 1 and Ruby Q and Crystal were code names. I think that Mr. Liddy used for the various bugs. I am not sure if that is correct. I think that is what it was.

Senator MONTOYA. Can you elaborate or amplify on their significance?

Mr. MAGRUDER. I did not pay any attention to the names at all. It did not interest me.

Senator MONTOYA. Did you have anything in your files with respect to these names?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, when the documents came in those names were in the documents, and I just cannot recall in what context they were in the documents. My recollection was that I thought that they were the positioning that would identify where that bug was, that is what I thought. I would not I could not verify that. I think that is my recollection of what Ruby 1, Ruby Q, and Crystal meant.

Senator MONTOYA. Did you have anything in your files with respect to the Gemstone file?

Mr. MAGRUDER. I did not say that, sir. I said I read the documents but the jargon the jargon that Mr. Liddy used was not of any interest. Actually, Senator, I only read the documents once found them to be useless and did not read them again.

Senator MONTOYA. What about Sedan Chair No. 2?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Sedan Chair 2, to my recollection, was an individual who was in the Humphrey campaign, who had been set up before Mr. Liddy came on board, although that could be incorrect, it may have been after, and was simply a. as I understood it. I think a disgruntled employee who was passing information to us. I just do not know who SedanChair was. He wrote one extensive report that I think Mr. Porter alluded to Humphrey's campaign in Philadelphia.

Senator MONTOYA. now, YOU indicated also in testimony heretofore given that you always assumed that when Mr. Dean acted that he had authority either from Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman, did you not

Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, I think. I said that his normal reporting relationship was either between Mr. Haldeman and 311. F. llicilllnan. T do not know specifically in ever) case whether he was acting, in their behalf.

Senator MONTOYA. But you were under the belief that because he was emp)loved at the White House under these two gentlemen that he was acting for and in their behalf. Is that what you indicated before?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, in general context, yes, sir.

Senator MONTOYA. What particular part did Mr. Dean have in forging
the plan for the coverup?
Mr. REISNER. The total amount, when you added up the amount Mr. Porter had received, seemed to be in the range of $40,000 to $50,000. But that was...

Mr. THOMPSON: N-. Is that what the committee referred to as petty cash at that time?

Mr. REISNER. I referred to it as petty cash until I had assisted Mr. Porter in the activity.

Mr. THOMPSON. And I realized it was greater than you thought.

Mr. REISNER. I am sorry.

Mr. THOMPSON. And you realized that the money he had was more than you thought?

WIT. REISNER. With this exception: It was not petty cash in the sense that there were $7,000 or $8,500 on hand, which is certainly not petty cash. The $40,000 to $50,000 that I am referring to was sums that had accrued from the beginning of the time that there were receipts—July or June of 1971 until March.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mm. How much cash was in the safe?

Mr. REISNER. How much cash at that time? It seems to me it was in the neighborhood of several thousand dollars—perhaps as much as five or six.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did the receipts—do you recall any names of, or any amounts to individuals who were receiving money from Mr. Porter's safe?

Mr. REISNER. Well, I can remember that there were, in addition to Mr. Liddy—I...V, Mr. Liddy was—it was Air. Porter that indicated to me that Mr. Liddy was receiving money. There was an individual who was referred to by a code name and that code name was "Sedan Chair" and that that individual was

Mr. THOMPSON. Sedan Chair? Two words?

Mr. REISNER. Yes. I believe it was actually "Sedan Chair 2."

Mr. THOMPSON: Mm. Was there a Sedan Chair 1?

Mr. REISNER. I do not know. I do not know. Perhaps there was.

There was also an individual who worked for Air. Porter named Roger Stone, I believe received money. And there may have been other individuals.

But to my recollection, which is a little bit vague on this, there was not a regular disbursements with those exceptions.
Mr. REISNER. I do not know I know—well, I mean, I have sort of a general circumstantial understanding of who I think Sedan Chair was.

Air. THOMPSON. Tell us about it.

Mr. REISNER. I will come as close as I can.

Mr. THOMPSON’. Tell us about it.

Mr. REISNER. Subsequent to that, after I learned that there was such an individual, I think I was more alert to the name and I did see a memo in April, I believe, or perhaps May, that purported to be a report from another campaign committee. I believe it was the Humphrey committee. I do not know for a fact who Sedan Chair was. It could have been someone who just simply had his disagreement with the Humphrey committee and wished to report on some of their activities.

Mr. T)HOMPSON. It was someone in the Humphrey committee, from what you can tell?

(72)
Mr. REISNER. From what I can tell, I mean it purported to be.<n
Mr. THOMPSON. How much money was this individual receiving

Mr. REISNER. A15 recollection is that it was approximately a thousand dollars a month, but I could have read that in the newspaper, frankly, it is vague.

Mr. THOMPSON. What about Mr. Liddy?

Mr. REISNER. Mr. Liddy received several disbursements that were considerably larger than that. I think they were in the nature of $5,000 to $8,000, I am not certain. The reason I remember them is that there were—he would return sums of money and it made the accounting somewhat bizarre. He would return $300 after taking out $8,000, that sort of thing. I really am not completely clear on that.

Mr. THOMPSON. Was there any indication as to the total amount Liddy had received to that time?

Mr. REISNER. No, there wasn’t. I have the feeling that the total magnitude, $40,000 to $50,000, means that, and that is the total magnitude of what was recorded. I have no idea. Mr. Porter, I do not think, would have hidden any of what he was recording but I only saw what the receipts were there and Mr. Liddy’s total figure I would think would be in the nature of half of that.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you state when this inventory took place?

Mr. REISNER. In March, later March. I could not pin it down exactly but it was late March.

Mr. THOMPSON. Concerning the money in Mr. Porter’s safe, could you tell either from anything that you saw there in the nature of receipts, from conversations with Mr. Porter, from conversations with anybody else about any other operations or individuals who were being funded, who had been paid money out of the safe of Mr. Porter?

Mr. REISNER. Anything else would be by the nature of a supposition. There is nothing else that

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you know?

Mr. REISNER. It is hard.

Mr. THOMPSON. Or do you know or have any basis for believing that any demonstrations or counter demonstrations were funded?

Mr. REISNER. Yes, there was one occasion in April in which I overheard a conversation. The nature of my job was such that there are pieces of these things that were overheard that after subsequent events they perhaps take some meaning. I was sitting in Mr. Magruder’s office at the time he received a phone call. The phone call concerned the fact that there was a desire to get some counter demonstrators or demonstrators to attend the Hoover funeral, that there was some sort of planned demonstration. It seems to me that that was an activity that Mr. Liddy was then asked to undertake and it seems to me there was some cash in that activity.

Mr. THOMPSON. Magruder asked Liddy to take care of this?

Mr. REISNER. When I say this I say this in an effort to be cooperative because I am talking about only my specific recollection. It may be that that wasn’t carried out or that it was carried out differently from the way in which I heard the conversation and I think only Mr. Porter could be of assistance there. That was the nature of the initial conversation.
Senator RYEICER. Which Senator is this?

Mr. PORTER. Senator Muskie—voted be used as a great front to
go to California and hold tax hearings that would be a great visual
event for Senator Muskie and all at the taxpayers’ expense and he
could get a lot of value for his campaigm

We thought that was rather interesting to say the least, and I told
Mr. Magruder about it. EIC asked me to just copy the memo 011 a, I
believe it was written on plain bond—and send it to Evans and A ovak.

Miss Duncan did that. Miss Duncan typed it and we sent it to
Evans and Novak, and they printed it and the hearings were
held.

Senator WEICKER. All right. Were there other documents or other
instances where Miss Duncan performed services relative to

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir, I believe it was Miss Duncan. On one occa
sion, Senator Muskie’s speech that he was going to deliver in the
Senate against the nomination of William Rehnquist to the Supreme
Court was on the film, and I specifically was—it was about 20 pages
and I asked Arlr. Magruder what he wanted me to do with it. He said,
let me check, and he did check, and he got back to me and said, Mr.
Mitchell would like to see it.

So that had to be completely typed and I had to read—I read off the
film into an IBNI dictaphone, and I believe it was Miss Duncan who
typed that. I believe it was she.

Senator WEICKER. Miss Duncan now being your secretary, is that

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. At any time, did you send Miss Duncan to the
White House to give Gordon Strachan copies of the photographed
documents or the transcripts emanating from those documents’

Mr. PORTER. An not remember, sir, whether I did or not; I do not
remember, It is pos. ~ that I did. If I did, it would have been be
cause Mr. Magruder wo. ‘-a said, take a copy of this over to
Gordon Strachan.

Senator WEICKER. I do want you to think about this answer.

Mr. PORTER. I understand.

Senator WEICKER. I am not trying to mislead you, and if you care to
take a minute or so, just to carefully think about it., please do so. I do
not want to rush you.

Mr. PORTER. I will tell it as I remember it, and I do—let me say
this. Certainly, if Miss Duncan sass that that happened, then it did
happen. I would not dispute anything that she might say.

On the other hand, the only reason that I would send a document over to Mr. Strachan would be at Mr. Magruder’s suggestion or direction. I believe that I do remember sending—I believe there was only one copy of the Rehnquist speech put together—I think—it was so long. However, on the item that appeared that was sent to Evans and Novak, I think perhaps that may have been sent over to Air.

Strachan. I just do not remember, Senator.

Senator WEICKER. And you realized at that time that these various documents—well, let me rephrase my question.

The obtaining of these documents, did you consider them been obtained legally or illegally?

(74)

to have
Mr. PORTER. I remember asking Afr. Vietz. The first question I asked him, I said, “Is this any part of the U.S. mail?” And he said, “No.”

I knew that intercepting the U.S. mail could be a violation of the law I put the photographing of a document in the same category as xeroxing a document. If you are taking a picture of it one way, you are taking a picture of it another way. So I did not think it was illegal. I thought it was very surreptitious, but I did not think it was illegal. Senator WEICKER. You thought it was surreptitious?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. But you did not think it was illegal?

Mr. PORTER. No, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Why, then, did you indicate to your secretary that these were not matters to be discussed?

Mr. PORTER. I think that is, in my opinion, that would be self-evident, Senator Weicker, that you would not go around discussing things like that, the same as you would not go around discussing any kind of information gathering that you might be doing.

Senator WEICKER. Did you indicate to her that if she discussed it, she would be fired?

Mr. PORTER. I do not believe I ever made that statement to her, DO, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Again, let me just ask the question, am I correct in paraphrasing your answer to me that there might have been an instance where you sent material to the White House to Gordon Strachan or am I correct in saying that there were those instances and if so, how many? That is my question.

Mr. PORTER. I cannot remember the exact number of instances that I sent things to Mr. Strachan. Mr. Strachan would get copies addressed to Mr. Haldeman of many things that I did, Senator, in relationship to my primary function at the campaign or the surrogate operation, schedules, and plans.

Senator WEICKER. I understand, but Mr. PORTER. I do not remember—excuse me. Senator WEICKER. Excuse me.

Mr. PORTER. I just do not remember specific instances where Mr. Strachan was sent an item here or an item there. As I say, if Miss Duncan says that she did, then I would believe that. But I personally do not remember that specific instance.

Senator WEICKER. ~~~011 do not remember, then, sending Miss Duncan to the White House to give Gordon Strachan copies of these photographed documents?

Mr. PORTER. I would say that, if it is an answer, I kind of remember it, but not enough to sit and testify that I did it. All right? I mean, I sent Mr. Strachan documents and, on occasion, Miss Duncan would hand carry them for one reason or another—either because the messenger was not going to come back until 4 o’clock and it was noon, or Air. Magruder wanted to get something over there right away, or something like that, and the secretaries would hand carry them.

Senator WEICKER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Montoya.
9. Dean told the President on March 21, 1973 that Haldeman was assuming that the Committee to Re-Elect the President had an intelligence gathering operation conducted by Liddy that was proper. Dean told the President there was nothing illegal about "Sedan Chair".
either fish or cut bait. This is absurd to have these guys over there and not using them. If you are not going to use them, I may use them." Things of this nature.

P When was this?

D This was apparently in February of '72.

P Did Colson know what they were talking about?

D

9a. WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT, MARCH 21, 1973, 10:22 - 11:55 A.M.
MEETING, 178-79

I can only assume, because of his close relationship with Hunt, that he had a damn good idea what they were talking about, a damn good idea. He would probably deny it today and probably get away with denying it. But I still -- unless Hunt blows on him

P But then Hunt isn't enough. It takes two doesn't it?

D Probably. Probably. But Liddy was there also and if Liddy were to blow -Then you have a problem -- I was saying as to the criminal liability in the White House.

D I will go back over that, and take out any of the soft spots.

P Colson, you think was the person who pushed?

D I think he helped to get the thing off the dime. Now something else occurred though

P Did Colson -- had he talked to anybody here?

D No. I think this was -

P Did he talk with Haldeman?

D No, I don't think so. But here is the next thing that comes in the chain. I think Bob was assuming, that they had some
thing that was proper over there, some intelligence gathering operation that Liddy was operating. And through Strachan, who was his tickler, he started pushing them to get some information and they -- Magruder -- took that as a signal to probably go to Mitchell and to say, "They are pushing us like crazy for this from the White House. And so Mitchell probably puffed on his pipe and said, "Go ahead," and never really reflected on what it was all about. So they had some plan that obviously had, I gather, different targets they were going to go after. They were going to infiltrate, and bug, and do all this sort of thing to a lot of these targets. This is knowledge I have after the fact. Apparently after they had initially broken in and bugged the DNC they were getting information. The information was coming over here to Strachan and some of it was given to Haldeman, there is no doubt about it. P Did he know where it was coming from? D I don't really know if he would. P Not necessarily? D Not necessarily. Strachan knew it. There is no doubt about it, and whether Strachan -- I have never come to press these people on these points because it hurts them to give up that next inch, so I had to piece things together. Strachan was aware of receiving information, reporting to...
Bob. At one point Bob even gave instructions to change their capabilities from Muskie to McGovern, and passed this back through Strachan to Magruder and apparently to Liddy.

And Liddy was starting to make arrangements to go in and bug the McGovern operation. P They had never bugged Muskie though, did they? D No, they hadn't, but they had infiltrated it by a secretary. P By a secretary? D By a secretary and a chauffeur. There is nothing illegal about that. So the information was coming over here and then I, finally, after -a. The next point in time that I became aware of anything was on June 17th when I got the word that there had been this break in at the DNC and somebody from our Committee had been caught in the DNC. And I said, "Oh, (expletive deleted)." You know, eventually putting the pieces together -P You knew what it was. I knew who it was. So I called Liddy on Monday morning and said, "First, Gordon, I want to know whether anybody in the White House was involved in this." And he said, "No, they weren't." I said, "Well I want to know how in (adjective deleted) name this happened." He said, "Well, I was pushed without mercy by Magruder to get in there and to get more information. That the information was not satisfactory."
10. Political Matters Memo ',P18 was prepared by Strachan and submitte(l to Haldeman on March 31, 1972. On April 4, 1972 Strachan prepared a talking paper including the mention of the "sophisticate intelligence gathering operation" for use by Haldeman in a meeting he was having with Mitchell on that day. The paper was returned to Strachan and filed with Memo #18 after Haldeman met with Mitchell. Strachan testified the subject of intelligence gathering was never raised again by Haldeman. Stracnan is certain none of the Political Matters

**Memo had** the "P" with a check mark through the "P" which was the procedure used for memos discussed in that form with the President.
that would(1 strike me as far more sensitive a matter to send through the normal messenger channels than some file which other witnesses have indi(ated was not patently illegal on its f face

Mr. DASH. In other words, what you; are saying is that you never did see the Gemstone file. Mr. Magruder never invited you over to see it, an(l that prior to March 30, you had no knowledge of any so-called Liddy intelligence plan?

Mr. STRACHAN -. That is correct.

Mr. D.ash. Now, did that. change. at least after March 30 2

If it did, could you tell us how it changed ?

Afr. STRACHAN. Yes; I was aware that Mr. Magruder be going down to Key Biscayne to review several campai(=n decisions that had accumulated durin(r John Mitchell's working (ill the ITT problem. He called me up in an apparenty fairly brief telephone conversation and reviewed the 30 or so pending campaign decisions. I too]; notes on that telephone conversation and prepared shortly thereafter a political matters memorandum for Mr. Haldeman, summarizing that telephone conversation as well as other information.

Afr. DASH. And what did that include ? I mean did it include a Liddy intelligence plan ?

Afr. STRACHAN. Yes; Mr. Magruder told me that a sophisticated political intelligence gathering system had been approved and I reported that to Arr. Haldeman.

Mr. DASH. Were VOII aware that that was one of the items for decision that vent down to Key Biscayne with Mr. Mag,ruder?

Afr. STRACHAN (5-. No- I was not.

Afr. DASH. So that it was after he came back that he reported that to you ?

Mr. STR ACTI \r. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Can you recall approximately- when he made that report to you ?

Mr. STRACHAN-. Well, it was shortly thereafter. I would guess either Friday, March 31, mayb)e Saturday. My secretary recalls having typed the memorandum on Friday.

Mr. D.ASH. And it is clear in your mind that Mr. Magruder reported that Mr. Mitchell had in fact approved a sophisticated intelligence plant

Mr. STRACH ss . Well, I concluded that Mr. Mitchell had approved it. I believe that when Mr. Magruder(ler was going through the decisions and the way I would usually report it to Mr.. Haldeman would(l he that Mr. Magruder rer)olts that Mr.. Mitchell has approved the followwing

matters, and I would put a colon. and then I would list the items.

Mr. DASH But did you do it with regard to this plan ?

Atr. STRACHAN\{\N-. Yes; that was one of the 30 items that was listed.

Mr. D\SH. I think in ~~~,-our statement you referred to a sophisticated intelligence system with a budget(lfTet of \',00. Three hundred what

Mr. STRACHAN-. Well it is 94.'S00,000. On almost all of the memorandums that, I wrote to Mr. Haldeman I would leave off the last three zeroes, because usually the figures that we were dealing(r with were very, very, large ..

Mr. DASH. Now, you say that you then prepared a political matters memorandum for Mr. Haldeman, and J'OU included this approved
GORDON STRACHAN TESTIMONY, JULY 23, 1973, 6 SSC
2452, 2454, 2488

Air. STR-ACH[AN-. Well, there was a button on the call director phone that I had which would buzz when I was to pick that line up, and I pushed down the l:button and began listening to the conversation usually at that time which was already in progress.

Mr. DASH[. All right. In this particular case non- with a call, I take it, you are testifying to Mr. Mitchell, could you tell us, having picked up) the line, what you heard ?

Mr. STRACHAN-. Well, Mr. Mitchell indicated that he was either going to return or had returned from Florida. and Mr. Haldeman jokingly said "Well.. that is clearly a mistake. You ought to stay down there and vacation some more." and Mr. Mitchell indicated that ' Well, we had better t et to gather and talk about some matters." Haldeman asked him if 3 o'clock that day would be convenient.

Air. D ASH. And that day was when ?

Mr. STRACHAN-. April A.

Mr. DASH-. 19, 2 ?

Mr. STRACHAN-. 19, 1972.

Mr. DASH. And was there, in fact, a meeting on April 4, 1972, between Arr. Haldeman and Arr. Mitchell ?

Mr. STRACHAN-. Well. I did not attend the meeting so I could not testify that there was in fact but I prepared GL talking paper for the meeting and we would prepare a folder which would include the talking paper, and the talking paper went into his office and came back out afterwards.

Mr. DASH. All right.

Now, in this talking paper. did you include the item of the sophisticated intelligence plan with a budget of $300,000 ?

Mr. STRACHAN-. In most talking papers I would frequently pose the. question is the intelligence system adequate? Is the proposal on track, just to get the conversation going 011 the subject, and in this particular one I did include that paragraph.

Mr. DASH. Now, prior to that meeting and when you were preparing that talking paper was there any other political intelligence plan operative or being considered to your knowledge

Mr. STRACHAN-. A-0; not to my knowledge.

Mr. DASH. Did you receive back that talking paper after you had given it to Mr. Haldeman ?

Mr. STRACHAN-. Yes. I did.

Air. DASH.-And to your knowledge, was there any indication as to whether all the items on the talking paper had been discussed?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, usually if a matter had not been discussed he would indicate that it should be raised again. In this case it was not raised again, indicating that he would have covered the subject.

Mr. DASH. A-W did you do with that talking paper then when you received it back ?

Err. STRACHAN. I put it back in the file with the political matters memo 18 files.

Mr. D VSH. And there was no indication from Arr. Haldeman that he had either not discussed it or it needed any further action on your part ?

Atr. STRACHAN-. That is
correct.

Atr. DASH. Now, did there come a time after that meeting be tween Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman, and also in the same month of April,
Senator INOUYE. Was any distinction made between personal and private papers and public papers or were they all in one package, sir?

STRACHAN. As far as I know, that question of law has never been settled. Most Presidents have taken the view that any documents prepared in their public capacity belong to them. Former President Johnson left with something like 20 moving vans full of documents and memorabilia, with no apparent distinction between personal papers that he had drafted and papers that had been prepared by other members of the Government for him.

Senator INOUYE. Were the tapes that we have been discussing today a part of the estate of Richard M. Nixon?

STRACHAN. Well, usually the description of the assets which would be transferred would be extraordinarily broad. Terms such as "material" would be used to include every thin—papers, memorabilia, State gifts, tapes, photographs, almost anything related to the Presidency.

Senator INOUYE. Were you aware that the tapes that have been under discussion the last few days were considered as part of the estate plan of the President?

STRACHAN. Well, I did not know of the existence of those tapes until Mr. Butterfield's testimony.

Senator INOUYE. Would you have said that you prepared several political memos which were passed on to Mr. Haldeman. Are you aware if these memos were ever seen by the President?

STRACHAN. And I would doubt that they were. Because memorandums which I drafted for Mr. Haldeman, that he reviewed with the President, would usually concern polling matters, and he would put a P up in the upper right-hand corner indicating that he would want to take it in and cover it with the President, then it would come back to me with a checkmark through the P indicating that he had covered it with the President. And I do not remember, and I am certain that any of my political matters memos were covered with the President in that form.

Senator INOUYE. My final question before we recess for a few moments. Mr. John Dean has stated that he recollected visiting you in your office in the presence of Mr. Richard Moore and recalling your saying that you would, if necessary, perjure yourself to prevent involving Air. Haldeman:

Just for the record, is that still the frame of your mind a

STRACHAN. Well, it is certainly not the frame of my mind now, and it wasn't at the time. The particular meeting or conversation that Mr. Dean, I believe, is referring to followed a series of meetings to decide how to cope with the Segretti matter. Mr. Dean testified that there was a Sunsat meeting in the Roosevelt room, and he listed the attendees, trying to deal with the imminent story on Mr. Segretti. Mr. Dean did not mention my name, yet I was at that meeting.

There were a series of meetings after that, and I believe one of them was the meeting in question with Mr. Moore. We were statements that could be put out to the press by the White House. such as the one that Mr. Chapin eventually released and I indicated at that time that if the statement as to be released in my name, it could indicate that I had approved Don Segretti instead of...
11. Haldeman has testified that he and Mitchell did not discuss intelligence gathering activities with the President on April 4, 1972, and that he and Mitchell only reviewed with the President matters relating to the ITT-Kleindienst hearings and arguments of regional campaign responsibilities. Haldeman's notes of the meeting show no political intelligence gathering operations were discussed. The transcript of April 4, 1972, meeting between the President, Haldeman,

and John Mitchell confirms that there was no discussion of campaign intelligence gathering activities.

11a Haldeman 7 SSC, 28 81..........................

11b Transcript, April 4, 1972, 4:13-4:50 p.m., p. 1-31 (submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary on

Page . 86

(85)
tion to either of us that he had been instructed to destroy any materials or make sure files were clean.

I think the effort to bri...n in my April 4 meeting with John Mitchell as in some way significant, with regard to intelligence is a little farfetched. By his testimony Strachan doesn’t know what was discussed at that meeting. All he says is that, in routine fashions he put an item on the talking paper regarding the adequacy of intelligence. As a matter of fact, the meeting with Mr. Mitchell that day was in connection with... a meeting of Mitchell and me with the President. My notes taken at the meeting with the President indicate the discussion covered the ITT-Kleindeienst hearings and a review of Mitchell’s plans for assigning regional campaign responsibilities to specific individuals. They indicate no discussion of intelligence.

John Dean, in his Camp David report—which is now exhibit 34-43 before this committee—says that when he arrived in Washington on Sunday afternoons June 15, he realized that the President would have to know everything, or that he could find out. He realized at that point that he would be asked to assemble all of the facts so that the White House could be fully informed as to what had transpired and how it would affect the President, but having been on an airplane for approximately 25 hours he did nothing further that evening.

The next morning after reading all of the news accounts of the Watergate incident, he spoke with John Ehrlichman, who instructed him to get the facts together and report to him. He then called the Attorney General to get what facts he knew. He called Gordon Liddy and met with him. Dean asked Liddy if anyone at the White House was involved and he told him 110.

During the days and weeks that followed, Dean discussed the incident with everyone who he thought might have any knowledge or involvement.

The source of these facts is John Dean’s report, or the start of it, which he wrote at Camp David in March of this year.

There is absolutely no question in my mind, or, I’m sure, in the minds of anyone at the White House, or at the Justice Department, that John Dean was in fact conducting an investigation for the White House regarding the Watergate as it might involve the White House. It is inconceivable to me that there could be any doubt in Dean’s mind.

Dean moved in immediately after the incident as sort of the Watergate project officer in the White House. This was in keeping with our usual procedure; the responsibility was his and he had the authority to proceed. Dean kept Ehrlichman and me posted from time to time on developments and, through us, the President. He apparently did not keep us fully posted and it now appears he did not keep us accurately posted.

The President, Ehrlichman and I were very much involved in many other vital matters through this entire period and we made no attempt to get into the details of, or in any way take over, the Watergate case.

See Book 3, p. 1263.
June 5, 1974

Hon. John Mitchell, IDe
Special Counsel to the House Judiciary Committee

New Jersey & c Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Doar:

In response to your request for the recording of conversations between the President, Mr. John Mitchell and H. R. Haldeman on April 24, 1972, from 13:45 to 14:00, with respect to which there is sworn testimony by H. R. Haldeman,

If desired to check the accuracy of the transcript, I am authorized to advise you that the President would permit the Chairman, N. Rodino, and the Ranking Minority Member, L. Hutchinson, to listen to the tape at the White House.

Sincerely,

James D. Clair
Special Counsel to the President
P Well John, I hope you had some time off -- that they didn't bother you to death with ITT and all that

M No. It was simply wonderful.

P Good (unintelligible).

M We always enjoy it, Mr. President. Oh, Bebe turned that thing up according to your formula and

H (Laughter).

M I tell you, it was just great.

P I told these people around here, I said unintelligible) call Mitchell, I said don't you Bob, and.

Of course, I suppose they had to (unintelligible) one or two.

M

M

P Well some of them did.

We didn't bother you too much?

No, not you fellows.

I said in the campaign -- I said to hell with the damn campaign. Did you do any golfing? No?

M Hell, I didn't even care to.

P Did you fish?

M We fished, and we went out in the boat with Bebe a couple of times and had(l dinner with him two or three times.
I'd like a little consomme. Want some consomme?

I'd love some. So it was just absolutely great. We had some of the people down from the Committee where we could spend a couple of days, you know, with quiet and so

Yeah (unintelligible) sort of busy these days. Try and get the weather, damn it, if any of you know any prayers, say them (unintelligible) weather. Let's get that weather cleared up. The bastards have never been bombed like they're going to be bombed this time, but you've got to have weather,

Huh! It isn't bad. The Air Force isn't worth a I mean, they won't fly. Oh, they fly, but they won't -- you see our Air Force is not . . .

It's the strangest thing -- in World War II they flew those bombing runs all the time and they couldn't see a thing.

I know.

But they were doing a different type of bombing then.

Strategic bombing and all that -- nevertheless it's a miserable business.

Are the Navy pilots as bad?
Oh they're better, but they're all under this one command.

It's all screwed up. We just aren't going to talk about it.

The weather will clear up. It's bound to. When they do,
they'll hit something -- and, they're a lot of brave guys --
you've got to say. After all that POW (unintelligible) that
poor who got shot down. They're over there starving on that
damned rice. It's all right, we'll give 'em hell. Well the ah,
what are your reflections on the present thing. Why don't we
start with what I told the staff to get the hell off of the ITT
and then get on to politics which is more interesting, not
that that isn't --

we'll get this thing.

Well, I don't know if we'll ever get out of it -- I mean -- I
think what we have to face is that it will be investigated by
(unintelligible) election as you get closer to the election of
course it's extremely, I think that a I think you might adopt
the practice -- I think you might consider adopting the practice
that after the Democratic Convention the Republicans will
boycott all investigating committees on the grounds that they
are politically motivated. How would that be?
I would think I would go beyond investigative committees. I'd go to some of the others where you have a facade.

Of substance, but

(Unintelligible). It's a good idea.

Yeah -- we're going to boycott anything that we think is politically motivated.

These people are disgracing (unintelligible).

And ah, Republicans just walk off and say it's just politically motivated. Well, at least ITT got 'em confused.

I would say it's quite confusing. Some of the more enlightened newspaper people are beginning to write to the effect that the Democrats got to come up with something more than they've come up with or the monkey's going to be on their back.

Manolo, who do you think (unintelligible).

I don't think so, sir.

Not much Manolo.

What they do is (unintelligible).

You happen to be right, Manolo. I was just telling --

(Material unrelated to Presidential actions deleted)
You know this little girl -- this Lichtman -- the secretary?

You know where she had her press conference don't you -- did you notice that? Down in the law office of the Democrat Chairman for the District --

She's a Democrat?

Yeah, but the press conference was held in the law office of this (unintelligible) District, Democrat Chairman, and yet there wasn't anything in the newspapers about it or why it just so happened.

Most of the "shakers" are that's for sure.

What is your view about the convention -- about all the scares and cries I hear about the 250,000 naked kids that are going to be coming?

Well, Bob and I have just gone over this and I've had a meeting this morning with

Kleindienst told us about it.
And so forth, ah, it seems to me there are three factors --
number one was screaming kids -- if you call them kids;
number two a- the ITT Sheraton business with the television
on the hotel all through the Convention; and thirdly, and
equally, if not more important, is the fact that the site
selection committee and the people that went out there to'
look at that thing did a God damned poor job. Its come to
the point where it's going to cost between 2.4 and 2.5 million
to put that thing together. In addition to that, there's

That's if we just get the convention hall apparently?

I see, all the hotels and stuff involved.

Yeah everything; in addition to that there has to be nine
hundred odd thousand dollars of insulation in that arena out
there, and in addition to that there's a

Who, (unintelligible) this, Wilson (unintelligible).

No, I think a lot of our people closer to us than that were at
fault in not recognizing the limitations of these facilities.

All right.

In addition to that you have your building trades labor contract
coming up on June 1, out there for negotiations, and they can
put the pressure on your pay board or the rest of it. So, in
view of that we have thought of the potential of changing the site.

We can get out of there --
P What ground would you use for changing it?

M The cost and the uncertainty of the availability of the facilities.

II There's a real question as to whether they can do the construction on __

M That's correct, and the arena out there is owned by two Canadians, and they're just acting tougher than hell.

P All Canadians are tough.

M And, there's no contract with them that covers some of these things; ah, so that you're not walking away from the City of San Diego, you're walking away

H You can make a very good case.

P How about San Diegans -- how do they feel?

M I don't know, frankly, I believe it would be mixed emotions.

H

P

H

It's mixed, but with all the talk of the demonstrators
Lot of people don't want them there
I think a lot of San Diegians would be very happy to have them go away.
M  I would think that that would be the case.

(Overlapping conversation)

H  Hotels anyway --

(94)
—8— (Unintelligible) you build the fact that the arena is in trouble, in other words, you've got to find the cause. This subject came up before, you know, you raised it, Bob, and said, well, our people are so stupid on public relations that I'm sure the way it would come out

is we went because we didn't want to stay at the Sheraton

where somebody I understand agreed I was to stay.

H No.

P I'm not even going to stay any place in San Diego -- I'm staying in San Clemente, but be that as it may that was apparently some story that they had. Well anyway, whatever it was, the question is whether or not at this point we could start the talk. It's awful hot incidentally, terribly hot,

H I can see that

M Well, we've started this

P Put it on the basis that the arena can't be finished. Can we do that?

M Yes, as a matter of fact, I was going to say we're starting this, programming this, by sending people out to continue, and I say continue the negotiations with these Canadians
because they don't want to give us a place for lead time in
order to get in there to do the improvements, etc., etc.

(95)
Then we could start the cost thing and then

(Overlapping conversation).

I'd just say that the arena would not be finished.

Well, the cost factor goes in with the negotiations because if

you don't get into the arena to do the reconstruction by a certain
date your cost factors multiply and multiply and **multiply** --
so you just (unintelligible) the same factor. In the meantime,
I talked to Bebe this morning and a Miami Beach **of course is**
the logical place.

P

H (Unintelligible).

P Well, if it's all set up -- safe -- television -- that's the major
consideration. At least it's all there. Go to the stupid damned
place again, and I got a place to stay this **time I wouldn't have**
to stay in a hotel.

M So Bebe has got this fellow Myers.

P Hank Myers.

M Hank Myers, who has the contacts and so forth, quietly can-
vassing to see if the arena and the hotel rooms will be available.

H This time of year?

M Oh hell, they run a lot of conventions.
They run a lot of conventions but they'll clear them out by that time. It isn't really, I've been there in June and August -- we all have -- and they do run conventions, but generally speaking it's still more open in the summer and the rates are lower.

Of course

It's still ridiculous though.

M So, if the only negative factors that I see in the change

P Is the admission of guilt in ITT, right?

M Well, I think that that will go by the boards.

P Maybe that's better than just having the damned story rehashed again.

M I would rather have the -- if they can sell it as an admission of guilt now than I would have the television cameras on the Sheraton Hotel all through the Convention.

P That's right. That's right.

M I don't know

P My theory is - It's the old story you know that a good poker player - cut your losses -- get out of the bad box and get out of it fast.

M I don't know how our friend the Governor would take this. He might be damned glad to get the problems out of the way. I don't know, but we would do --

(97)
P  Can't we -- could we have a situation where we have a break

  with the Canadians. You see what
I mean? Create a conflict

  with them.

That's what we're

And then go out and announce it, but it's got -- if for once we
could do the PR right -- if for once -- just one single solitary
time -- and keep it out of Bob Wilson's hands - - and do it
right -- but the problem is that the convention
(unintelligible) that is the arena won't be ready, the cost is
too great, or . . .

M  That's the way we would program it.

P  Think it would work?

H  Sure. I think it would. You're bound to get some bumps on the
other side? So what? You got a base a story -- just stick with
it -- couldn't get the arena done -- made a mistake in surveying
it. It's all fallen apart.

P  You've got to establish that immediately though. This is April,
and the Convention is only five months away, and so everybody
is going, as you know, now that's going to be ready --

M  You see these negotiations are going on and what we were
proposing to do is to send a big architect and a builder or

  somebody- else up to have a confrontation!, Liicn

  with the Canadians s

M

  in
P  Well let's do it.

M  Well, we want to make sure we can go to Florida before we
break this pick.

H  I'd just soon not have a convention, but we can't get away with it.

M  Have an absentee ballot -- that's what I'd prefer.

EI  The Ripon Society is suing us for improper selection of delegates
or something.

P  (Unintelligible).

H  We have something where you state that (unintelligible) to the
President gets eight additional delegates or something and the
Ripon people have gone to court and some judge has upheld
them on the first round.

P  Is that right? Well that's been done -- been done from the
beginning -- I don't know whether it means anything.

H  I don't think it does, They don't seem to worry about that anymore,

M  The fact of the matter is that there are a few rules that a political
party has control of it's Convention and in the past they have
ignored even the state laws that require people to be pledged for
so many ballots and so forth. They've just ignored them.
P  Let me ask you this. Do you think the possibilities of major
demonstrations are less in Florida? It doesn't make a hell of
a lot of difference anyway. I'd rather have a demonstration in
Florida than I would in California anyway. California is a state
we have to go for for other reasons.

H  Well, I think they are infinitely less.

M  Infinitely less.

H  You've got much better physical (unintelligible).

M  And in addition to that you have all the Democrats in control in
Florida from the Governor on down -- where in California you
have all the Republicans in control.

H  (Unintelligible) have demonstrations (unintelligible).

P  One story John, whenever you're asked about a (unintelligible).

You know, I'm the only one in the whole outfit that
didn't want to go to California. I was against it all the time.

M  You wanted to go to Chicago. I didn't want you to.

P  I did. That's right, but I (unintelligible).

M  No question about it.

P  How about Chicago now?

M  Daley wouldn't let you in there, I bet.

P  Oh
Can't start from scratch from anyway now, I don't think.

You've got

Be very very difficult.

It would.

And we have a month between the Conventions -- more than a month in which

Clean things up

To change things enough to make it look like -- assuming that (unintelligible) platform in. The facilities for crowd control are so much better in Miami Beach there. And of course the cost is And we save money LEAA money, we don't have to save police money. The other point is the Democrats really fouled up, and the police and the rest will feel that they have a responsibility to be a little bit more restrained when we're there. Well, I hope you can do it. My idea is -- I'd wait. Obviously we have to get ready -when it's ready - I'd say in about 30 days from now. I think we could move in on it before then. Because we're at the point where
- 15(Unintelligible) no way you could do it though without being charged because of ITT Well Herman came out with a statement today which shows that ITT's contribution is down to $25,000. I just think that the cost of it, the labor problem, the possibility that you'll never get that place in shape

P Yeah

M Ah, added on top --

P Also, we don't -- there's very little that we could do to screw up Florida as a state that we might win. California is a toss up anyway you figure it. It's a to carry and there's a nasty incident that could hurt us.

M Yep.

P That's the point. On the other hand, I don't think Reagan's attitude is supportive. He wants to carry the state. On the other hand, you got to figure whether or not -- these clowns that want to go there say -- oh it would help so much -- and all that business.

H (Unintelligible).

M Well -- you've a double edged sword there -- if everything went off nice and peaceful and you had all those 10,000 college kids we were going to have out there marching with their banners and everything, was be beautiful -- that'd be great.

P Yeah.

(102)
M But if you have one of these confrontations with a Republican Governor and a Republican Mayor and Pete Pitchess is sending in his stormtroopers -- why Yep. Well that's where the police are going to come from, you know they don't have enough in San Diego to handle it. (Unintelligible) send Pete Pitchess down - Sheriff's posse. Those old farts riding their horses. Well, I like it, but I would say that if you just start getting the word out awful fast about the (unintelligible) problem you are having with the Canadians. Is that being done, I haven't seen anything? Well, it's all local out there. It's known locally. The main point is to get it out nationally. Well.

P Who would say that? -- the Mayor would say it or the Convention Committee -- that we regret that we cannot handle it -- that we cannot have the hall ready.

M Well this is the Republican Convention and they wouldn't be saying it because they would, of course, have to bring that site selection committee back and they'd have to put out another call and things like that; so it would be the Republican National Committee that's the party of interest.
Ok. -- Well leaving that subject -- what else is -- I guess today is Wisconsin isn't it?

It certainly is -- ought to be an interesting go -- ah -- I told those fellows over there tonight with Dale and -- Dole and so forth -- to get out two thoughts in connection with this primary in Wisconsin. Number one, that there was a clear indication because of the proliferation that the Democrats did not have a viable national candidate when you look at who won in New Hampshire and who won in Florida and who won here and the next place and secondly, if there was any winner at all it was Teddy Kennedy. Now Teddy's been getting a free ride, but not being drawn into this, and if you have Dole, Dale and whoever else bring this up that --

Why wouldn't you say that Teddy is going to be the nominee.

Yeah, Teddy' s getting

Rather than he' s a winner -- I'd simply say that McGovern' s a stomping horse for Kennedy and Lucey is the Kennedy man and it looks like Kennedy is going to be the winner of the nomination.

Looks like Kennedy. None of the others have got the horses to win it. Smoke him out a little.

That's right and then, what I would hope would come out of it --
is what the Republican National Chairman and so forth are saying.
M is that the reporters will be going to these other candidates
and say "what do you think about what they are saying about
Kennedy" and let's get them posturing themselves against Kennedy
so that he doesn't get this free ride.

P It's clear, it's clear that this is a -- Mel Laird is saying that
the reason Muskie has been really pøæaxed there among other
is that Lucey and the Kennedy I)emocrats have ganged up on him.

They got behind McGovern, not for the purposes of supporting

McGovern, but to kick the hell out of

M Muskie

P Muskie, and also, he said they did it for another reason: they
didn't figure Hubert had a chance before Florida and didn't have
time to change their course until then or they'd all been for

Hubert, but then anybody but Kennedy. Their purpose was to stop

Muskie. But they've done that -- now Hubert, of course, has
H They can't stop Hubert! (Laughter)

P They can't stop him if he wins this time.

P I think he will. I think-he'd be first -- McGovern second -- and if
    -Wallace is third, I think Muskie then would be fourth, but that's
    just a guess.

(105)
P Maybe Muskie will be -- Muskie will be second.

M Well, I doubt that very much.

though. He had a big telethon push which I

(unintelligible ).

M I don't think Muskie is going to have that drawing power up

there.

P You know the thing that occurred to me is that -- it seems to

me that as you look around the states -- the big states --

New York is one that I don't think you could (unintelligible) -

you really have to be personally in charge out there, and

anybody else I let in there, you know what I mean, because

you've to play the game and Rockefeller's got to carry it for

us hasn't he? Have to get off his ass, but you've got to play

the game with those conservatives, right? And so there the
H Incidentally, did you see Bill Buckley's -- you see that letter he sent out?

P No. What's he done now?

H He sent out a letter to the -- I don't know whether it's a circulation building letter or something to the publication people or whatever it is - but anyway, the whole pitch is -- 'I've been asked about this coming election or something-~~, and r will say proudly I will vote for Richard Nixon for President. I consider

P He's up there th
-20- one of the Democratic possibilities would be a disaster for this country. " He said that "Nixon will be a problem too but that he has the job" -- no, he insists that "he has the job now of doing just what the conservatives want of pulling together a sufficiently broad coalition in order to be elected to govern. " He said "I would not vote for Nixon as editor of a conservative journal. "

That's very good.

And he said "I don't feel that we should abandon our principles but when we get to the election we must vote (unintelligible)."

Then he sort of sticks it to Ashbrook?

Well, Bill's written

He said he was going to do that

A couple of column's you know that go in this

How does he, well how does he deal with Ashbrook. I mean does he want him to get a good vote anyway?

Yeah, because that's forcing you

That's the signal
H To take a conservative position.

P I mean I watched Ashbrook closely

H You watch Ashbrook closely and get your guidance from
Meeting, 1-31

P What I was going to say is -- in Pennsylvania, who do we have there that you would say -- you also will handle New Jersey won't you? I don't think (unintelligible) or were you using Sears or others

M Yeah, Sears.

P What about the list of the big states? We got New--~v York and New Jersey. What would you say about Pennsylvania? (Unintelligible). Or do you just divide the state up?

M Oh, do you mean who do we have in Pennsylvania?

P The boss, I mean it's a Unintelligible). Who would you consider to be the top man?

M That's really divided into regions but Arlen Specter is -- well

P Specter is our general

M

Well he's our campaign director. Scott and Schweiker are the co-chairmen, and Arlen -Specter is the statewide chairman? Yes. Good. Well he's really going to work Well he's good.
And a

And he wants to be governor doesn't he? That's correct.
Whether he wants to be (unintelligible), he's good don't you think with the Jews and with the Blacks and (unintelligible)? Also he's with us.

Yes, and also he's -- we're deciding whether Rizzo's campaign manager should go to work for Arlen Specter now or wait and a

How's his relationship with the Pittsburgh crowd, all right?

They're good, because we've got other lines

But Specter -- that's the guy -- in other words you wouldn't be in direct -- you wouldn't need anybody here to watch (unintelligible)?

done

(Unintelligible) you ought to handle that

Well let me.

On a real tough job, I would not let them out of your hands. I don't know whether you can do them all but

No, I've already decided that in California, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey, that I am going to have a direct line through to the people. The other states we will have these surrogates

Surrogate s.
Regional people. Now, what I want is what we've talked about before, it's -- well, use the example of California: If we can get Cap Weinberger, if he's not so far "Hatched" that he can't do it, Cap could be a state desk man or auditor, or whatever you want to call it, somebody with the expertise of politics in California -- can go in and see what's going on up in the Valley under Monagan or what Packard is doing and his people and San Francisco, or what they're doing here there and the next place. I expect to have somebody like that for each of these big states. But I think

I'm afraid he is "Hatched," but a

Is he?

(Unintelligible)

Cap is a pretty bright able guy and he's been immersed in politics out there as state chairman

Wonder if we should pull him out of the Budget?

He gets along with everybody.

Well, he doesn't want to stay in the Budget.

I know he doesn't want to stay there. Can we pull him out and put him in an agency. He might be just as good a man as you could find around California.
M Can he take a leave?
H Just resign.
P Let Carlucci or somebody else be Budget Director if he resigns, and
H After you get a Budget Director.
P I'd have him as full time. George could find somebody
H You've George on top of it.
P George Shultz can run the Budget, (unintelligible). I really think the thing for Cap -- so important that you want him (unintelligible). Illinois?
M Well, we've got, of course, Tom Houser is a good operator and I haven't got anybody yet.
P Pretty good, yeah
M Tom Houser.
P He's Percy's man, you know.
M No.
P No, I meant he was.
M He was.
P I mean his
M He broke with Percy you know when Percy went back on his commitment to vote for you -- or to me to vote for you at the Convention.

(111)
P Well he helps us in the area we needed him (unintelligible) and so forth, and Texas?

M And we have

P

M

P

M

P

M

P

M

P

M

P

M How does Texas stand? We have Al -- we have John Connally. (Unintelligible) We have Al Topper (phonetically) downstate. Oh, good. Who is, you know (Unintelligible). And so -- plus a lot of good regional people -- even a top flight guy in the city of Chicago which is a real good politician. In Texas, I've been talking to John Connally about it. Have you? Good. John's feeling is that by the time they get to the Democratic Convention he is not even sure that Bentsen or the Lt. Governor

P Barne s

M Ben Barnes or these people should even go to that Convention.

I guess it's his line. What he is angling for in effect, is keep
your options open. Don't get tied in with an organization now, because you may want to bring

P Texans for Nixon, I know, I know (unintelligible).

(112)
Well, on the other side of the coin, of course, our Republican friends are getting itchy and I keep telling them to go out and write you some more Republicans -- but they say well, we're going to lose good people to the gubernatorial campaign, etc., etc.

Let 'em go.

So what?

Let them go. They don't -- that doesn't make any difference.

Hold it firm. We need Texas Democrats. We don't win Texas -- we haven't won it yet -- but you don't win it with Republicans.

We never have. And let's just face it, that's the way the score is.

Tower has won it once or twice but -- accidents, pure accidents.

( unintelligible) any Democrat, believe me, by any Democrat (unintelligible) committee of that sort is better. Rather than that fellow who is finance chairman down there. What's his name?

Al Fay

Al Fay

You mean Peter O'Donnell? Peter's left.

He's left?

Peter quit. He's (unintelligible) national committee

Unintelligible).

I'll be darned.

Agnitch is the new national committee an.
lrb. WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF APRIL 4, 1972, 4:11-4:50 P.M.
MEETING 1-1-31

- 27 -

P Yeah.

L-I O'Donnell was such a horrible whiner.

P Ohio!

M Ohio we still have the Bliss.

P Bliss is still.

M Situation.

P I think going for the old timer there is a bad idea. What do you think Bob?

H I think it is a good idea.

M Well, we have to, Mr. President -- almost have to -- to keep the Taft forces and the Rhodes forces and the rest of them.

P Well, we've got to go for the young too and the rest, but I guess Bliss is

M Well, Bliss is going to come back to work for me, you see,
he wants the recognition.

P  Great.

M  He's not going to be the guy to come and do the nuts and bolts, but he wants the identification with you and back here to re-establish his

P  Let me ask you this. We have these curious reports, which, you've seen these of course, (unintelligible) out of Michigan showing we have a chance in Michigan. Do you think we ought to take a whirl at it or not?

(114)
M We're going to take a whirl at it. We're going to take a whirl at all of them.

P Well (unintelligible) even Minnesota?

M Well, I mean a whirl at them to the point where we're going to organize to the teeth and then when it comes to where you're going to spend the money on your media, your mail, your telephone, and things like that, we'll make the judgment a little further down the line.

P Michigan judgment could be very interesting because if it gets really heated up on busing, if it could, and we're on the one side and they're on the other side, you might win the state on that issue. You agree Bob?

H Sure.

M In addition to that, look what you've done for the automobile industry.

H That was a year ago.

P Well, still

M It still can be sold

P Sold lots of cars

M And, Milliken is all aboard and he's working hard, and we've got a good chairman out there.

(115)
I'd even run -- I'd even have some sort of a campaign on that. I'd even do something in Massachusetts. Do you know why? Solely because I think it isn't good to let any one area just go completely.

No, you can't, because of its rub off on Vermont.

(unintelligible)

We've got an added starter there who wants to be the chairman to get out and work and that's the Governor.

He does?

Sargeant?

Why not? He gets

Won't hurt us!

He gets on the tube.

(unintelligible).

Well, he's a good liberal fellow.

He really wants to get in?

Yep -- and I think we can get it cleared with Brooke and Volpe and all the rest of them.

I think there's a great deal to be said to go for every state. You know the line I took with these people -- the governors
which they all like to hear -- but you take, I was telling Bob the other
day that in terms of our own p\] lan of c\)urse, we\'s c\) got to look at
everything you can without killing ourselves or without being over
exposed. But, I feel very strongly that
Wallace in or out, we ought to hit of the southern states that
I ought to get to Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi,
because I think if we can sweep that South and of course Texas
is the big question mark (unintelligible).

Did I tell you about Connally's poll that Barnes ran down there?
Shows the President did very well -- quite different from our
polls.

In Texas?
Yep.
Our poll shows five points behind.
With Muskie, yeah.

That was awhile back.
Quite awhile back. Yeah. But John Connally's impression is
that you're in good shape in Texas with or without Wallace.

Well, that's hard to say (unintelligible).
Well we don't have that liquor thing down there this year that
we had in '68. That was what really did us in.

(Unintelligible).
You know (unintelligible) really kicked Muskie in
(unintelligible) that Harris Poll showed him slipping in the
trial heats. Apparently (unintelligible) something similar
Well, this has a hell of an impact because the press picks it up and drums on it day in day out.

Especially because he had been (unintelligible).

(Unintelligible) Gallup (Unintelligible) even, even in February and now (unintelligible).

When is this coming out?

I've got to see the Ambassador -- he's leaving -- he's leaving.

Oh, is he?

Going home.


French Ambassador's name is Kosciusko. Figure that one out.

San Diego thing -- got something to do, do it! Cut our losses and get out. But I do think that from a PR standpoint, Bob, at this time we really ought to.

(Unintelligible) ahead of time.

To build (unintelligible). Start a fight right now. Play hard (unintelligible) no question.

As soon as we see any light through it at all, '

I'd start right now.
M  Give them the guidelines and put them right on it and let them

    stay right on it. (Unintelligible).

P  John, I would start the fight right now. (voices fade away).

P  Well, Mr. Ambassador, (The French Ambassador and

(118)
12. The President had no knowledge of an attempt by the White House to cover-up involvement in the Watergate affair. Dean told

the President that there were things Dean knew the President had no knowledge of.
D I know, sir. I can just tell from our conversation that these are things that you have no knowledge of.

P You certainly can! Buggings, etc! Let me say I am keenly aware of the fact Colson, et al., were doing their best to set information as we went along. But they all knew very well they were supposed to comply with the law. There was no question about that! You feel that really the trigger man was really Colson on this then?

D No. He was one of us. He was just a thing.

P All I know about is the time of ITT, he was trying to get something going there because ITT was giving us a bad time.

D I know he used Hunt.

P I knew about that. I didn't know about it, but I knew there was something going on. But I didn't know it was a Hunt.

D What really troubles me is one, will this thing not break some day and the whole thing -- domino situation -- everything starts crumbling, fingers will be pointing. Bob will be accused of things he has never heard of and deny and try to disprove it. It will get real nasty and just be a real bad situation. And the person who will be hurt by it most will be you and the Presidency, and I just don't think
13. The testimony of Gray before the Senate Select Committee establishes that the origin of the theory of Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the break-in of the UNC was in the FESI and that Gray communicated the theory to Dean on June 22, 1972. Dean confirmed that Gray informed him on June 22, 1972 that one of the EBI theories of the case was that it was a CLA operation and Dean testified that he reported this to Halde}nan and Ehrlichman on June 23.

13a Gray 9 SSC, 3£51............

13b' Dean 3 SSC, 943.............................

NOTE: Objection has been raised by Congressman Seiberling that the first sentence is a conclusion rather than a statement of information---e within the Rules of Procedure of the Committee. .

(121)
assist him in his inquiry I asked Mr. Dean if he would be reporting directly to the President or through Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman. He informed me that he would be reporting directly to the President.  

At this meeting with Mr. Dean there was no discussion of whom we were going to interview or where our leads might take the investigation. We did discuss the scheduling of White House interviews through Mr. Dean and his sitting in on the interviews as counsel to the President.

On Thursday, June 9, 197_, after being briefed by Mr. Charles W. Bates, Assistant Director, General Investigative Division regarding the latest developments in the Watergate case and undoubtedly as a result of information developed at that briefing, I telephoned Director [illegible] of the CIA &. I told him of our thilkinfr that ave may be polkilla into a ...olleration and asked if he could confirm or deny thi3. He said he had been rmeetinCr on this e~~-erv day with his men, that they knew the people, that they could not figure it out lout that there avas no

CIt involvemellt.

I met afront +~~, ith T\1 r. Dean at 6 30 t) m tvhe same cla~~- to a2~ain discuss the scheduling of intersiesvs of AN7hite House staS l)ersonnel and to arrange the schedulin=-,r of these interviews dirctlv rhrouX+h the AVashington fiell office ratter than throu(rl FBI headqllarters .-tt this meetina I also disl-ussed vaith him our very early theories of the case; namely, that the episode ~~~as either a Ckt covert operation of some sort simply because some of the peolzle involsted had been CI-t people in the past, or a CI & monev chain, or a political money chain, or a pure polieical operation. or 'i Cuban riCrtw winr o;eration. or a combination of an of these. I also told Air Dean that ave svere not %eroincr in Oll any one theory at this time, or excludin~~ any, but that ~~~e justCONtld HO see any cclear reason for tllis bur(rlary and attempted intercept of communications operation.

I helieve that it ~~~as at this meetin~~ on Jtlne az that I tolcl him of our discoverx of a ballk accotln in the name of Belnard Barl;er, xvhos was arrested in the AVater(rate hurClalvb and the fact that a ta .000 check associatd ~~rith Ivenneth Dahlherv and four checlss drzlvn on a Wllexican hanli payable to Alanuel Ocrarrio in the total amount of :89,000, n-ere depositetl in the Barlxel account I do not fr.lz-e a clear memov of tellinfr him about my telephone call earlier in the dav to Director II[elsms rewardiny the question of CILt involvement It is likely thLt I ~~~would have eissclssled the Helms call lvith hiTn in conneCtion nith our discussioll of the theories of the case since Air. Helms hacil in formed me that there mas no C I -t involvement

On Flidav, J Judges 23 19~~ 3. Air. Bates met lvith me afront to brief me on recent developmellts I telel]honecl Alr Denn fol]on in(r fmV meetinfr ~b?r 13ates I am qtlite certain that this c.~ll a(rain involved the Barl;er bank account allcl the Onarrio and I).illher(r checlss Litiller in this call or in the meetin(r of the precedin(r evenin(> Alr Dean first baced but me the idea that if +N-e persisted in Oul efforts to investi~~ate this Alexicall money chain lve could uncover or become involvectl in CI~~- t opel ations I remnember tellinz Alr Dean in one of these early teler]hone calls or meetint s that the FBI lvas goin(r a pursue all leads t (tressivel) ulless ~~~e m-ere told by the CI thL t there ~~~as a CI tinterest O1 involvement in this case.
told—and I do not recall specifically who told me this that this money had absolutely nothing to do with the Watergate; it was unrelated and it was merely a coincidence of fact that Liddy had used Barker to cash the checks and Liddy had returned the money to Sloan. I was told that the investigation of this matter which appeared to be connected with Watergate but wasn't, was unfounded and would merely result in an unnecessary embarrassment to the contributors Accordingly, Mitchell and Stans both asked me to see if there was anything the White House could do to prevent this unnecessary embarrassment. I, in turn, related these facts to both Haldeman and Ehrlichman. On June 22, at the request of Ehrlichman and Haldeman, I went to see Mr. Gray at the office of Rice in the early evening to discuss the Dahlberg and Mexican checks and determine how the FBI was proceeding with these matters. Mr. Gray told me that they were pursuing it by seeking to interview the persons who had drawn the checks.

It was during my meeting with Mr. Gray on June 22 that we also talked about his theories. At that time, as it was beginning to unfold, I remembered well that he drew a diagram for me showing his theories. At that time, Mr. Gray had the following theories: It was a setup job by a double agent; it was a CIA operation because of the number of former CIA people involved; or it was someone in the reelection committee who was responsible. Gray also had some other theories which he discussed, but I do not recall them now, but I do remember that those I have mentioned were his primary theories.

Before the meeting ended, I recall that Gray and I again had a brief discussion of the problems of the investigation in the White House. Gray expressed his awareness of the potential problems of such an investigation and also told me that if I needed any information I should call either Mark Felt or himself. Gray also informed me that he was going to meet with the CLM to discuss their possible involvement and he would let me know the outcome of that meeting.

On June 23, I reported my conversation with Gray of the preceding evening to Ehrlichman and Haldeman. We discussed the Dahlberg and the Mexican checks and the fact that the FBI was looking for answers regarding these checks. I had the impression that either Ehrlichman or Haldeman might have had a conversation with someone else about this matter but this was mere speculation on my part at that time.

Within the first days of my involvement in the coverup, a pattern had developed where I was carrying messages from Mitchell, Stans, and Mardian to Ehrlichman and Haldeman—and vice versa—about how each quarter was handling the coverup and relevant information as to what was occurring. I was also reporting to them all the information I was receiving about the case from the Justice Department and the FBI. I checked with Haldeman and Ehrlichman before I did anything. One of the few sets of early documents evidencing this working relationship with Haldeman and Ehrlichman relates to responding Larry, C Brien's letter of June 24 to the President requesting the appointment of a special prosecutor. I have submitted these documents to the committee.

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No 34-17.*]
14. Haldeman's testimony before the Senate Select Committee confirms that: Dean reported to him the FBI's concern about CIA involvement, and that Haldeman in turn reported this to the President, who ordered Haldeman and Ehrlichman to meet with the GIA officials to insure that the FBI investigation not expose any unrelated covert operation of the CIA. The uncertainty regarding the possibility of uncovering CSIA activities was recognized in a memo dated June 28, 1972 from Helms to Walters.

14a  Haldeman 7  SSC, 2884

14b Memo from Director Helms to Deputy Walters, June 28, 1972

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is that the President was not directly involved himself and he was not told by anyone until March; well he intensified his own investigation. Even then, he was (riven conflicting and unverified) reports that made it impossible to determine the precise truth regarding Watergate or the coverup and, at the outset at least, he was relying primarily on one man, John Dean, who has admitted that he was a major participant in the illegal and improper coverup, a fact unknown to the President until 1.3

Any attempt on my part at this time to try to identify those who participated in, directed, or knew of the illegal coverup would of necessity be based totally on hearsay.

CONTAINMENT

There was a concern at the White House that activities which had been in no way related to Watergate or to the 19/2 political campaign, and which were in the area of national security, would be compromised in the process of the Watergate investigation and the attendant publicity and political furor. The recent public disclosure of the FBI wiretaps on press and NSC personnel, the details of the Plumbers operations, and so on, fully justifies that concern.

As a result of this concern and the FBI's request through Pat Gray to John Dean for guidance regarding some aspects of the Watergate investigation, because of the possibility of CIA involvement, the President directed John Ehrlichman and me to meet with the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA on June 23. We did so and ascertained from them that there had not been any CIA involvement in the Watergate affair and that there was no concern on the part of Director Helms as to the fact that some of the Watergate participants had been involved in the Bay of Pigs operations of the CIA. We discussed the White House concern regarding possible disclosure of Watergate-related covert CIA operations or other nonrelated national security activities that had been undertaken previously by some of the Watergate participants, and we requested Deputy Director AT Walters to meet with Director Gray of the FBI to express these concerns and to coordinate with the FBI, so that the FBI's area of investigation of the Watergate participants not be expanded into unrelated matters which could lead to disclosures of earlier national security or CIA activities.

Walters agreed to meet with Gray as requested. I do not recall having any other communication, or meeting with Walters. Helms or Gray on this subject. I did not, at this meeting or at any other time, ask the CIA to participate in any Watergate coverup. Nor did I ever suggest that the CIA take any responsibility for the Watergate break-in. I believe that the action I took with the CIA was proper, according to the President's instructions and clearly in the national interest.

There were a number of newspaper stories and allegations raised during the period following the Watergate break-in that posed new questions regarding the facts of Watergate or related matters. When any such questions arose, the President would again ask that the facts be ascertained and made known publicly as completely and quickly as possible, but there always seemed to be some reason why

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SUBJECT:
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The President stated on May 22, 1973, that it did seem possible to him that because of the involvement of former CIA personnel, the investigation could lead to the uncovering of covert CIA operations totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in. The President stated he was also concerned that the Watergate investigation might lead to an inquiry into the activities of the Special Investigations Unit. Gray testified that on July 6, 1972, the President told him to continue to conduct his aggressive and thorough investigation of the Watergate affair.
anzig, who is now an associate judge of the U. S. Court of Claims.

Mr. Sampson has been Acting Administrator of General Services since June 2, 1972. He joined the General Services Administration in 1969 as Commissioner of the Federal Supply Service. From 1970 to 1972 he was Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service in GSS and the first deputy Administrator of GS-N for Special Projects.

He came to the General Services Administration after 6 years in Pennsylvania State government, where he was secretary of administration and budget secretary under Gov. Raymond P. Shafer, and deputy secretary for procurement, department of property and supplies, under Gov. William J. Scranton. Prior to entering government service, Mr. Sampson was employed by the General Electric Co. for 12 years.

Mr. Sampson was born on October 8, 1926, in Warren, R.I. He received his B. S. degree in business administration from the University of Rhode Island in 1951 and has done graduate work at the George Washington University.

Active in several professional organizations, Mr. Sampson was presented the Synergy III Award for outstanding contributions toward the advancement of architecture by the Society of American Registered Architects in 1972.

1973 he was selected as one of the Top Ten Public Works Men of the year, and he was named an honorary member of the American Institute of Architects.

He and his wife, Blanche, have four children and reside in Washington, D.C.

NOTE: For the President's statement upon announcing his intention to nominate Mr. Sampson, see the preceding item.

The Watergate Investigation

Statements by the President. May 22, 1973

Recent news accounts growing out of testimony in the Watergate investigations have given grossly misleading impressions of many of the facts, as they relate both to my own role and to certain unrelated activities involving national security.

Already, on the basis of second- and third-hand hearsay testimony by persons either convicted or themselves under investigation in the case, I have found myself accused of involvement in activities I never heard of until I read about them in news accounts.

These impressions could also lead to a serious misunderstanding of those national security activities which, though unrelated to Watergate, have become tangled in the rev. They could lead to further compromise of sensitive national security information.

I will not abandon my responsibilities. I will continue to do the job I was elected to do.

In the accompanying statement, I have set forth the facts as I know them as they relate to my own role. With regard to the specific allegations that have been made, I can and do state categorically:

1. I had no prior knowledge of the Watergate operation.
2. I took no part in, nor was I aware of, any subsequent
efforts that may have been made to cover up Watergate.

3. At no time did I authorize any offer of executive clemency for the Watergate defendants, nor did I know of any such offer.

4. I did not know, until the time of my own investigation, of any effort to provide the Watergate defendants with funds.

5. At no time did I attempt, or did I authorize others to attempt, to implicate the CIA in the Watergate matter.

6. It was not until the time of my own investigation that I learned of the break-in at the office of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and I specifically authorized the furnishing of this information to Judge Byrne.

7. I neither authorized nor encouraged subordinates to engage in illegal or improper campaign tactics.

In the accompanying statement, I have sought to provide the background that may place recent allegations in perspective. I have specifically stated that executive will will not be invoked as to any testimony concerning possible criminal conduct or discussions of possible criminal conduct, in the matters under investigation. I want the public to learn the truth about Watergate and those guilty of any illegal actions brought to justice.

Allegations surrounding the Watergate affair have so escalated that I feel a further statement from the President is required at this time.

A climate of sensationalism has developed in which even second- or third-hand hearsay charges are headlined as fact and repeated as fact.

Important national security operations which themselves had no connection with Watergate have become entangled in the case.

As a result, some national security information has already been made public through court orders, through the subpoenaing of documents, and through testimony. Other sensitive documents are now threatened with disclosure. Continued silence about those operations would compromise rather than protect them, and would also serve to perpetuate a grossly distorted view— one that recent par. al di!oEures have given of the nature and purpose of those operations.
The purpose of this statement is threefold:
—First, to set forth the facts about my own relationship to the Watergate matter;
—Second, to place in some perspective some of the more sensational—and inaccurate—of the charges that have filled the headlines in recent days, and also some of the matters that are currently being discussed in Senate testimony and elsewhere;
—Third, to draw the distinction between national security operations and the Watergate case. To put the other matters in perspective, it will be necessary to describe the national security operations first.

In citing these national security matters, it is not my intention to place a national security "cover" on Watergate, but rather to separate them out from Watergate—and at the same time to explain the context in which certain actions took place that were later misconstrued or misused.

Long before the Watergate break-in, three important national security operations took place which have subsequently become entangled in the Watergate case.

—The first operation, begun in 1969, was a program of wiretaps. All were legal, under the authorities then existing. They were undertaken to find and stop serious national security leaks.

—The second operation was a reassessment, which I ordered in 1970, of the adequacy of internal security measures. This resulted in a plan and a directive to strengthen our intelligence operations. They were, protested by Air. Hoover, and as a result of his protest they were not put into effect.

—The third operation was establishment, in 1971, of a Special Investigations Unit in the White House. Its primary mission was to plug leaks of vital security information. I also directed this group to prepare an accurate history of certain crucial national security matters which occurred under prior administrations, on which the Government's records were incomplete.

Here is the background of these three security operations initiated in my Administration.

WIRETAPS

By mid-1969, my Administration had begun a number of highly sensitive foreign policy initiatives. They were aimed at ending the war in Vietnam, achieving a settlement in the Middle East, limiting nuclear arms, and establishing new relationships among the great powers. These involved highly secret diplomacy. They were closely intercd Leaks' s or secret information about any one could endanger all.

Exactly that happened. News accounts appeared in 1969, which were obviously based on leaks some of them initiatives unless further leaks could be prevented. I required finding the source of the leaks.

In order to do this, a special program of wiretaps was instituted in mid-1969 and terminated in February 19. Fewer than 20 taps, of varying duration, were involved. They produced important leads that made it possible to tighten the security of highly sensitive materials. I authorized this entire program. Each individual tap was undertaken in accordance with procedures legal at the time as in accord with longstanding precedent.

The persons who were subject to these wiretaps were
determined through coordination among the Director of the FBI, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, and the Attorney General. Those wiretapped were selected on the basis of access to the information leaked, material security files, and evidence that developed as the inquiry proceeded.

Information thus obtained was made available to senior officials responsible for national security matters in order to curtail further leaks.

THE 1970 TELLIGENCE PLAN

In the spring and summer of 1970, another security problem reached critical proportions. In March a wave of bombings and explosions struck college campuses across cities. There were 400 bomb threats in one 96-hour period in New York City. Rioting and violence on college campuses reached a new peak after the Cambodian operatic and the tragedies at Kent State and Jackson State. The 1969-70 school year brought nearly 1,800 campus demonstrations and nearly 250 cases of arson on campus. Many colleges closed. Gun battles between guerrilla groups and police were taking place. Some of the disruptive activities were receiving foreign support.

Complicating the task of maintaining security was the fact that, in 1965, certain tapes of undercover FBI operations that had been conducted for many years had been suspended. This also had substantially impeded our ability to collect foreign intelligence information. At the same time, the relationships between the FBI and other intelligence agencies had been deteriorating. By May 1970, Director Hoover shut off his agency's liaison with the CIA altogether.

On June 5, 1970, I met with the Director of the FBI (Hoover), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Mr. Richard Helms), the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Donald V. Bennett), and the Director of the National Security Agency (M. A. Crenshaw). We concluded that the relationship between the FBI and other intelligence operations needed improvement. I appointed the Ad for a chairman of an interagency committee to provide recommendations.

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me...norality of the options approved. After reconsideration, however, prompted by the opposition of Director Hoover, the agencies were notified on July 28, that the approval had been rescinded. The options initially approved had included resumption of certain intelligence operations which had been suspended in 1966. These included authorization for surreptitious entry—breaking and entering—in effect on specified categories of targets in specified situations related to national security.

Because the approval was withdrawn before it had been implemented, the net result was that the plan for expanded intelligence activities never went into effect.

The documents spelling out this 1970 plan are extremely sensitive. They include— and are based upon— assessments of certain foreign intelligence capabilities and procedures, which of course must remain secret. It was this unused plan and related documents that John Dean removed from the White House and placed in a safe deposit box, giving the keys to Judge Sirica. The same plan, still unused, is being headlined today.

Coordination among our intelligence agencies continued to fall short of our national security needs. In July 1970, having earlier discontinued the FBI’s liaison with the CIA, Director Hoover ended the FBI’s non-liaison with all other agencies except the White House. To help remedy this, an Intelligence Evaluation Committee was created in December 1970. Its members included representatives of the White House, CIA, FBI, NSA, the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Defense, and the Secret Service.

The Intelligence Evaluation Committee and its staff were instructed to improve coordination among the intelligence community and to prepare evaluations and estimates of domestic intelligence. I understand that its activities are now under investigation. I did not authorize nor do I have any knowledge of any illegal activity by this Committee. If it went beyond its charter and did engage in any illegal activities, it was totally without my knowledge or authority.

THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT

On Sunday, June 3, 1971, The New York Times published the first installment of what came to be known as the “Pentagon Papers.” Not until a few hours before publication did any responsible Government official know that they had been stolen. Most officials did not know they existed. LN’ senior official of the Government...ent had read them and knew what they contained.

All the Government knew, at first, was that the papers compr...ed 47 volumes and some 7,000 pages, which had been taken from the most sensitive files of the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA, covering military and

Moreover, a majority of the documents published with the first three installments in The Times had not been included in the 47-volume study—raising serious questions about what and how much else might have been taken.

There was every reason to believe this was a security leak of unprecedented proportions.

It created a situation in which the ability of the Government to carry on foreign relations even in the best of circumstances could have been severely compromised.

Other governments no longer knew whether they could deal with the United States in confidence. Against the background of the delicate negotiations the United States was then involved in on a number of fronts—with regard to Vietnam, China, the Middle East, nuclear arms limitations, U.S.-Soviet relations, and others—in which the utmost degree of confidentiality was vital, it posed a threat so grave as to require extraordinary actions.

Therefore during the week following the Pentagon
Papers publication, I approved the creation of a Special Investigations Unit within the White House which later came to be known as the "plumbers." This was a small group at the White House whose principal purpose was to stop security leaks and to investigate other sensitive security matters. I looked to John Ehrlichman for the supervision of this group.

Egil Krogh, Mr. Ehrlichman's assistant, was put in charge. David Young was added to this unit, as were E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy.

The unit operated under extremely tight security rules. Its existence and functions were known only to a very few persons at the White House. These included Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean.

At about the time the unit was created, Daniel Ellsberg was identified as the person who had given the Pentagon Papers to The New York Times. I told Nk. Krogh that as a matter of first priority, the unit should find out all it could about Mr. Ellsberg's associates and his motives. Because of the extreme gravity of the situation, and not then knowing what additional national secrets Mr. Ellsberg might disclose, I did impress upon Mr. Krogh the vital importance to the national security of his assignment. I did not authorize and had no knowledge of any illegal means to be used to achieve this goal.

However, because of the emphasis I put on the crucial importance of protecting the national security, I can understand how highly motivated individuals could have felt justified in engaging in specific activities that I would have disapproved had they been brought to my attention.

Consequently, President, I cannot and do not take responsibility for such actions that I would not have approved or had knowledge of.

I also assigned the unit a number of other investigatory matters, including part with compiling an accurate record of events related to the Vietnam war, on which the
records having been removed with the change of administration and which bore directly on the negotiations then in progress. Additional assignments included tracing down other national security leaks, including one that seriously compromised the U.S. negotiating position in the SALT talks.

The work of the unit tapered off around the end of 1971. The nature of its work was such that it involved issues that, from a national security standpoint, were highly sensitive then and remain so today.

These intelligence activities had no connection with the break-in of the Democratic headquarters, or the aftermath.

I considered it my responsibility to see that the Watergate investigation did not adversely upon the national security area. For example, on April 18, 1973, when I learned that Mr. Hunt, a former member of the Special Investigations Unit at the White House, was to be questioned by the U.S. Attorney, I directed Assistant Attorney General Petersen to pursue every issue involving Watergate but to confine his investigation to Watergate and related matters and to stay out of national security matters. Subsequently, on April 25, 1973, Attorney General Kleindienst informed me that because the Government had clear evidence that Mr. Hunt was involved in the break-in of the office of the psychiatrist who had treated Mr. Ellsberg, the Attorney General believed that, despite the fact that no evidence had been obtained from Hunt's acts, a report should nevertheless be made to the court trying the Ellsberg-case. I concurred, and directed that the information be transmitted to Judge Byrne immediately.

The burglary and bugging of the Democratic National Committee headquarters came as a complete surprise to me. I had no inkling that any such illegal activities had been planned by persons associated with my campaign; if I had known, I would not have permitted it. My immediate reaction was that those guilty should be brought to justice, and, with the five burglars themselves already in custody, I assumed that they would be.

Within a few days, however, I was advised that there was a possibility of CIA involvement in some way.

It did seem to me possible that, because of the involvement of former CIA personnel, and because of some of their apparent associations, the investigation could lead to the uncovering of covert CIA operations totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in. Therefore I was also concerned that the Watergate investigation might lead to an inquiry into the activities of the Special Investigations Unit itself.

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Richard Nixon, 1973

In this area, I felt it was important to avoid disclosure of the details of the national security matters with which the group was concerned. I knew that once the existence of the group became known, it would lead inexorably to a discussion of these matters, some of which remain, even today, highly sensitive.

I wanted justice done with regard to Watergate; but in the scale of national priorities with which I had to deal—and not at that time having any idea of the extent of political abuse which Watergate reflected—I also had to be deeply concerned with ensuring that neither the covert operations of the CIA nor the operations of the Special Investigations Unit should be compromised. Therefore, I instructed Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman to ensure that the investigation of the break-in not expose; either an
unrelated covert operation of the CIA or the activities of
the White House investigations unit—and to see that this
was personally coordinated between General Walters, he
Deputy Director of the CIA, and Mr Gray of the FIST. It
was certainly not my intent, nor my wish, that the
investigation of the Watergate break-in or of related acts
be impeded in any way.

On July 6, 1972, I telephoned the Acting Director of the
FBI, L. Patrick Gray, to congratulate him on his successful
handling of the hijacking of a Pacific Southwest Airlines
plane the previous day. During the conversation, Mr Gray
discussed with me the progress of the Watergate
investigation, and I asked him whether he had talked
with General Walters. Mr Gray said that he had, and that
General Walters had assured him
involved. In the discussion, Mr. Gray suggested that the
matter of Watergate might lead him
I told him to
press ahead with his investigation.

It now seems that later, through whatever complex of
individual motives and possible misunderstandings, there
were apparently wide-ranging efforts to limit the
investigation or to conceal the possible involvement of
members of the Administration and the campaign
committee.

I was not aware of any such efforts at the time. Neither,
until after I began my own investigation, was I aware of
any fundraising for defendants convicted of the
break-in at Democratic headquarters, much less authorize
any such fundraising. Nor did I authorize any offer of
executive clemency for any of the defendants.

In the weeks and months that followed Watergate, I
asked for, and received, repeated assurances that Mr.
Dean's own investigation (which included reviewing files
and sitting in on FBI interviews with White House
personnel) had cleared everyone then employed by the
White House of involvement.

In summary then:

(1) I had prior knowledge of the Watergate
operation, of any illegal surveill.
ne, for
I, political purposes.

(2) Long prior to the 1979 campaign, I did set in motion
certain internal security measures, including
...
wire-taps, which I felt were necessary from a national security standpoint
2nd, in the climate then prevailing, also neces ary from a domestic security
standpoint

(3) People who had been involved in the national security operations
later, without my knowledge or approval, undertook illegal activities in the
political campaign of 1972.

(4) Elements of the early post-Watergate reports led me to suspect,
incorrectly, that the CIA had been in some way involved. They also led me
to surmise;--sc, correctly, that since persons originally recruited for covert
national security activities had participated in Watergate, an unrestricted
investigation Of Watergate might lead to and expose those covert national
security operations.

(3) I sought to prevent the exposure of these covert national security
activities, while encouraging t.'acse conducting the investigation to pursue
their inquiry into the Watergate itself. I so instructed my staff the Attorney
General, and the Acting I:director of the FBI.

(6) I also specifically instructed Air. Haldeman and Air.
Ehrlichman to ensure that the I;DI would not carry its investigation into
areas that might compromise se these covert nation: 1 security activities, or
those of the CIA.

(7) At no time did I authorize or know about any offer of executive
clemency for the Watergate defendants Neither did I know until the time of
my own investigation of any efforts to provide them with funds.

CONCLUSION
With hindsight, it is apparent that I should have given more heed to the
warning signals I received along the
way about a Watergate cover-up and less to the reassurances.

With hindsight, several other things also become clear:

With respect to campaign practices and also with respect to campaign
finances, it should now be obvious that no campaign in history has ever
been subjected to the kind of intensive and searching inquiry that has been
focused on the campaign waged in my behalf in 1979.

It is clear that unethical, as well as illegal, activities took place in the
course of that campaign.

None of these too.'C place with my specific approval or knowledge. To
the extent that I may in any way have contributed to the climate in which
they took place, I did 110; intend to; to the extent that I failed to prevent
them, I should have been more - --;.;i..lant.

It was to help ensure against any repetition of this in the future that last
week I proposed the establishment of a top-level;--el, bipartisan,
independent commission to recommend a comprehensive reform of
campaign laws and practices. Given the priority I believe it deserve such
e'torm should,~ be possible before th. I;,"t Congressional
el c t 'ect in 1 to ';.

--T: now appear.) that there were persons who may have gone beyond my
directives, and sought to expand on

RICHARD NIXON, 1973 6'/9

my efforts to protect the national security operations in order to cover up
any involvement they or certain others might have had in Watergate. The
extent to which this s true, and who may have participated and to what de
SAC, are questions that it would not be proper to address here. The proper
forum for settling these matters is in the co u rts .

—To the extent that I have been able to determine what probably
happened in the tangled course of this affa r. on the basis of my own
recollect ect and of the conf licting accounts and evidence that I have
seen, it would app.curt that one factor at work was that at critical points
various people, each with his own perspective and his own responsibilities,
saw the same situation with different eyes and heard the
same words with different ears What might, have seemed insignificant to one seemed significant to another; what one saw in terms of public responsibility, another saw in terms of political opportunity; and mixed through it all, I am sure, was a concern on the part of many that the Watergate scandal should not be allowed to get in the way of what the Administration sought to achieve.

The truth about Watergate should be brought out—ir. an orderly way, recognizing that the safeguards of judicial procedure are designed to find the truth, not to hide the truth.

With his selection of Archibald Cox—who served both President Kennedy and President Johnson as Solicitor General—as the special supervisory prosecutor for matters related to the case, Attorney General designate Richard has demonstrated his own determination to see the truth brought out. In this effort he has my full support.

Considering the number of persons involved in this case whose testimony might be subject to a claim of executive privilege, I recognize that a clear definition of that claim has become central to the effort to arrive at the truth.

Accordingly, executive privilege will not be invoked as to any testimony concerning possible criminal conduct or discussions of possible criminal conduct, in the matters presently under investigations including the Watergate scandal and the alleged cover-up.

I want to emphasize that this statement is limited to my own recollections of what I said and did relating to security and to the Watergate. I have specifically avoided any attempt to explain what other parties may have said and done. My own information on those other matters is fragmentary and to some extent contradictory. Additional information may be forthcoming of which I am unaware. It is also my understanding that the information which has been conveyed to me has also become available to those prosecuting these matters. Under such circumstances, my opinions on the activities of these must be left to the judicial process, our best tool in achieving the just result that we all seek.
for- any one man or group of men to control an FB,l investigation even

i l’ one RX wished to do so.

After General Walters left the office I sat at my desk quietly and
mulled over our conversation. I was confused. un(el-taill and uneasy.
I was concerned enough to believe that the ]:President would i)e
i informed.

I deci(le(l to call Clark AtacCre~~~>-or to request that he inform the

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tllon~~~~~~hts that I conveved to hlnl.

.-tsrain,althouerh tirelle are not the exact lvords. I also conveved to
hill the thousfht that I felt that people on the AVhite I [otlse staft’ avere
careless ancl indiit’elent in their lse of the CI.t and the 1281. I also
extended the thollo,ht tlrat this activitV vvas iniujriotls to the Cl t and
the FP.1. and that these AVhite lE-Iottse staff people ~~~vere +^oundinfr the
Presidellt.

I nslved if he avollld Telease inform the I’resident, nncl it is bV best
recollection that he said Ile vsould handle it.

Tllirtv-seven r:~~~intles later, at ll :4’S a.m. 011 Thlrlrsdav. Jl,lv 6s 1574..

the President calied me. He expressed his con~~~~ratllations to the FISI
ancl asl-~ed ed that I exy)re~~~<s his con.(eratllations to the agents in San
Francisco ax bo sucessflly terminated a hijac!;infr there the previotls
lav. I thanked the President and tlllen said to him, and to the very
best of mv recollection these are the xvords: ~~~ *

3r. President, there is something I lvant to speak to yon aboilt.

Jack Blders mA f----el that people on your staft are tryinCt to morally m-ollnd yoll by using the CTA an(l FBI and hy confrDusing
the question of Cl t interest ill, or l00 in. people the FBI ----rishes to inteviexv.

I have jtlst talked to C’lark ATaeGregor and asl ed him to speal; to yOII abowlt this.

There was a sliftht t)atlse and the President said.; Pnt. vou just COII

tinle to concluel vonr atrfrressive nTIld thoroll(rh inz esti(ration.*'

F~~~olloxvin(r this convelsation I exl~~~erienee no fflrther concern~~~~ .

this kincl. I T)eile}-ed ed that if there \ ns anvttlin,r tr (l the coneerns I
expressed to the President or to ar~~~. ATAcTrefrot that r ~~~-voul{r hear
fllrtller in the matter. I did IlOt. Franlv,v. I came to the concelllsion that
General Mralters ancl I had beelII alatmists, a belief 1’ held for many
molllths.

Cleneral A0talrters eame to my office a(ain on .TI~~~}v 1’). 1974. -^t this
meetinfr he apl)alentlv gave me a memorandllm lvhich, I am non
infolme(l. contained infoimlttioll to tile effect that the CT.Xt furnislled
eertain aliases to ILiddv ancl Hnnt and eertain Trclray)lllemalia to Hlnl.
Hntil I )riefly salv a eoirl of this momorandllm this ssrin r ill the
offi(es of the IT..8. .ttornev for the District of Colum!ia containinfr
a notation of its reeeir)t it mV hand------- rititrfrz I ha(l no recollection of
this memolandlll I sti]l do liOt recall notint,r its conteiltts at the time.

(135)
16. The President indicated that he was unaware that Gray

had destroyed documents found in Hunt's safe when told by

Henry Peterson on April 17, 1973.

16a Transcript, April 17, 1973, 2:45-3:49 p.m.,
  p. 1098.................................

16b Transcript, April 16, 1973, 1:39-3:25 p.m.,
  p. 910,.... ,'

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Page
Yes sir - I'll tell you what happened, HE said
he met with Ehrlichman - in Ehrlichman's office
Dean was there and they told him they had some
stuff in HUNT'S office that was utterly unrelated
to the Watergate Case. They gave him two manilla
envelopes that were sealed. He took them. He says,
they said get rid of them. Dean doesn't say that.
Dean says I didn't want to get rid of them so I
gave them to Gray. But in any event, Gray took
them back, and I said Pat where are they, and he
said I burned them. And I said: “
He burned them?
I said that's terrible.
Unrelated - only thing he can say was - he did it
because it was political stuff I suppose?
Well, you know, the cynics are not going to believe
it was unrelated.
Oh yes of course.
I said, did you read it?
Who hande
Dean and Ehrlichman. Dean -- Gray says he never
looked at it - never read it.

Did Dean? - did we ask Dean what the contents
ld it to him, didn't ask Dean because he said it was
We're going to go back to him again.

(Inaudible). I'll get you out of here. (Inaudible) yet.

By the way Mr. President, I think that...

(Inaudible) evidence -- not evidence? (Inaudible) explain that

the evidence was not evidence -- is that right? The staff out

of his safe?

Well - - that's.

What would you get after him on this -- destruction of evidence?

Well you see the point of it is -- there are two other items that --

according to the cíefense -- Hunt's defense -- that were missing.

Both of which were notebooks.

P, Hunt's notebooks?

HP And we can't rind those notebooks. Dean says, Fielding says,

and Kehrli says, they have no recollection of those notebooks.

P Yeah.

HP Hunt says they were there, and --

P so...

HP So only to the extent that the notebooks are missing which Hunt

says they're germane.

P (Inaudible) doe he tell us very much, huh?

---

HP No sir
he had personally destroyed documents from Hunt's safe.
The United States v. Howard Hunt, James W. McCord,

Bernard L. Barker,萍v. Martinez, Frank Sturgis and
Virgilio R. Gonzales.

Mr. Philip J. Cavanaugh, counsel for the government.

Mr. Sidney Sacks, counsel for Mr. Hunt.

Mr. Bernard L. ensXee, counsel for Mr. McCord.

Mr. Jerald A. Sturcis, counsel for Messrs. Barker, Martinez, Sturgis and Gonzales.

The Court: As to the defendants do you have the right to be present here today?

Mr. Shultz, I will hear you with reference to the motion filed by your clients to withdraw their pleas of guilty. I will allow one half-hour and then I will allow the Government one half-hour to answer.

Mr. BEr-Enk: I will make a brief statement.

The Court: does.

Is R. S[ISL---]: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: As to the defendants I will you, represent that do you have the right to be present here today?

If I file certain, I agree to withdrast their pleas of

The motion to file certain, I agree to withdraw their pleas of

The Government one half-hour to answer.

If I file certain, I will make a brief statement.

The Court: does.

If I file certain, I will make a brief statement to withdra ves to

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...
that Magruder and Porter perjured themselves to a grand jury.

01 April 17, 1973, the President advised Ehrlichman and Haldeman against perjury.

18a Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m.

18b Transcript, April 17, 1973, 12:5-2:20 p.m.

NOTE: Objection has been raised by Congresswoman Holtzman and Congresswoman Seiberling that the first sentence is a conclusion rather than a statement of information within the Rules of Procedure of the Committee.

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Magruder is (unintelligible)

Yeah. Magruder is totally knowledgeable on the whole thing.

Yeah

Alright now, we have gone through the trial. I don't know if Mitchell has perjured himself in the Grand Jury or not.

Who?

Mitchell* I don't know how much knowledge he actually had.

I know that Magruder has perjured himself in the Grand Jury.

I know that Porter has perjured himself in the Grand Jury.

P Who is Porter? (unintelligible)

D He is one of Magruder's deputies. They set up this scenario which they ran by me. They said, "How about this?" I said,

"I don't know, If this is what you are going to hang, o

fine."

P What did they say in the Grand Jury?

D They said, as they said before the trial in the Grand Jury, that Liddy had come over as Counsel and we knew he had these capacities to do legitimate intelligence. We had no idea what he was doing. He was given an authorization of $250,000 to collect information, because our surrogates were out on the road. They had no protection, and we had information that there were going to be demonstrations against them,

and that we had to have a plan as to what liabilities they

(146)
14 were going to be confronted with and Liddy was charged with doing this. We had no knowledge that he was going to buy the DNC. The point is, that is not true? Tha W ' S right *

Magruder did know it was going to take place?

Magruder gave the instructions to be back in the DNC.

He did?

Yes .

You know that?

Yes_

I see . O . K .

I honestly believe that no one over here knew that. I know that as God is my maker, I had no knowledge that they were going to do this.

Bob didn't either, or wouldn't have known that either. You are not the issue involved. Had Bob known, he would be.

Bob -- I don't believe specifically knew that they were going in there. - -

I don't think so.

I don't think he did. I thin]; he knew that there was a capacity to do this but he was not: given the specific direction .

Did Strachan know?
I called him this morning and told him I wanted to talk to him later to ask him about that appointment June 19, but I don't think I better get into that any more.

Well (unintelligible) for your private information, I have gone back to the participants in that meeting where I was supposed to have said, "send Hunt out of the country. "

To a man, they say it didn't happen. And two of them said, "Gee if either one of them --"

What about the meeting?

And they said, " If that had happened, it would have been burned into my recollection. " The sort of thing like you ordering --'

You better damned well remember being -- The main thing is this, John, and when you meet with the lawyers and you Bob, and I hope Strachan has been told -

believe me -- don't try to hedge anything before the damned Grand Jury. I'm not talking about morality.
but I’m talking about the vulnerabilities.

Sure, good advice. Huh?

(148)
19. John Dean advised the President on March 21, 1973, of Hunt’s demand for approximately $120,000 for legal fees and family support. The President explored the option of meeting Hunt’s demands so as to secure the time needed to consider alternative courses. The President was not concerned with the possible Watergate related disclosures, but rather which disclosure of the National Security matters Hunt had been involved in as a member of the Plumbers.

The President advised Dean that the money could not be paid because it would look like a cover-up. At another point in the conversations the President requested advice as to whether or not the money should be paid. Later the President concludes that Hunt will blow the whistle no matter what is done for him.


19b Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m., p. 192, w. 151


19d Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m., p. 242

19e Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m., p. 243

(149)
H Right.

P He is playing hard ball with regard to Ehrlichman for example, and that sort of thing. He knows what he's got.

H What's he planning on, money?

V Money and --

H Really?

P --7

P

224

It's about $120,000. That's what, Bob. That would be easy. It is not easy to deliver, but it is easy to get.

Now,

If the case is just that way, then the...thing to do if the thing cranks out.

If, for example, you say look we are not-going to continue to -- let's say, frankly, on the assumption that if we continue to cut our losses, we are not going to win. But in the end, we are going to be bled to death... And in the end, it is all going to come out anyway: Then, you get the worst of both worlds. We are going to lose and people are going

And look like dopes!

And in effect, look like a cover-up. So that we can't do.

Now the other line, however, if you take that line, that we are not going to continue to cut our losses, that means then we have to look square in the eye as to what the hell those losses are, and see which people can -- so we can
F: It seems to me we have to keep the cap on the bottle that much, or we don't have any options.
D: That's right.
P: Either that or it all blows right now?
D: That's the question.
P: We have Hunt, Krogh. Well go ahead with the other ones.
D: Now we've got Kalmbach.

Kalmbach received, at the close of the '68 campaign in January of 1969, he got a million $700,000 to be custodian for. That came down from New York, and was placed in safe deposit boxes here. Some other people were on the boxes. And ultimately, the money was taken out to California. Alright, there is knowledge of the fact that he did start with a million seven. Several people know this. Now since 1969, he has spent a good deal of this money, and accounting for it is going to be very difficult for Herb. For example, he has spent close to $500,000 on private polling. That opens up a whole new thing. It is not illegal, but more of the same thing.
P: Everybody does polling.
D: That's right. There is nothing criminal about private polling.
P: People have done private polling all through the years.'
thing. Call everybody in the White House, and I want them to
come and I want them to go to the Grand Jury.

D This may happen ~~, without even our calling for it when these ~~

P Vesco?

D No. Well, that is one possibility.' But also when these people
go back before the Grand Jury here, they are going to pull all
these criminal defendants back before the Grand Jury and

immunize them.

P Who will do this?

D To do what? ' ' ~

P To do what? ' ' ~

To let them talk about anything further; they want to talk about.

D Nothing'.

P To hell with it ! ' ' D

D They're going to stonewall it, as it now stands. Excepting

Hunt. That's why his threat.

H It's Hunt-opportunity.

P That's why for your immediate things you have no choice but to
come up with the $120,000; or whatever it is. Right?

D That's right . . 0 I

P Would you agree that that's the prime thing that you damn well

better get that done?
Obviously he ought to be given some signal anyway.

(Expletive deleted), get it. In a way that -- who is going to
talk to him? Colson He is the one who is supposed to know
him?

Well, Colson doesn't have any money though. That is the
thing. That's been one of the real problems. They haven't
been able to raise a million dollars in cash. (unintelligible)
has been just a very difficult problem as we discussed before.

Mitchell has talked to Pappas, and John asked me to call him

last night after our discussion and after you had met with,

John to see where that was. And I said, "Have you talked to:
to Pappas?" He was at home, and up the phone
so it was all in code. I said, "Have you talked to the Greej?"
And he said, "Yes, I have." I said, "Is the Greek bearing
gifts?" He said, "Well, I'll call you tomorrow on that."

Well look, what it is you need on that? When ---, I'm not familiar with the money situation.
do and everyone is out there doing it, and

that is where our breakdown has come every time.

Well, if you had it, how would you get it to somebody?

Well, I got it to LaRue by just leaving it in mail boxes
and things like that. And someone phones Hunt to come

and pick it up. As I say, we are a bunch of amateurs in that

It sounds easy to
V Yenh. It would get Magruder, and it could possibly set

Colson.

D That's right. Could get --


h Hunt can't get Mitchell.

D I don't think Hunt can get Mitchell. Hunt's go. 2
t lot of hearsay.

P Ehrlichman?

D Krogh could go down in smoke.

P On the other hand -- Krogh says it is a national security

matter. Is that what he says?

D

P

D

P

D

242} J

Yeah, but that won't sell ultimately in a criminal situation. It may be mitigating Oil sentences but it won't, in the main matter. Seems we're going around the track. You have no choice on Hunt but to try to keep Right now we have no choice. But my point is, do you ever have any choice on Hunt? That A is the point. No matter what we do here now, John, whatever he wants if he doesn't get it -- immunity, etc., he is going | to blow the whistle. I What I have been trying -to conceive of is how we could lay

out everything we know in a way that we have told the Grand

( 154)
Jury or somebody else, so that if a Hunt blows, so what's new? It's already been told to a Grand Jury and they found no criminal liability and they investigated it in full. We're sorry fellow -- And we don't, it doesn't -

P (Unintelligible) for another year.

D That's right.

P And Hunt would get off by telling them the Ellsberg thing.

D No Hunt would go to jail for that too -- he should understand that.

P That's a point too. I don't think I would throw that out.

I don't think we need to go into everything. (adjective deleted) thing Hunt has done.

D No.

P Some of the things in the national security area. Yes.

H Whoever said that anyway. We laid the groundwork for that,

P But here is the point, John. Let's go the other angle, is to decide if you open up the Grand Jury: first, it won't be any good, it won't be believed. And then you will have two things going: the Grand Jury and the other things, committee, etc. The Grand Jury appeals to me from the standpoint, the President makes the move. All these charges being bandied about, etc., the best thing to do is that I have asked the Grand Jury to look into any further charges. All charges have been raised. That is the place to do it, and not before a
20. At the March 21, 1973, meeting the President after considering several options seized on the possibility of calling a new grand jury, thereby delaying Hunt's sentencing and making the immediate payment unnecessary as a means of buying time. Not once after this option was explored was there any suggestion that Hunt's demand be met.

The concluding page of the transcript of the March 21, 1973, morning meeting clearly demonstrates that the President recognizes that any blackmail and cover-up activities then in progress could not continue.

20a Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11,55 a.m., pp. 245-246

20b Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11-55 a.m., p. 249...

N Z E: Objection has been raised by Congresswoman Holtzman and Congressman Seiberling as to whole statement being a conclusion rather than a statement of information within the Rules of Procedure of the Committee.
without a transcript.

D What we need also, sir

H But John's view is if we make the public statement that we talked about this morning, the thing we talked about last night -- each of us in our hotel, he says that will immediately lead to a Grand Jury.

P Fine -- alright, fine.

H As soon as we make that statement, they will have to call a Grand Jury.

P They may even make a public statement before the Grand Jury, in order to --:

So it looks like we are trying to do it over.

D investigations by the U.S. Attorneys office.

P If we said that the reason we had delayed this is until after the sentencing -- You see that the point is that the reason time is of the essence, we can't play around on this. If they are going to sentence on Friday, we are going to have to move on the (expletive-deleted) thing pretty fast, See what I mean?

D That's right.

P So we really have a time problem.

D The other thing is that The Attorney General could call Sirica, and say that, "The government has some manor
dev.-elop.aents that it is considering. Would you hold for two weeks?" If we set ourselves on a course of action.

P   Yep, yep.

D   See, the sentencing may be in the wrong perspective right some things that I am not at liberty to discuss with you, but I want to ask that the Court withhold two weeks sentencing.

H   So then the story is out: "Sirica delays sentencing Watergate __

D   I think that could be handled in a way between Sirica and Kleindienst that it would not get out. Kleindienst apparently does have good rapport with Sirica. He has never talked since this case developed, but ___

P   That's helpful. So Kleindienst should say that he is working on something and would like to have a week. I wouldn't take two weeks. I would take a week.

D   I will tell you the person that I feel we could use his counsel on this, because he understands the criminal process better than anybody over here does.

P   Petersen?

D   Yes, Petersen. It is awkward for Petersen. He is the head or the criminal division. But to discuss some of things with him we may well want to remove him from the head of

(159)
H We should change that a little bit. John's point is exactly right. The erosion here now is going -- , and that is the thing that we have to turn off at whatever cost. We have to turn it off at the lowest cost we can, but at-whatever cost it takes.

i) That's what we have to do.

P Well, the erosion is inevitably going to come here, apart from anything and all the people saying well the Watergate isn't a major issue. It isn't. But it will be. It's bound to.

(Unintelligible) has to go out. Delaying is the great danger to the White House area. We don't, I say that the White House can't do it. Right?

Yes, sir.
Neither of the participants of the March 21, 1973, morning meeting came away with any opinion that the President authorized payments to Hunt. Haldeman concluded that the President rejected payments to Hunt. Dean testified: "The money matter was left very much hanging at the meeting. Nothing was resolved."

21a Transcript, April 17, 1973, 12:35-2:20 p.m.

Page 21b Dean 4 SSC, 1423

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H Could very well be. John, I can't believe, is a basically dishonorable guy think there's no question that John is a strong self-promoter, self-motivated guy for his own good, but -

p But in that conversation I was -- we were -- I was -- I said, "Well for (expletive removed), let's --"

TT You explored in that conversation the possibility of whether such kinds of money could be raised. You said, "Well, we ought to be able to raise --"

P

H That's right.

P "How much money is involved? " and he said, "Well it could be a million dollars. " You said, "That's ridiculous. You can't say a million. Maybe you say a million, it may be 2 or 10, and 11"

But then we got into the blackmail.

You said, 'Once you start down the path with blackmail it's constant escalation. "

Yep. That's my only conversation with regard to that.

They could jump and then say, "Yes, well that was morally wrong. What you should have said is that blackmail is wrong not that it's too costly. "

P Oh, well that point (inaudible) investigation --

H (inaudible)
after that we sent him to Camp David?
Senator INOUYE: "On March 20th, the President indicated that he still did not have all the facts."

511. 'D-Ns. Bl'eat date was LE!' t) --ertator 2

Senator ISO: --. --. --. --. --.--farcll 90,

Alr. D3A-d. r'thc presiderlt cld not state to one5 on the 20th, vThen I re.eived a call fromn th3 Presic'LeIst I toid hili ri at tllat time that T lvould iFl-e to meet V7titl h i.m f fie nerii, n-lomint, and :E would wilec to tell him M-l, t I: thou2r,h,-- tne implication ofE the s:aaUioil atus, lhat lhad really j{larnlsted me at th3t; time vlas tne nev-~~- detnand from Wlr. Wfunt that indeed, this thillL, vzas gettintr far oui; of halld, tlat the ~White I-Touse vsas novv l beII,--. --, drectcly subject to blaclimai! and :r ctid not luloav how to handle it.

Sen.,tor IS.o--z Is it yo-- te,st~~ony th2t on Alarch 20 the Presi...

\[snert dif in fact i! ve all the facts Sr:

Al--. 19v.Ns. X tidl lltot hear 5705!, a--r3m., Senator, I am sorry.

Sen. tor IN-01TY2. 5S it SC; lte.-ti.-nony (hat on I.larch 20 t.he Presi...

\[cnt dicl not hrtve ali tile facts ?

'Alr. DDAN. SC do not izloxx lvht-Lt th3 President lmew on Wlarch 20. AVe had had conversatio-s-- h2f0!lnt wtht.----We had convers3ti0ns that I lsas p orsonalzJ enfrac,ed LR on Septenaber 1'- o . the preced.inrr year. WN7e had had conv3l-s,,tions in earlTS Febr3- or late February in nvhich I tried t:0 start tel'jнт,-- him soma or i my o--stn ulVive.Inent. AVe had also had a discussion CIL Alarch 1t, about the mone,y (lemancts tTlat nvere ';.

Leer.<-- sneade. wtt tllat i:ims he (tiscussed the--i'itet tllat a 'million- dollars is no pro'olem. He:repeated.ii--cexertld-tlnes. l-can very-`xividlvly-recall that the lva----- he sort-o-- rollet' liis dlair,b:Lds from lls desk an(l I learned over to Wlr. 3:Ial--.leman and said, "A million dollars is no l)roblem,

.2 nd tlen he came b cJr and -asl, edit t ";Tell, svho is ma----in (r t tese -demands,:': l

and I said they are p/rin-cip311: -comm--from Alr.-H'trllt- and-he got into t he fact that I r-lr-t--~aZ bee ne riven clemency cnd h's conv3r--a ti on about his annovance tllat he had alsD talked to Cvlson about this in addition' tll E.lrlrich:ln, and the money maSitter vzaS left very much hangint at t.nat meetin--. SToTllin----vas resolved. " ," 3

.jenator 1x-oslt. AKs th8 President's conlnsel, did you,~ g14. ver.7 lefOral f--.shion, advise liim of your meetin--gs in-Feba-lalT in the Attorney

General's office? --

Atr. DEAN-. W1a channel of re)--rvintr--was throubfh Wlr. Haldetman or

5Tr. lZhrlichman. At the completioin of the second meetin,\t I sounrrht net an appointnmen; w-ith Wlr. -Haldeman. I recall --

. Renator ISO--E. In the subsfequent meetin ,s lvith the President did V<s)l C1 earJr advise him of the break-in, your involvement and the cover np. and your involvement?

Arr. DEAN. I cettair.tilly did on the 2,l3t- and I had attempted to do it r--rlier in Bebrtrary bUt l le lvas not interested in it xwhen I raised it, Xntl the conve----at,iOn got CUT short. l’ told him I thouta,h t I had,an,
'Instruction of illustrate problem and gave Isim, started to vive him-the
things. She did not 'Want to purmoit further

Senator D>o--ls. "In the precedinfr week Dean had been

Wichard Aloore concern abotlt Dean's own involveinent. "referred

tn the meeting in Witchell’s office, the plumbers operation and the 1311s

ti C hl-cak-in and the demands by Hunt possibly on Blarch 16 fol more

money."

(163)
At the March 21, 1973, morning meeting while discussing

the practicability of getting another grand jury the President told Dean and Haldeman to get Mitchell to come to Washington, so

that Mitchell could meet with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean.

22a Transcript, March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m.

pp 247-248. 8

(165)',
the Criminal Division and say, "That related to this case, you will have no relation." Give him some special assignment over here where he could sit down and say, "Yes, this is an obstruction, but it couldn't be proved," so OII and so forth. We almost need him out of there to take his counsel. I don't think he would want that, but he is the most knowledgeable.

P How could we get him out?

D I think an appeal directly to Henry -

P couldn't the President call him in as Special Counsel to the White House for the purpose of conducting an investigation. Rather than a Dean in office, having him the Special Counsel to represent us before the Grand Jury.

D I have thought of that. That is one possibility.

H On the basis that Dean has now become a principal, rather than a Counsel.

D I could recommend that to you.

H Petersen is planning to leave, anyway.

P You could recommend it and he could come over and I would says "Now Petersen, we want you to get to the bottom of the damn thing. Call another Grand Jury or anything else. Correct?

Well, now you gotta know whether Kleindienst can get Sirica to hold off. Right? Second, you have to get Mitchell down

(166)
here. And you and Ehrlichman. I. C. run all and I Mitchell by tomorrow. *

Why don't we do that tonight?

I don't think you can get Mitchell. If that soon, can you?

John?

It would be helpful if you could.

It would be better if he could come down this afternoon.

Actually, I am perfectly willing to meet with the group. I don't know whether I should.

H

Or maybe have Dean report to me at the end. See what conclusions you have reached. I think I need to stay away from the Mitchell subject at this point do you agree?

D Uh... huh.

D Unless we see... I know, s. 3 rae sort of a reluctant dragon there.

H You might meet with the rest of us, but I am not sure you would want to meet with John in this group at this time.

P Alright. Fine. And my point is that I think it is good, frankly, to consider these various options. And then, once you decide on the right plan, you say, "John," you say, "No doubts about the right plan before the election. You handled it just right. You contained it. And now after the election we have to have another plan. Because we can't for four years have this thing el. + I.) oJ away." We can't do it.
Eldeman and Dean left the meeting with the President at approximately 11:55 a.m. on March 21, 1973. Pursuant to the President's request Haldeman called Mitchell at approximately 12:30 p.m. and requested Mitchell come to Washington. Dean's testimony confirms this.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>PLACED</th>
<th>DISC</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>250 AM</td>
<td>OUT</td>
<td></td>
<td>COLONEL HYMAN</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 PM</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>THE PRESIDENT</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>253 AM</td>
<td>OUT</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>DON KENDALL</td>
<td>O-166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406 PM</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>DAN MITCHELL'S OFFICE</td>
<td>O-166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:25 PM</td>
<td>OUT</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>THE PRESIDENT</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the record, you are represented today by counsel in the presence of Mr. Eason and Mr. Strickler; is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q So, then, anything you do say should be true and voluntary. Do you understand that?

A Yes.

Q And you understand further, as in the past, the fact that you have been advised that you are a potential target of this Grand Jury's investigation which means that you may well be considered as a defendant for purposes of indictment by this Grand Jury.

A I understand.

Q Hereunderdaring all of these facts and rights which you possess, are you prepared to testify this morning?

A I am.

Q This, Haldeman, may I direct your attention to the 21st day of March, 1973, and ask whether you recall meeting with the President and John Dean that day at the White House at some time around 2:00 o'clock that afternoon?
be said freely
...Z'

1. Grand

23b. H. R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY. JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 4-?

A Yes, r I do.

Q And recall entering a meeting, which was then-I in progress s?

A That's correct, yes.

Q NG-4 following that meeting did the-e conversation with John Mitchell who was the-in New York City on the telephone?

A Yes, sure, there I did. Let's see--March 21st

Q Can you give us the substance of your account of the substance of the telephone conversation and the substance of st?

A I don't have a record of that, but I do recall a conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean and the President.
I meet that day or the following day to discuss some of these questions and then to report back to the President.

I feel sure that I called Mr. Mitchell to request him to arrange a meeting.

What do you recall of the conversation between yourself and Mr. Mitchell?

A I think there was a call. I think I called him.
H. R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE JUR., 4-7

F: ...t7:..*:..** that ... S0.20'i... else cl,leu ...t1'.** ..ely general rec ztleAct-'.s

170t, ...xoEl?... "1...-1 t...-at: J' h لديك. caT le'd lii:n arS5~52id.tld'; the o-t sh ci... S;
, ...A.-1c~1 ...' P i to .SFc.: et a~...: E15~h z, lrt ito co.r: ... dofm.

Q: Ti: 44 no:s S1iS C2.Xr ... ...) Z*t yox, di...:c=~~~ Malth ...o~o~o~

i pUr... '-c:i=lal-2. Je.S: t he protelas ...-~o~ to 1J31t~...'-t't sl--ageste

Krou, r~--sj~~ t i.fq afw7.e Cta1,r,Rti).erf,!:lal irml-- ws,tt! ...~, Xje~heli?

;~ zsC:e that t ...re~... 'llt lC).

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I ito 8,~~* tC1:ca2. Il 321 cArisi::ance ftrat Ee P>~esid:nt: re:gu:esWe: t~~~'i':

I you ~-eet eis to X~ow to cqea wJ thl >xr. "~~~ITit~~ S aertand for sUbse~*

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i--ha.. woil.Le'~sse t--W2oa--?~aar;3 yoll 2^7ould l<e211, stef0SK'12; t :t'i J)'er in 'f;

had- such a dt scusDion?

A I w ould tnt-A. 50 bUe I don't see hzb as halttrwg h
the m.a --o . pOililt of dlscvllsn o.n eiEle r at Uhe t<LE 0E the ph:.i
call to set up t.ne L?Eet--ttig or at the a2eeting which toc3.< Dlac-;

on the 22nd.

Q You 're 'cal];:ing now - agairl anout trr, T1=--t `S specif 7 c

reque3t, is that correct?

Zi Yes.

Q thHzn were you xIrst advIsce? that vtLne XZ25 --:iakir.g
tho, Presid12nt sl1.7er, ested t., R1. ffl h. ave a meetir!C +; i-th Ll:;:: hxl-~:; "fai-de-)
1 r, ali(l., l.lrlr r - vi.: n to clis-"~-, ~s-~1-3.5.r tv ileal l li .-.l tlli r still.-ti.,lz. ~Ylial enl.erg.ed f.-orn *') l t diSCUJSI0l! afcer Haldemall carne into the on'ee nvas
t.l-sat Jol 11 'li.'ehel! slJou]d ac.;ol.:rl:. -t.O' illin/selected. for ftre izxe izx.-.il.lr,e 1T
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~vlich h..d ooCur;>:nl a*~er June 17. f

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in°., *J. ith f-Ialdemall ank1 13hrlir!~ -rlan to clisi.etss tile xl~., t,-ter ~illl th; r. rrhe
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now wsis for 5.;.fitchiel to seld) fol.v°.rel an~] i-f.;A'-iteht-!! Xve, E k, step
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volvecl in the 78.'111t? Su cise in tlv eor erup. --~

AccordinlLVy, X.:ra.de.-Pt.a.n. a.s l rea(', caller.; ;;;\-itcheli anclr asl-ed .hat
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* N) j r Le.-b ate l-n.e:tl.'-tz ' o-w--

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and-1 h. d a secG.rsd mettine -7?ith rhe Presiteliqi;:i. Before cllterrrif, tltis
rmeettllX l looc a brief discilv io-vl i,n t)----e Pre iiains'zs out-t---* Jg2ICd of thc
Executive (;li-tce Prulllidi-irr suite svith Lalt-elsan in -s.hich X tvid llrnr

that xse ]tfid tvn (>:~.~.l.oni:;

(8Jne is that this tili,.;~ goes a.ill the wa,v nncl de. isi mvtill both the pre
acti.-ritic-. and; the ;:ostact.ivi-ties,zn the s.e.---oll.~-l alternative; if rhe
covsr.-p svas to proeeod vwe • voukl have to drnev the xvafrons in a circle
around tle st-:-ite Ilolise and t.l(lat t)---e Wilite r.cuse prot-ot itself.
I told Hslldemarl that. it llad heen tile IN'hite t*~.Tou<s's assist.m(e to .ile
reelctio:nal commiiiTt1,e that l-tacl ,S.otterl ns into much • l•i;:.s prc;lsien) and
nowv the only ho>}>e .% otldlc be to protec,t.t ou -.r. Eekes from furAller
illvolvt.;.mellt.

'Clle meetin;-- svith the Presiaent that afternoa with IT,tllrletnans
Ehrlichlan, and rr.v.elf svas 7t trejzre.d, dous dispair-oirlme,nt to me
because it vvas qui.e elear tlat th- covelalp as far as the APHitc l-touse
V.::-IS concerned Ivas toing to con..intle. I recall lhat Evhile Haklemall,
E,hrlcchm.thn. and I xsere sittinfr at a smrrll table in front of the Presi-
dent in his Executive C)ffice ]?3midint office tlli. tt I fcr the first time
snid in front of the Presideltt that I thou-.~ t that Haldeman, 'Eil2Ich-
mano. nd Dean lve re all indictable Ior obstruction of :;)13tiC2 ancl tlclat
W.tS the reason I disa.-.reed vvitth all that v;ns bein<~ discussed at ihat
point in time.

I could tell that both Haldeman. an cl particularl sF IZhrlichman. n-ere
ver-- ullhapl>-v with mv comments. I had let thent vewr t.early r.lknow
that I Ivas not :-oine to partilicrse in the matter anV frlther ancl that
I thol-:-e. rht. it VE-as tirse that ever, vbodfi start thinldin,.~t about tellint,-
the truth.

I a-ain repeated to them I did not think it vas l)-ibe to per
petnate the coverfly) ancl the iml)ortant tincO now- avas to (tet the
President out in front.
The arrangement had been made to have a meeting after luncheon with Rhrlichman, Fialkeleman, Atitchell, and myself. Arr. Atitchell earlie to Ayshin, ytc. n twat mornin, for a meeting in

J.-Inklemall's office in which Ehrlichman, Mitchell, Halcleman, and
On March 21, 1973 Dean had a telephone conversation with LaRue concerning Hunt's request for money and Dean suggested LaRue call Mitchell. LaRue called Mitchell in the early afternoon of March 21, 1973 and advised Mitchell that he had a request for $75,000 for Hunt's legal fees. Mitchell acknowledges that he advised LaRue to pay the money for attorney fees. During the March 21, 1973 late afternoon meeting with the President, Dean denied that he had spoken to either LaRue or Mitchell, when in fact he had spoken to both.
JOHS DEAN TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 14, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND jury, 16

A No, he did not cat.

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L Y%E then 2, *%e [1 -.e Vqem, 7: & .ilolli,hr he s] n,ou~ ~ c1 cts 2rdz t
',~ to7 fl hin:: X tho???~:l~v~~ he 0Lsie*h:t; to t2}.l. to iss Wcnel 1. tglrouo ? 4. i
Q IXD-~7, olrif t ttle m~~.ee'*.le~~~ 0'1 t~~!-~!st •Jet" the Pres.t-0
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[ aryone ;ZhrZcn2r ,sir. ~9Jicitil"ll Ildad t-~e~~~n cQInt-C Led ~eit:h J.esrec:t th
tt) co:25r.C, dolzrs to lW~s:~h>~nc,tc~;~ ar'd Dee~~inO wit;~h yo,_, an~~ "-t ;
}3L;~ide>an alld th2 PresLient: and WI~~. Eh lic&a v2 t?
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A: Do you learn that?

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IIlan. Originally, it had been ho,Jed tinnt T'lr. lditchen 1 CO*X!!Ct

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1 X do ii-x cre.til the ne.>:9 r.le>~~r.ir.~~,. So z r.eetin~. tvas scheGMIcol ;~~o

2: j t tllD ne.xt r:>.orna n;

25' Q l'o:v, late~ on in tlue ci~~E, o. t,le olst, ao~ heid _

(178)
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I),.-.:C., nf.'ha afrt..->r^oo., cr t11e early e:i-eniAng?

A The first nal.t n:a:ll

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621Avenr,

ti That is c<,--rect.

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4±1 Q --'hat *12xs nslel yOU! spokell to trS-. Dee:a! and I=lr-- elitC'.?t'll?

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u A That is co.rect.

±±±±±±-

2 |--o,7 statillg *zith eir. De>aalR can you tell us azhat !,=.

P e an to! C you in stilbance?

A l.y best recollection of ~--hat phone call is tho.t b~

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I1. 1)2aa cal),cwd Lne. He statUd -t^l-at he had hacl a reau-2st for a

11 2Trvfl for 11. llvl!t's ex-panses, livi.lg
c.e:;p2lne5.

(179)
I was going to have any further involvement, counsel, or effect.

I told Dr. D a that he did not get a $25,000 interest in stock in the company, that if.

A Yes. I recall that he did not get a $25,000 interest in the company, that if.

I think he C f-4E ex2, s's. i. tTr. li. U.n '.' 172S due to be sold for.

So Y

17

ls

19

201

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23

28!

*CEG~*SEBERG 11...11
"XCR 1-3 session 11

I think he C f-4E ex2, s's. i. tTr. li. U.n '.' 172S due to be sold for.

Q 1. xe ttr. 1)ean identified an ar io-ant e~ r. lon-ey; a

I the coin se of that v-contamination that is. I went to 2c1 17g for?

recollection is that the- e-ostas

S 10,000 real- e-8 for.

hi's living e- senses.

I Q NOH I use it an hld a conversation l-lit 01 tTri

fichell folio-ing that hld br. Dear...

Ji That is correct.
sense of urgency about it, yet.
StiOst:...iiCC, o,' t'lat c-o.larersa..iol'~

A As is to: ".7"?'tC'f'f RiMk (2 3... ot'~.~ d~s s.7...... TC:J)

yes. I told l... 2. t'sllch, ll of itEly c. ot-others-A-... :.; 7th Jrh l Dun-

ndical'(c:i.ng :hal. incall lic..- n<3D- go:in J to he inlOl ~-oed. any fur-'.t--e ^

in the auozoz-l: a-P:ic7l and dl.ser:izzi:ion of moine~zw

I told -2. ts!chell. t'aa~: w-e ha.' h. (i a recr4u.2.~ fzy;

$'75, OJG fo ~ sT ~. Itunt. ile as':ed r.2 :.;hat ie -.; as for. I tol.e

.e~...d 'nc s_id th.lv uma2; t]le circu stltcesf he 5aidr Si~ tElirLEX

you ought to pay it"r which I lJrc:Ice;->ded t-o cLo.

Q IS it a >Uact then that C/01E 'didr, ' -e l"'enticys t.e i--rr .

. 7/te:le31 tne rec.uest 'Cj'i' N,SO,OOG:-~

A Th-... ett Ef try 5h In... ilae grlestloiv f,6o, 000

I lor ma.in'cenence.

A To the b2st ofn.~ y recoil.c-ction ehwf.E; is to-e, r,

thi.9s this was a d2ctsion i~mado myself. It ;.'7dS ce~tatnhy
a rather large sum of roney I received, quite frankly approaching the amount of roney which I had on hand at that time.

The only amount of roney I recall discussing with Mr. Hitchell was the $75,000 which was delivered.

Q What was the exact amount of the conversation you held with Mr. Hitchell by which Mr. Hitchell indicated that he had or had not heard of this request earlier than the time of your visit?

(181)
Q: ...testify, FEBRUARY 13, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 7-10

Recall I that the date following the delivery of your letter was April 28, 1974.

Q: Do you recall or your own recollection, or through your notes, what this was? We referred to it as 

A: I can't specify. I don't recall a precise day. It could have been the evening of the dinner party with the Ungers?

I specified can you recall the precise day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: All you can be sure of is that it was some time around the middle of the month of April?

A: ...tions.

Q: The date in your recollection or your notes, that this was?

A: ...tions.

Q: Are you sure of is that it was the evening of the dinner party with the Ungers?

A: ...tions.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: ...tions.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

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A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

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Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

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Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?

A: I can't recall a precise day.

Q: Can you recall the pXecutive day?
Now in fixing the date of these events, do you recall that the date following this delivery of money was as the
24c. JOSX MITCEELI TESTIMOSY, JULY 10, 1973, 4 SSC 1630-31

103J

art. 1.05 (TPOL. 5 ex. 87f.

itr. -- AS15. 'N: osf, -Vilb' 4lio. yOll le:!ve todlr l)OSitiOll --I the director
C( C( C( t1 C( C- -r5Pxi i... rnm. ?

art. ALITCEELI 1.01 tile | 31 tile : PII (1 J ) .

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hrr. Sllirr--.rrrLe, Yes,le sta-s-e.( ]0 011 aS. Afr. :Alat:Grerol's (lepplts.

Art. D2: S:F'E. Knd -ve you irot axvare --vit!ell --oll ivere le- -virl-t tltlat SHW.
INla. --rfllder at least fackel some serious l)ro!3Il--tl of be133tr indic.ted on the
7t teas-it-o1,t ttle DemoefJ ifce Wation*1 Con--ntitce lle..Lq(lcartels SLS oft
II:i:It y 1 2

Lir. A. rTTC.. r:.XJ., wtS of July 1 ? I thi[x]; t]lat s: as :l potent,:al, 5 es.

Lrr. 3)AS]' W00N7. (OU did lltlet axvith tile Pesi1(Zy on JlyUJE 30, 197.U,

just l.Jc3eole 3'Oll left. SS s i uldelesLall(l, ysu llad luncit xvti the Presi1(Zy, t.

Blle. Bkrc-To-F>x.xl. Tlllat is cerred, sir.

ALr. D:.SJI:. Dicl vou thit?Jo. il: il: 5 our duty to tell the Presidellt 3t that lunch before T7'0It
leltb that the man xhvo v.7as l-laying SUCItl A lie-- role i hix calnp ip. al; 'l-1-Lltloder, h5[l,
shle a. plolelem that he nti--irt be zrldicte Ior tlle sake s i.k-is1 C[T 'lke Der,i;iera,tic Nation]
al C03Hlimit;e+:+ heecqlla.- IrDr-

Art. AI.--.,?crz; J.Lrr., tlll. Da-.1, 'I tllink 7'Olt Ilnd I lla.ve --one over to the l)Oillt mhere --v-e
have establ shecl that the 'bthie HounA a horlor stories liad come out; ill colnction +.--t lh.e prol)
lecin at tllat, p.--rticllllrzr time and tllere --vrit's', the qwtesL;On ox OX Iffias-< of the tent sito-
ltrlv or rler to : (et Ixth l esto.,i..- to one intestiv(llal or alsother, it m-as a ixeelWing tllle lid 011
ansl no illforsl:ltio7l volunteere(l.

M. Ir. DAStJT. l,ve ii if ttle li(l hacl heell kei')t; orr ttle so-sallecl White Hotils horrol.s,
avou'n(l t it bc +av eml complications il-- to the Presidearl of the l)IIlitetl lst.:tes in his eflfort
tr{(t le reelleekAd 3 1' his deutu' cs;Wil)laff director 51pS indieter(l llil tll3e lere:ll; in of the
I3e-!loraciol JNatl.ollal Conllinitee headqua-tel.?

ATr. AtTCTIEET.3., I don't t,hink as far as the AVaternrate --ras concerned t.here svas a hel of
a lot of diSerence. 1)et-seen the deput-- campctigIz clireetor aml the counsel f.or the fillance
committee aml the secrAty ohieer. Quit.e eankl--., as far as the WAtaternate --vas concerned.
that sv.ws allely a. public issue. It --zas the tratties that Lvere inxolvecl.

\}lr. D:tsl-r. Tllere came a t:ime, did theln IIOT, 3ifr. Alichells that the pressures for money bV
the clefendallts or hty Arr. Hunt increzised?

ANould 5 ou tell us --ViiRT A-OU knolv about that. ?

hio. A'tr'ITCTIEET.3., A57ell. I :.m not sure, Atr. I,ash, that I can tell ToU very muccll about them.
other thall ttle fact that sorneavllere alc)nar in the fall. A'Tr. IIiltl ha(l a tele-jhone cowlerxation
+N-th Atlll Colsonz sZ-lhlc. I thilllu. covered the subject natter aml then later on, as I recall,
Atr. I)Call has frot in the record a letter from ALr. IIiltl to:otr. C50Ison. lvieh I thilllu is quite
slfrgestive of ttle faet that. he lvas beinfl abandoned.

Tilten I lle:rl (I lK tar 011-- ill :ATalch of this veal . ihere svere oral commllnications from
other T4nt 011-- his attorr:. eV relatinf to renilests for legal fees an(l so forth. --v-h:icll --ere
communicatecl to the AG'lille B olle.

ar. J)ST-I. STovx X-le vou hear ahotl the ATalch reqllest?

LaRlle, if NV memory serves me rifiilt.

Blr. n:STT. l)po VOIl kIIOIV hoah much money lvas actually beinfl requestecl .olt that tinie ?

(183)
Atr. XIITCEIIL. 1 Ce}8I1e really tell ToU a>>out the nlf,llevs aecrws this l jerio--1 of time. It
s,erjS to me til-Ls,i tile Niarcell re--;test IwaI(< esol-e-- e ll:itount ill th? area Or $s v.;l;,(1)Q3 wS-
hiCl Axx Laluce cleslt e-e--1 to me. tllat xrf{x 1einXr retlusted en fottsielsel for tlei{e le DF al
fees in 2{olle(tio;e--sith ike reEc{r--.; Lt.liulOfl of Afr. IBInl.

Afr. J) tSI xT. Disl a r. , LaRile ask 5 OtI \h tt yo.ir ol3i1l!on xc--(s O' -xI-Iether ile sholl{l
{vso that. aWI(;CI11 It of roljilsjy to Afr. Huit1 01^ lilis counsel?

Wlr. AatTelci\e:r.:-. 3tr. IlaPue, k) th:5 Iest of mv recollectiou, 3j?11t, it ili tl Lis coltext: I has-e /YOF
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11E|sin;|v;av nlore, RVJ].It nl-ould }O(y to if VC'tl ~X-inre iw lUi;, siloes a?ld). noxvinfr tll-t te he nJade
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the Presidelt.t to f-he MThite .r3.ouse--
hrl. 5ITCIIIEII. T)lat is the onl~~ funci I E as awafae of, --es.

3r. DSIII. Ths. Afr. Alitchen, di(l yv yU rei'us* alould that tirJHe. to aise nn.- money for the
}|-a.ymellt of tlese fees?

Atr. XtiITHELLE. Well, I fOl on;l, r ar0r1l1lcl th.at time, but all other times. I have nes-er raisecl
any :noney for an-fthincr and I lvas not al otl to start, lor tl at particular purpose.

IVIr. IDASTfV Did you ever Inake sl1w sU---rfrasions that the moneST th3t sho1t{l1lI 1Je usecl
for r dlat purpose xvas the $1.50,000?

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maybe you omJHt to call over to tlle AArhite Elouose and see if the S-:--;(.)\)00 that ha(l I
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positions are syAapaetletic.

i,ell, i.t is a long road isn't it-s When you look ha.c];
on fite as Jol.n has poinl_ed Olt h.ere, it ree-llly has
been a long road for all of yotl, or' us.

It sure is.
For all of uss for all of us. Ti-lat's why you are wrestling

szith the idea O,c m=.<?ving in another direction.

That's right. It is not only that group, but. within this
circle of people, that have tidlj]i'.s of kno-wledge, there
Having received information on March 21, 1973 of possible obstruction of justice having taken place following the break-in of the DNC, the President promptly undertook an investigation into the facts.

The record discloses that the President started his investigation the night of his meeting with Dean on March 21st, as confirmed by Dean in his conversation with the President on April 16, 1973. At the meeting with Mitchell and the others on the afternoon of March 22nd, the President instructed Dean to prepare a written report of his earlier disclosures.

Page

25a Transcript, April 16, 1973 10:00-10:40 p. 801 ................................................................. 188

25b .................................................................................................................. p. 282-283 ........................................................................................................ 189

25c Transcript, (187)

p. 309: ........................................................................................................ 191
P But I did ask you and I think you should say the President authorized me to say this -- I won't reveal the conversation with the President -- he asked me this question. I told him this, that nobody in the White House was involved. And in addition to that to the best of my ability I kept, I guess, or how do you think you should handle this Presidential advice? Maybe you better -

D Well, I think the less said about you, I think you say anything you want to say anything about it.

P Well, let me tell you I am going to handle that properly and I Dust wanted to be sure that it jives with the facts.

D That's right.

P Then it was that night that I started my investigations

D That's right -- that was the Wednesday before they were sentenced; now I can get that date--

P Would you do this. Get your chronology of this. Wednesday you came in and told me that, et cetera. That would be helpful for me to have. That is when I frankly became interested in the case and I said, "Now (expletive omitted)" I want to find out the score." And set in motion Ehrlichman, Litchell and -- not Mitchell but a few others.

OK?

D Sure.
25b. WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MAR 22, 1973, 1:57 - 3:43 P.M. MEETING,

282-83

13

(inaudible) (two memorandum that THE courts have public record

P We tried that move, John --

J'I Well, I did too -- before MR. President. But now that the

indictment has come out (inaudible) has the reeling that

they have the documentation back of it. Now that the bag

has come out.

D' I think the proof is in the pudding, so to speak -- it is

how this document is written and until I sit down and write

that document. I have done part of it so to speak. I

have done the Segretti thing and I am relatively satisfied that

we don't have any major problems there. As I go to part A --
to the Watergate A-- I haven't written-- I haven't gone through
the exercise yet in a real effort to write such a report, and I
really can't say until I do it where we are and I certainly
think it is something that should be done though.

P What do you say on the Watergate (inaudible)

D We can't be complete if we don't know, all we know is what,

is what --

P It is a negative in setting forth general information involving

questions. Your consideration -- your analysis, et cetera.

You have found this, that. Rather than going into every news

story and every charge, et cetera, --

put it down -- I don't know but

This, this this, --

D I don't think I can do it until I sit down this evening and

start drafting.

H I think you ought to hold up for the weekend and do that and

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get it done. Sure Give it your full attention and get it done. I think you need --- why don't you do this? Why don't you go up to Camp David? I might do it, I might do it.

Completely away from the phone. Just go-up there and

(inaudible) I want a written report'.

That would be my 'scenario. He presents it to you at your request. You-then publish -- (inaudible)

I know that but: I don't care.

You are not-dealing with the defendants on trial. You are only dealing with White House involvement. You are not dealing with the campaign.

That's where I personally

You could write it in a way that you say this report was not comment on et cetera,
facts with regard to members of the White House staff et cetera.

et cetera, that you have asked me about. I have checked the

FBI records; I have read the Grand Jury transcripts -

et cetera, et cetera.

As a matter of fact you could say, "I will not summarize

some of the FBI reports on this stuff because it is my

understanding that you may wish to publish this." Or you

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et cetera, but, "I have reviewed the record,
Do you think we want to go this route now? Let it hang out so to speak?

Well, it isn't really that -

It's a limited hang out.

It's a limited hang out. It's not an absolute hang out.

But some of the questions look big hanging out publicly or privately.

What it is doing, Sir. President, is getting you up above and away from it. That is the most important thing.

Oh, I know. I suggested that the other day and they all came down negative on it. Now what has changed their minds?

Lack of - candidate or a body.

Laughter.

(Inaudible) We went down every alley.

I feel that at a very minimum we've got to have this statement. Let's look at it. I don't know what it where in the hell is it -- If it opens up doors, it opens up doors -- you know.

John says he is sorry he sent those burglars in there -and that helps a lot.

That's right.

You are very welcome, sir.

(Laughter)

Just glad the others didn't get caught.
Yeah, the ones he sent to Muskie and all the rest; Jackson;
Although Dean was instructed to go to Camp David and write a report on March 22, 1973 by the President, Dean denied this and later testified before the Senate Select Committee that he was never requested to write a report until Haldeman called him after he arrived at Camp David.
Mr. -- J E ON. Well, the President called me on the 23d. In the meeting on the 22d—I might mention this: As early as February, when I had a meeting with the President, he asked me had I ever spent any time up at Camp David? I said no, I hadn't, I had been up there to a meeting once after the election, a very brief meeting with Ehrlichman and Haldeman. He said, you and your wife ought to go up there on some weekends it's an excellent place to go. He mentioned that on a number of occasions and I told my wife, I said, the President has been very gracious in saying that you should go to Camp David and mentioned it to her.

Senator GURNEY. At any rate, you did go to Camp David, sort of understanding that you were going to write a report about Watergate.

Mr. DEAN. No, sir. When the President talked to me on the 23d, I had talked to O'Brien that morning about the fact that in court, Mr. McCord's letter had been read by Judge Sirica. O'Brien reported from somebody who had told him at the courthouse.

I called Ehrlichman, and Ehrlichman said he had a copy of the letter and read me a copy of the letter and asked me what my assessment of it was as. Based on my conversation with O'Brien, I told him that it seemed at best that all McCord has is hearsay.

It was then much later. It was, oh, in the afternoon, I guess, 1 or 2 o'clock or so. I was still surrounded by the press at home because of the Gray statement the preceding day; they wanted me to make a comment on it, and I didn't want to do that. I received a call from the President.

There are some details of that conversation of a personal nature to the President that I don't want to put in because they are not relevant. But I recall the conversation very clearly because there were some complications because Mrs. Nixon andTricia were up there at the same time.

The President said "Well, go on ahead. You need the break, you have been under a lot of pressure," and the like. He never at any time asked me to write a report, and it wasn't until after I had arrived at Camp David that I received a call from Haldeman asking me to write the report up.

If I was going to go up and write a report, I would have gone to my—there was as general discussion also of preparing a Segretti report, as I recall. If I had Cone to Camp David specifically to write a report, I would have gone to my office first and collected an awful lot of material that I didn't take with me, which I subsequently had to call back for in order to write a report.

Senator GURNEY. It was shortly after this though, that therti~ engaged counsel. is that correct?

Sir. DEN. On the evening—I believe it was Sunday evening I received word that the Los Angeles Times was going to publish a story that I had had prior knowledge of the fact that there was going to be a break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters on June 27.

Nov. 27, I knew I hadn't had prior knowledge of that. In fact, I don't think anybody else other than those involved—and I prior knowledge of the fact that there was going to be a break-in. I called Mr. Toftan and explained the facts.
27. Just six days after Dean's disclosures, on March 27, 1973, the President met with Ehrlichman and Haldeman to discuss the evidence thus far developed and how best to proceed. Again the President stated his resolve that White House officials should appear before the grand jury. They confirmed to the President, as Dean had, that no one at the White House had prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in.

Ehrlichman told the President that there wasn't "a scintilla of a hint that Dean knew about this." The President asked about the possibility of Colson having prior knowledge and Ehrlichman stated that Colson's response was "of total surprise. . . He was totally non-plussed, as the rest of us."
before any judicial group, therefore, is on a different basis from anybody else, "which is basically what I - you know when I flatly said Cease would not appear but others would.

YGU know, I did say that, and of course --

E It was on a different basis. And at the same time, a man in any position ought to be given a chance to defend himself from these groundless charges.

P "Mr. Dean certainly wants the opportunity to defend himself against these charges. He would welcome the opportunity and what we have to do it to work out a procedure which will allow him to do so consistently with his unique position of being a top member of the President's staff but also the Counsel. There is a lawyer, Counsel -- not lawyer, Counsel -- but the responsibility of the Counsel for confidentiality."

Z. Could you apply that to the Grand Jury?

E Absolutely. The Grand Jury is one of those occasions where a man in his situation can defend himself.

P Yes. The Grand Jury. Actually if called, we are to refuse for anybody called before the Grand Jury to go, are we, John?

E I can't imagine (unintelligible)

P Well, if called, he will be cooperative, consistent with his responsibilities as Counsel. How do we say that?

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I would -- the reason I would totally agree -- that I would believe Dean there (unintelligible) i-e would be lying to us about that But I would believe for another reason -- that he thought it was a stupid damn idea.

E There just isn't a scintila of hint that Dean knew about this.

Dean was pretty good all through that period of time in sharing things, and he was tracking; with a number of us on --

P Well you know the thing the reason that (unintelligible) thought -- 2nd this incidentally covers Colson -- and I don't know whether --. I know that most everybody except Bob, and perhaps you, ; Colson knew all about it. But I was talking to Colson, remember exclusively about -- and maybe that was the point -- exclusively about issues. You know, how are we going to do this and that and the other thing. (unintelligible) mainly, the labor bill, how do we get this, how do we get aid to the Catholic schools.

Getting that aid to Catholic schools, you know was, a --

Colson's fight was with (unintelligible).

P Right, That was what it is. But in all those talks he had plenty of opportunity. He was always coming to me with ideas, but Colson in that entire period, John, didn't mention it. I think he would have said, "Look we've gotten n some information, " "but he
there had been this burglary—the first guy I called was Colson.

'Yeah.'

I And his response, as I recall it, was one of total surprise and he could have said then, "Oh, those jerks, they shouldn't have; Or, "I knew about it earlier"; Or, referred to it by saying, "It would have been a meaningful leak," but he didn't. He was totally nonplussed, the same as the rest of us.

P Well, the thing is too, that I know they talk about this business of Magruder's, saying that Haldeman had ordered, the President had ordered, etc. all people who was surprised on the 17th Of June - I was in Florida -- was me. were you there?

E No, I was here.

13 Who was there ?

E I called Colson, Haldeman and Ziegler and alerted them to this.

P And I read the paper. ANThat in the name of (expletive removed) is this? I just couldn't believe it. So you know t I mean - I believe in playing politics hard, but I am also smart. \-~~That I can't understand is how Mitchell would ever approve.

FI That's the tiling I can't understand here.
April 8, 1973, the President talked with Ehrlichman and Haldeman on board Air Force One and directed them to meet with Dean and urge him to go to the grand jury. Haldeman and Ehrlichman met with Dean that afternoon and, at 7:33 p.m., Ehrlichman reported to the President that Dean indicated he would agree to go before the grand jury.
2757

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Senator G1-1-NEY. ArarcJl o0, •vere you reqprtmg t to the Preisd~t;~t t
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Brien but ver;~ move on that subj ect, and I just said: "I am be~m~imb
to get a feel lOr thirs tsisller l)--t I ha++ e got so Lllicll hears~ y here I
do t r Elii it's --X-orttl takint, a toL; of your .ir~m~le-le."

Senator G1-1;ney. ArarcJl o0, were you repurtmg to t he Preside;~~t

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r?ie airpalle goiDg ?1sacl; al<d vve talked al)out Dean goinH to the s
ond iurw, and he said (inally "I 2JL h0l. going te) w ait, he is t-- olug, t-)
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~~: said "lfo, we a-e aomfjr to s~~-i Des~zL Tsfe .7.on1 1 z ow l Vrk--f,
thM is."

Senator-Graxtv~~.TZeu, no r;) dud you ms.ke a exDmplev repo$ ts the

President ?

Ab. E.----D.----Tcn7-zy. 76 Sr,

J--L. uCoxc. Xr--Rien t9gs thz--wa;s 7 - *

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Senator Grt >---r. TVhlt did P011 sell LiTH ?

Atr. J----a----.1----==t. s, s--;#e hld h-- k>;C .alY a narrci*titve ov t--7
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yet ts]yed and SiracbauZ the s2eone1 tinae wh-zil I got into the wh41e
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Senator GUSEET. Now, so we c.~s wrsp that$ up ssncR I can lIzlesse
the flooxhere, did you at tllTut time~ --ive him a ozmnlete accouat OI

5>Yastergate ag ~~ve Eov it now, and if well did not, nvlllat portions
(3.id ;you not tell him that ~~~ou didn't know 2 Perhaps we can > u it
that wa-y (---nihLly

Atr. EHP2aczz~~X.5rve~~~I didn't know, for im--kn>, any ol the
behind-thescenes busi-less of the money beyoTId vhf that Paul O'Brien had <uiven me 11ere and a
little feel of it that Dean had given me A; Lich I thinL: I have just desoribed to TOU gboht ss wll
as I can. The subsequent iniviere~--s-s that I had lvith ~--?artie.ularly
3iz-Erfruder th.Lt atternoon -you see the outcome of this report to twte
President v. as, he said ';I ~rant y-ou to talk to Magruder j--I xvant w-
ou to talS; to Atitchell ' and then he also tol(l me he wanted to find out
more about Bob Haldeman's involvement So those three followed that
prelirrlinals report and none of the .hin7Ts that I deveoloDed from an) of
thenl were included in it. WHXen I completed them, then I calTle back
and reported --vhat those three in(ividuals told me and laid that out for
himP

Senator GER.NTET. And lvas that a fairly
complete account of Watergate?
Oh, John. Hi.

I just wanted to post you on the Dean meeting. It went fine.

He is going to wait till after he'd had a chance to talk with

Is C L

Mitchell an to pass the word to Magruder through his lawyers

that he is going to appear at the Grand Jury. His feeling is

that Liddy has passed the phlegm on Magruder and that (unlegible) he thinks he knows it,LOW. Axel he says til there's

no love lost the e and that 'there: c-X-Rus Liddy's not-ive in

concluding communicating in formatly f

Uh~~ hu6..

A, the same time, he said there is little thing that I should say til there is not much to do on that, if Dean,

LOW or could say til t-Xoulel in E-ny svaer Jolon t-f.icXell.

P

-Val; it would harm Magruder.

E

Right. Imd his feeli ng is th? sitic a would BIO listen to a plea

of infinfalirty at a UNIC tel (unlegible) I should say. And that is

telligible) to win him. IcTe would be much better off to go in

there and have an informal talk and that's what we talked to do.

P

Right.

F

So obviously we didn't tell him not to, but we did say that it

is important that the other people knew what he was doing.
JOHN DEAS TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973, 3 SSC 1006

1QC'o

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~See p. 1263.

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02~;
Mr. MAGRUDER. I cannot recall in my meeting with him in January whether—yes, I am sure I did discuss those meetings yes.

Mr. DASH. So the attempt to get together and agree on that meeting was an attempt to vet together and agree on at least from your point of view, would be the full story?

Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. Mr. Haldeman recommended that Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell and I meet, which we did that afternoon.

Mr. DASH. What was the result of that meeting?

Mr. MAGRUDER. I realize that Mr. Dean had different opinions then as to what he would do probably, and so then my—I thought that probably it was more appropriate that even on that Bifonday that I get separate counsel so that I could vet advice independent of the individuals who had participated with me in these activities.

Mr. DASH. In other words, you really could not agree at the meeting with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean.

Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, it was cooperative.

Mr. DASH. What was Mr. Dean's position?

Mr. MAGRUDER. He would not indicate a position.

Mr. DASH. All right. Did there come a time when you did get independent counsel?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Mr. Parkinson, who was counsel of the committee, recommended me, and on that Saturday I went to meet him, he was out of the country, and I met him and we agreed, he agreed to be my counsel that Saturday evening.

Mr. DASH. Did there come a time when you decided that you should go to the U.S. attorney's office?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. DASH. When did you go to the U.S. attorney's office?

Mr. MAGRUDER. We agreed, we discussed the things—With the U.S. attorney—I think on April 19 and I saw them formally on April 13 and saw them formally on April 14 on Saturday, April 14.

Mr. DASH. At that time did you tell everything to the assistants U.S. attorneys?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Who did you meet with?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Silbert, Mr. Glanzer, and Mr. Campbell.

Mr. DASH. Did you tell them everything you are now telling this committee?

Mr. MAGERUDER. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Did you have a meeting afterward with Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. Mr. Ehrlichman called while I was still the U.S. attorneys and asked me if I'd come over and talk to him about the case. We talked to the U.S. attorneys and they agreed as a courtesy that we should and Mr. Bierbower and the other attorney with Mr. Bierbower and I went to see Mr. Ehrlichman that afternoon.

Mr. DASH. Then according to that meeting that you had with Mr. Ehrlichman, what happened?

Mr. MAGRUDER. We told him in rather capsule form basically what I told you this morning.

Mr. DASH. Do you have just a final question? I am about to go back to the time when you came back from California to Nashantown, putting you back
On April 4, 1973, the President signed Ehrlichman and Halldenlall to review the results of three investigations and to determine the future course of action. Based on Ehrlichman’s report the President concluded Mitchell should go before a grand jury. The President instructed Ehrlichman to see Magruder and tell him that he did not serve the President by remaining silent. The President told Ehrlichman that when he met with Mitchell to advise him that “the President has said let the chips fall where they may. He will not furnish cover for anybody.” The President told Ehrlichman to tell Magruder to purge himself and tell this whole story.

30a Transcript, April 14, 1973, 8:55-11:31 a.m., p. 445

30b Transcript, April 14, 1973, 8:55-11:31 a.m., p. 478

30c Transcript, April 14, 1973, 8:55-11:31 a.m., p. 507
scenario that was spun out, that Dean spun out on Mitchell

is basically the right one. I don't think Mitchell did order

+ the Watergate bugging and I don't think he was specifically

aware of the Watergate bugging at the time it was instituted.

I honestly don't.

That may be.

(Material unrelated to Presidential actions deleted)

What did he say? What did he tell Moore?

Well, remember I asked Moore to find out what Mitchell had

tested to.

Yeah. Moore heard the testimony and said well you're not --

He was never asked the right questions. Now, as far as he

He probably didn't to the Grand Jury, either.

That's right. As far as the quality of the evidence is concerned -

(Material unrelated to Presidential actions deleted)

Well, 'to go back to the

All right. I only mentioned (unintelligible) because, let me, -

going ahead with your -

Well, all I was going to say is that -

All right. I now have evidence that -

You don't have evidence if I
I'm not convinced he's guilty but I am convinced that he ought to go before a Grand Jury.
got to make this move today. If it fails, just to get back
our position I think you ought to talk to Magruder.

H I agree.

P And you tell Magruder, now Jeb, this evidence is coming in
you ought to go to the Grand Jury. Purge yourself if you're
perjured and tell this whole story.

I think we have to.

Then, well, Bob, you don't agree with that?

No. I do.

Because I think we do have to. Third, we've got the problem

You should talk to (unintelligible) first though.

What really matters, Bob, is that either way --

Yeah.
Who is ever (unintelligible)

You see the point is --

But don't use Jeb as a basis for the conversation.

Yeah. Say that the evidence is not Jeb. I'd just simply say that these other people are involved in this. With Jeb, although he may blow -

I can say that I have come to the conclusion that it is both John and Jeb who are liable.

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pass unpunished. I can't make that judgment for you and

I don't have any right to make it for you. All I'm saying

is that if we're looking at this thing from the standpoint

of the President, today is probably the last day that you

can take that action, if you're ever going to take it to do

the President a bit of good."

"Do you realize, John, that from the White House, I mean,

Colson, maybe Haldeman are going to get involved in

this thing too?"

We'll, here again, we're looking at this thing not from the

standpoint of any other individual. "We are looking at it

from the standpoint of the Presidency and that's the only

way I think you and I can approach this."

And I'd go further and say, "The President has said let the

chips fall where they may. He will not furnish cover for

anybody. " I think you ought to say that.

That's right.

Don't you agree, Bob? That isn't it?

He may go. He may get Chuck.
Of the continuing investigation. The President met with Assistant
Attorney General Petersen on the afternoon of April 15, 1973,
in his EOB office. At this meeting Petersen indicated there

was no criminal case on Haldeman and Ehrlichman at this time.

Having been told Liddy would not talk unless authorized by

"higher authority" the President instructed Petersen to tell

Liddy's counsel the President would confirm his urging of Liddy
to cooperate.

Page

31a Transcript, April 15, 1973, 8:25-8:26 p.m.,

31b Petersen 9 SSC 3632, 3875, 3876.

31c Transcript, April 15, 1973, 8:25-8:26 p.m.,
and that's why we had no control. Well, anyway, I'm not making excuses. The thing
to do now is to. Deal with the facts as you have them. Go forward. It would have to
be by you, Mr. President. There's (unintelligible). How about another man that
we could bring down? How about a former circuit Court Judge like Lombard? Well the
Chief Justice doesn't like that unless he has completely retired from the judiciary. Says' he
can serve if we gave him an interim appointment? Yes—yeah. Seventy-one years of age?
No-no. What you are doing is having a Federal judiciary. Well it seems to me that's the
same. The Chief Justice thinks this fellow Sears—he's the one who recommended Sears.
Thinks we should have a special prosecutor? Yes. He does. Yes. Now what does he say--
now—I want to get some other judgments because I—I'm open on this. I lean against it and I
think it's too much of a reflection on our system of justice and everything else.
to come to him if we disagreed, and so I think the criticism is wholly unwarranted.

Mr. DASH. Did you receive a call from the President on April 30, 1973?

Mr. PETERSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Could you tell us what that call was about?

Mr. PETERSEN. April 30, 1973?

Mr. DASH. Yes.

Mr. PETERSEN. He called up and said, you can tell your wife that the President has done what needed to be done, and I want to thank you for what you have clone.

To the extent that requires some explanation in the course of our conversations, I was impressing upon the President the situation so far as I was as coalesced m-as degenerating, and it was vitally affecting the people's confidence in the White House, and I related to him a conversation that I had with my wife at the breakfast table in which she had said, "Do you think the President is involved?" And I related to the President that we had the conversation that I had with my wife, and she had said, "What is important is that my wife, who is no left wing kook, is raising these questions of me, and that indicates to me that you have got a most serious problem."

And that affected the President quite strongly, and when he called me on April 30 he made that point.

Mr. DASH. This was the point that he announced the resignation of Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, and the leaving of the office at his request of Mr. Dean.

Mr. DASH. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN-. Atr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON-. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Atr. Petersen, let me ask you a few more detailed questions about your meeting with the President on April 15. You stated that you told him on that occasion that unless you-- regardless of-- didn't have a criminal case against Haldeman and Ehrlichman that it could be very embarrassing to the Presidency.

What information did you have on Haldeman and Ehrlichman at that time? AE h at had Dean told the prosecutors about Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's involvement in the Watergate matter?

Mr. PETERSEN-. Well we had not too much! on Alr. Ehrlichman at that point. We had Dean's statement that Ehrlichman had told Dean to "deep six" certain information recovered by Dean from Mr. Hunt's office. If you don't mind, I will refer
to m) notes on this.

Mr. THOMPSON -. Yes, sir.

Mr. PETER SEN. Too that Atk. Iean had said that Ehrlichman through Ie an had
informed Liddy that Hunt should leave the country. Hunt corroborated this in part in
that he testified that Liddy had told him that
s princes wanted Hunt out of the country.
Hunt did not testify with respect to or identify Ehrlichman.
That is the basic information. the only information we had on Ehrlichman at that
point.

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John Ehrlichman

April 16 1973

We have no other information as of this time except the following 4 items:

1. That Ehrlichman in the period immediately following the breakin told John Dean to "deep six" certain information recovered by Dean from Hunt's office.

2. That Ehrlichman through Dean informed Liddy that Hunt should leave the country. Hunt corroborates this in that he testified before the grand jury that Liddy told him that his, Liddy's, principals, wanted Hunt out of the country. Hunt states that as he was preparing to leave, he was called again by Liddy and informed by Liddy that Liddy's principals had countermanded the order. Hunt further states that notwithstanding he then departed for California.

With respect to Item One you will recall that you told me that Dean had on one occasion indicated to me that he had given certain non-Watergate information recovered from Hunt's office to Pat Gray personally. Sometime during the middle of March, I had occasion to consider this matter and I asked Pat Gray. Gray told me on that occasion that he had received no information from John Dean other than that which was given to the agents.

Today I again raised the matter with Pat Gray and told him specifically what Dean had stated to the prosecutors who are debriefing him. Gray emphatically denied that he had ever received any information from Hunt's office from John Dean. Gray states that all the information and records recovered from Hunt's office were received by agents of the FBI in the normal course of business.

Bob Haldeman

With respect to Bob Haldeman's alleged involvement in the Watergate Dean states that in December of 71 or early parts of January 1972 there were a series of meetings, three in number, with John Mitchell which took place in Mitchell's office.
Present were Liddy, Magruder, Dean and Mitchell. At each of these meetings the Liddy operation was discussed. The purpose being to obtain information about Democratic presidential contenders. On the first two occasions Mitchell refused to authorize the budget proposals. The first being $1,000,000, and the second $5,000,000. On the third occasion Mitchell approved the reduced budget of $30,000. The operation was described as "gemstone." Magruder says the budget information was given to Strachan. Magruder also says that information given to Strachan was for delivery to Haldeman. Magruder is not in a position to say that Strachan actually delivered the

in Formation.

Dean states that after the second meeting with Mitchell, Liddy and Magruder, he returned to the White House and relayed to Bob Haldeman the nature of the proposals being discussed and stated that we ought not to have any part of them. Dean states Haldeman agreed but apparently no one issued any instructions that this surveillance program was to be discontinued.

Magruder further states that he caused to be delivered to Strachan for transmittal to Haldeman a summary of the intercepted conversation. Again Magruder is not in a position to say that Strachan actually delivered the information to Haldeman. Magruder does say that the nature of the information was such that it was clear that it emanated from intercepted telephone conversations.

Strachan appeared at the U.S. Attorney's office was informed of his rights and was questioned by the prosecutors concerning the Haldeman allegation. Despite considerable fencing Strachan refused to discuss the matter and he was excused by the prosecutor with instructions to obtain legal counsel and return this afternoon.
No, no - I don't want to leave that impression.

Because of Mitchell, huh?

He is taking orders from higher authority. The decision is mine but since you are the highest authority he will stand in line if we handle it discreetly.

I just want him to be sure to understand that as far as the President is concerned everybody in this case is to talk and to tell the truth. You are to tell everybody, and you don't even have to call me on that with anybody. You just say those are your orders.

Yes, sir.

Ok.

Alr:~ht thank you, sir.
April 16, 1973, discussed with Dean his resignation, and advised him to be totally truthful in his explanations. The President asked Dean not to lie about the President either.

At this same meeting Dean explained to the President that O'Brien had been the one who relayed Hunt's demand, that Dean had informed Ehrlichman and Ehrlichman advised Dean to inform Mitchell which Dean did Dean told the President that all along had tried to make sure that anything he passed to the President didn't cause the President any personal problems.
Yes, I said that. I am incapable of it. Thank God. Don't ever do it John. Tell the truth. That is the thing I have told everybody around here. (expletive omitted) tell the truth! All they do John is compound it.

That (characterization omitted) Hiss would be free today if he hadn't lied. If he had said, "Yes I knew Chambers and as a young man I was involved with some Communist activities but I broke it off a number of years ago." And Chambers would have dropped it. If you are going to lie, you go to jail for the lie rather than the crime. So believe me, don't ever lie.

The truth always emerges. It always does. Also there is a question of right and wrong too.

That's right W.

Whether it is right and whether it is wrong. Perhaps there are some gray areas, but you are right to get it out now.

I am sure.

On Liddy I wanted to be sure. You recall our conversation. You asked me to do something. I have left it with Petersen now and he said he would handle it. That's the proper place. When Liddy says he cannot talk with peers it must be higher authority, I am not his higher authority. It is Mitchell.

Well, he obviously is looking for the ultimate, but I think he is looking for the ultimate. He has the impression that you and Mitchell probably talk on the telephone daily about this.

You know we have never talked about this.
D No, I think you are in front right now and you can rest

P No, I don't want, understand when I say don't lie. Don't lie

D No, I won't sir ---you --

P I think I have done the right thing, but I want you to --

D This thing has changed so dramatically. The whole situation

P since I gave you the picture

D In that chair over there and gave you what I thought were

P the circumstances, the potential problems. You have done

D nothing but try to get to the bottom of this thing, and --

P was you write-a-report as I said, "I want-the Segretti

D stuff., Put,eve?rything else.- Was. the White House invloved?

P You know., et cetera." -How-about -- one last thing., Colson.

D I think he has some technical problems close also. I don't

P Right. I suppose the key there is Hunt. He was so close to

D know if he has any. To the best of my knowledge, he had

P Hunt. I Just want to know for my own benefit. As I told you,

D no advance knowledge of this thing,

P last night, I--don't want to get out there in front and have

D someone say "What about Chuck Colson?"
No. 110: O'Brien, who was one of the lawyers who was representing the Re-Election Committee, was asked by Hunt to meet with him. He came to me after the meeting and said that Hunt asked that the following message be passed to you. I said, "why me?" He said, "I asked Hunt the same question." You, Dean—or me, the President?

Passed to me Dean.

He had never asked you before?

No.

Let me tell you. What did you report to me on—though.

It was rather fragmentary, as I recall it. You said Hunt had a problem—.

Very fragmentary. I was — !

I said, "Why, John, how much is it going to cost to do this?"

That is when I sent you to Camp David—and said (expletive i removed) "Let—see—where this thing comes out.'

And you said it could cost a million dollars.

I said it conceivably could. I said, "If we don't-cut this thing—"'

How was that handled? Who handled that money?

Well, let me tell you the rest of what Hunt said. He said, "You tell Dean that I need $72,000 for my personal expenses, $50,000 for my legal fees and if I don’t get it I am going to have some things to say about the seamy things I did at the White House for John Ehrlichman." Alright I took
That's right.
that to John Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman said, "Have you talked to Mitchell about it?" I said, "No, I have not." He said "Well, will you talk to Mitchell?" I said, "Yes I will." I talked to Mitchell. I just passed it along to him. And

then we were meeting down here a few days later in Bob's office with Bob and Ehrlichman, and Mitchell and myself, and Ehrlichman said at that time, "Well is that problem with Bunt straightened out?" He said it to me and I said "Well, ask the man who may know: Mitchell." Mitchell said, "I think that problem is solved."

That's all?

That's all he said.

In other words, that was done at the Mitchell level?

That's right.

But you had knowledge; Haldeman had knowledge; Ehrlichman had knowledge and I suppose I did that night. That assumes culpability on that, doesn't it?

I don't think so.

Why not? I plan to be tough on myself so I can handle the other thing. I must say I did not even give it a thought at the time.

-No one gave it a thought at the time.

P You didn't tell me this about Ehrlichman, for example, when you came in that day.

D I know.

P You simply said, "Hunt needs this money." You were using it

a- an example of the probl.,el.s 2::e2-.

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along to make sure that anything I passed didn't cause you any personal problems.

P John, let me ask you this. Let us suppose if this thing breaks and they ask you John Dean, "Now, John, you were the President's Counsel. Did you report things to the President?"

D I would refuse to answer any questions unless you waive the privilege.

P On this point, I would not waive. I think you should say, . "I reported to the President. He called me in and asked me before, when the event first occurred, and passed to the President the message that no White House personnel in the course of your investigation were involved." You did do that didn't you?

D I did that through Ehrlichman and Haldeman.

P I know you did because I didn't see you until after the Election.

D That's right.

P Then you say, after the election when the McCord thing broke, the President called you in. I think that is when it was, wasn't it?

D No. It was before the McCord thing, because you remember you told me after Friday morning that McCord's letter - you said, "you predicted this was going to happen." Because I had oh, in the week or two weeks -

P Why did I get you in there? What triggered me getting you in?

Well, we just started talking about this thing.

P But I called you and Moore together for a Dean Report,
33. On April 27, Petersen reported to the President that

Dean's lawyer was threatening that unless Dean got immunity,

they would bring "the President in--not this case but in other things." The President told Petersen to use immunity if he needed
to get the facts, but there would be no blackmail. It was not until

June 25, 1973, while testifying before the Senate Select Committee

that Dean stated the President had prior knowledge of the cover-up.
Come in. As, like all things, some substance, some falsity.

Ah, last Monday Charlie Shaffer was in the office, and a continuation of the negotiations. Charlie Shaffer is the lawyer.

Charlie is a very bright, able bombastic fellow. And he was carrying on as if we're making a summation in a case. And he said -- that -- ah he was threatening, "We will bring the President in -- not this case but in other things" What "other things" are we don't know what in the hell they are talking about.

Don't worry.

"In other areas," more specifically is the word he used. That they regarded -- and didn't consider of importance they regarded as the elaboration of his earlier threat. You know, "We'll try this-Administration -- Nixon -- what have you, what have you. " There's a new conversation by them with Dean since the Sunday we first met (unintelligible) Whatever is said is through Shaffer the lawyer.

What else do you have besides that?

Well, let's see. They did say that at a later date in the proceedings that Dean went to the President, and I assume that's the February or March or whatever that date was. But that's 'in the course of your trying to find out. Ah, today they were
as adversaries. They are decent. They are honorable lawyers, they are a pleasure to deal with.

All right. We have got the immunity problem resolved. Do it.

Dean if you need to, but boy I am telling you -- there ain't going to be any blackmail.

Mr. President, I --

Don't let Dick Kleindienst say it. Dean ain't "Hunt is going to blackmail you." Hunt's not going to blackmail any of us.

"It is his word, basically, against yours." It's his word against mine. Now for -- who is going to believe John Dean?

We relied on the damned so -- Dean, Dean was the one who told us throughout the summer that nobody in the White House was involved when he, himself apparently, was involved, particularly on the critical angle of subornation of perjury.

That is the one that -- I will never, never understand John.

I, I can almost quote him. He said, "Henry, God damn it, I need this information. That man has designated me to get all these facts." And he calls me in there and chews my ass off.

Do you know something?

And this was before the trial --
On March 1, 1974, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against seven individuals charging all defendants with one count of conspiracy in violation of Title 18 U.S. C. Sec. 371 and charging some of the defendants with additional charges of perjury, making false declarations to a grand jury or court, making false statements to agents of the FBI and obstruction of justice.

34a Indictment, U. S. District Court for D. C.

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March 1, 1974, p. 1-15, ...............................228

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UNITED STATES V MITCHELL, CRIM. #0. 74-110, INDICTMENT, MARCH 1, 1974,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA/<

M ET THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:

JOHN N. MITCHELL, HARRY R. ITALDANI, JOHN D. BIEHL, and GORDON STU N

The Grand Jury charges:

Introduction

1. On or about June 17, 1972, Bernard L. Barge,-, \viroillo \Psy. Gonzalez, Eugenic Fo. Martinez, James Jr. and

Pran); L. sturgis where arrested in the offices of the Democratic National Co., asmr, located in the Watergate office building, Washington, D. C. While

attempting to photograph documents and repair a surreptitious electronic listening device Which had previ.ousl~~~ been placed in those offices

unlawfullyX

2. At all times material herein, the United states Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation Dere parts of the Department of Justice, a department and agency of the United states, and the Central Intelligence Agency Aces ar

agency Se United st ites .

3. 13ec.-ji.zininc, on or after: Ccil

} VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C.

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} false statements to a
UNITED STATES V. CHELL

Indictment, CH. 29-44

In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

Criminal Case No. 73-01

April 30, 1973, HARRY R. D'EDEAN, the DEFENDANT, alias

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7. At all times material herein up to or about July 1, 1973, JOSEPH D. WILSON, the DEFENDANT, was Assistant for Domestic Affairs to the President of the United States.

8. At all times material herein up to or about March 10, 1973, COLESON, the DEFENDANT, was Special Counsel to the President of the United States.

9. At all times material herein, ROGER C. RICHARDSON, the DEFENDANT, was an official of the Committee to Re-Elect the President.

10. From on or about June 21, 1972, and at all times thereafter herein, BRUCE G. KEDDIE, the DEFENDANT, was an attorney representing the Committee to Re-Elect the President.

11. At all times material herein up to or about November 17, 1972, GORDON S. SPICER, the DEFENDANT, was a staff assistant to HARRY R. HILL, a White House Assistant. Thereafter he became General Counsel to the United States Information Agency.

12. From on or about June 17, 1972, and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, JOHN N. MITCHELL, HARRY R. HANSEN, ROBERT B. STARR, CHARLES H. COLEMAN, ROBERT R. ROLL, RICHARD D. S. G., THE FATHERS, the DEFENDANTS, and other persons unknown, unlawfully and willfully, and in concert with each other, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other...
to obstruct justice; that is, to willfully and

violently to an agency of the United

States, Section 1001, to conceal false

declarations in violation of Title 18, United

States Code, Section 1520, and to defraud

the United States and agencies and

Department of Justice, the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the

Department of Justice of the Government's

right to have its officials of these agencies

transact their official business honestly and

impartially,


false from corrupt, improper, and undue

influence, dishonesty, and self-preservation

and obstruction;

all in violation of Title 18, United States

Code, Section 371.

13. It is part of the conspiracy that the

conspirators could corruptly influence, obstruct and

impede, and corruptly induce to influence, obstruct and

impede, the due administration of justice in connection

with the investigation referred to in paragraph 11.

(1) The investigation referred to in the trial of

Criminal Case No. 1827-72 in the United States District

Court for the District of Colombia, for the purpose of

concealing and causing to be concealed the identities

of the persons who were responsible for, participated in,

and knew of (a) the subject of the investigation and trial,

subject of the investigation and trial, and (b) other

facts

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34a. UNITED STATES V. MITCHELL 
INDICTMENT 
CR. 74-1.10, 
MARCH 1 1974 1-15 

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15. It s"as further a part of the conspirczy that the 
17. t~t~n the lnsoclns }\x-\x laic'n the coalspi.latol.

19. \x\x\x(1 cal-r-r---- out the (xfoisaid co!spiraoy \x\x\x the follci

(232)
(a) The collective_EV_Direct

G. Cordon Lidc'y \textit{et al.} \textit{v.} District of Columbia, in obtaining

...been arrested 0, 1 June 17, 1972, in the

...offices of the Der. ocrat c \textit{c} \textit{N}ational Cor...mitee

...in the 17atel-gate officeg building in Ifashingtorl,

...D. C., and G. Cordon Lidc'y \textit{v.} Toould see; such -

...assistance fro.,l Pvi.chard G. zleindienst.

(19) The conspiratoz-s \textit{vould} \textit{it} various

\textit{times} \textit{to concea}l, \textit{alter} and \textit{destroy,

\textit{at}r...\textit{conceal, \textit{alter} and \textit{de-

\textit{stoy, anc cause tG be reroved, concealed,

\textit{altered and cSestroyed, doocurrents, papers,

\textit{records and c\textit{meets.

\textit{c}) The conspirators \textit{vould} \textit{pian, solicit,

\textit{assist and \textit{facil}i.tate the givir,g of false,

\textit{decelptive, evasive and r,~sleading stater?ents and te s t ir~ony .

\textit{d}) The consp.irators \textit{vould} give false,

\textit{misleading, evasi.ve and deceptive statea?.\textit{nts

\textit{(e}) The conspirators \textit{vould} overtly

\textit{distribute and oSv\textit{e

\textit{cauXi failts to t r.c.l. or the be,c.d.~}~\textit{t}~\textit{a}~\textit{a}~\textit{c}~\textit{d}~\textit{e}

fendants in Cirit.lina Ctloo lqo. 1E27-72 in t].c
34a. UNITED STATES V. MITCHELL INDICTMENT, CR. 74-110, 824RCE 71, 1974, 1-15

BEFORE the re,turn of the indictmen-

on September 15, 1972.

(f) The co-conspirators would and cause to be made offers of leniency, executive clemency and other benefits to E. Howard Hunt, Jr., G. Gordon Liddy, James W. McCord, Jr., and Jeb S. Magruder.

(g) The conspirators would attempt to obtain CIS financial assistance for persons who were subjects of the investigation referred to in paragraph three (3) above.

(h) The conspirators would obtain information from the FBI and the Department of Justice concerning the progress of the investigation referred to in paragraph three (3) above. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect the objects thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the District of Columbia and elsewhere:

OVERT ACTS

1. On or about June 17, 1972, JOE MITCHELL met with ROBERT C. INEXIQUE in or about Beverly Hills, California, and requested that he tell G. Gordon Liddy to inform Richard G. Kleymen of Richard G. Kleymen's interest in talking with him. (234)
34a. UNITED STATES V. MITCHELL, INDICTMENT, CR. 74-110, MARCH 1, 1974, 1-15

[Page content partially legible due to damage]

4. On or about June 19, 1972, CTIAUzES 17. COLSTO and JOHN D. EHLICHER, S'N directed US to tell G. GO-CON that Dean was instructed by Col. Hunt, Jr., to leave the United States.

5. On or about June 20, 1972, GO-CON met with RALPH C. LARUE at LaRue's apartment in the District of Columbia, at which time Liddy told Larue that certain documents had been traded to and for the benefit of Liddy and other persons involved in the altergation breach.

6. On or about 24, 1972, JOHN N. MITCHELL and JOHN D. EHLICHER met with John Z. Dean, III, at the White House in the District of Columbia, at which time Mitchell suggested to Larue that he and the others involved in the alteration breach be requested to leave the United States.
8. On or about June 19, 1972, JOHNNY D. EHLICHER had a conversation with JOHN L. DEAN, III at the White House in the District of Columbia, during which EHLICHER asked DEAN to obtain FBI reports of the investigation into the Watergate break-in.

9. On or about June 25, 1972, JOHNNY D. EHLICHER had a conversation with JOHN L. DEAN, III at the White House in the District of Columbia, during which EHLICHER instructed DEAN to raise cash funds to make covert payments to and for the benefit of the persons involved in the Watergate break-in.

10. On or about July 2, 1972, KEITH L. BARNES had a conversation with JOHN L. DEAN, III in the District of Columbia, during which BARNES told DEAN that "there is a OR to talk to..."

11. On or about July 6, 1972, KEITH L. BARNES had a conversation with JOHN L. DEAN, III in the District of Columbia, during which BARNES told DEAN that "there is a OR to talk to..."

12. On or about July 10, 1972, JOHNNY D. EHLICHER and KEITH L. BARNES met with JOHN L. DEAN at 50 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., in the District of Columbia, at which time DEAN obtained FBI reports of the investigation into the Watergate break-in.

13. On or about July 17, 1972, ANTHONY W. VLAASIC delivered approximately $40,000 in cash to DOROTHY BANK.
MARCH 1, 1974, 1-15

15. On or about July 26, 1972, JOHNNY ESSEX, D. ES.<LIC.,"--N met with Herbert J. Wertz at the 101th Street Hospital in the District of Columbia, and at that time Wertz told Ulaseicz that he had to raise funds with which to arm local agents to do certain things in connection with the persons involved in the Watergate break-in.

16. On or about July 26, 1972, JOHNNY ESSEX, D. ES.<LIC.,"--N met with Herbert J. Wertz at the 101th Street Hospital in the District of Columbia, and at that time Wertz told Ulaseicz that he had to raise funds with which to arm local agents to do certain things in connection with the persons involved in the Watergate break-in.

17. In or about late July or early August, 1972, Anthony Ulasycz made a delivery of approximately $13,000 in cash at Washington National Airport.

18. In or about late July or early August, 1972, Anthony Ulasycz made a delivery of approximately $13,000 in cash at Washington National Airport.

19. On or about August 29, 1972, C. DARLINGTON, the District Attorney for the District of Columbia, met with John H. Dean III, during which Dean assured COLSON not to serve a memorandum to the authorities investigating the Watergate break-in.

20. On or about September 19, 1972, Anthony Ulasycz delivered approximately $53,500 in cash to Dorothea J. Fornoff, deceased.
34a. MXM GD STASS V. MZCEIL IZICTENT, CR. 74-110

11a4 RICH 1 1974.1-4S

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caration with C-1 'TDIIES f. COlSON, during ~l|ich Hunt
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mentS to and iS(n> the benefit of t.e defenc'a ants in Cir) ia.

Case lvo. 1o27-72 in the Unite' States Distric, Court fe,

the District of Col=.-7,ia.

23. In or about: mid-Novmre, 1972, ChiARLES 1q.

COLSON last 5nth John IT. Dean, III, at the Zh;te House in

the District of Columbia, at xShich time CO T.SOl'? gave Dean

a tape recording of a telephone conxZersation bettzeen

CONSO's ar d E. Howard Hunt, Jr.

24. On or about Novembrr 15, 1972, Erohn lZ. Dean,

III, met etho 0J0' i's D. EIRIC\CT'sa? and IS> Rry r-. HALDE w.'X

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convfation bettzeen CIAURES 11. COlSON and r.: Xoward Hunt,

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25. On or about Iovcbrer 15, 1972, John 15. Dean,

III, met etho 001'. N. 1-TTC\illLL in Nelst You!, city, at HSlsh ch

town.e Dean pla.Zc-c1 for ISI\ CVS\ al e-tel e-

phon2 conversation hettfeen CliARLES 17. COLSO'? and E. HolYard

Hunt, Jr.

26. On or about D2cember 1, 1972, MeEN'ETH IZ.

PP.RlD'SO'. met s,ith Jolli 1s. Dean, III, at the Zhite House

in t3ze District of Colb~ h2; at -w3ich tti 1' t: P7 Rws4NSON g.l--e

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s2. te S Dis-ci... C-l. Coelz. fol.: th-4 D.s.tric, of Co-l=11708r=.

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27. In or about early December, 1972, GOP DONALD STRICKLIN met with Fred C. Lallue at Lallue’s party in the District of Columbia, at which time STRICKLIN delivered approximately $50,000 in cash to Lallue.

28. In or about early December, 1972, GOP DONALD STRICKLIN met with Fred C. Lallue at Lallue’s party in the District of Columbia, at which time STRICKLIN delivered approximately $50,000 in cash to Lallue.

29. In or about early December, 1972, in the District of Columbia, Fred C. Lallue arranged for the delivery of approximately $50,000 in cash to STRICKLIN.

30. On or about JUNE 27, 1973, CHARLES COLSON met with JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN and John E. Dean, III, at the Hertz offices in the District of Columbia, at which time COLSON, EHRLICHMAN and Dean discussed the need to place assurances in the case of E. Howard Hunt, Jr., concerning the length of time E. Howard Hunt, Jr., would have to spend in jail if he were convicted in Criminal Case No. 18-72 in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho.

31. In or about early July 1973, JERRY R. BILDEY had a conversation with John J. D-2all, III, during which time BILDEY proposed the use of the balance of the cash for approximately $50,000 in cash for the benefit of the defendant in Criminal Case No. 18-72 in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho.

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32. In or about late January, 1973, in the District of Columbia, Fred C. LAREE arranged for the delivery of approximately $25,000 in cash to a representative of G. i-oro and a representative of the District Court for the District of Columbia.

33. In or about late February, 1973, in the District of Columbia, Fred C. LAREE arranged for the delivery of approximately $35,000 in cash to a representative of G. i-oro and a representative of the District Court for the District of Columbia.

34. In or about late February, 1973, in the District of Columbia, Fred C. LAREE arranged for the delivery of approximately $75,000 in cash to a representative of G. i-oro and a representative of the District Court for the District of Columbia.

35. On or about late February, 1973, in the District of Columbia, Fred C. LAREE arranged for the delivery of approximately $100,000 in cash to a representative of G. i-oro and a representative of the District Court for the District of Columbia.

36. In or about late February, 1973, in the District of Columbia, Fred C. LAREE arranged for the delivery of approximately $125,000 in cash to a representative of G. i-oro and a representative of the District Court for the District of Columbia.

37. In or about late February, 1973, in the District of Columbia, Fred C. LAREE arranged for the delivery of approximately $150,000 in cash to a representative of G. i-oro and a representative of the District Court for the District of Columbia.

38. In or about late February, 1973, in the District of Columbia, Fred C. LAREE arranged for the delivery of approximately $175,000 in cash to a representative of G. i-oro and a representative of the District Court for the District of Columbia.

39. In or about late February, 1973, in the District of Columbia, Fred C. LAREE arranged for the delivery of approximately $200,000 in cash to a representative of G. i-oro and a representative of the District Court for the District of Columbia.

40. In or about late February, 1973, in the District of Columbia, Fred C. LAREE arranged for the delivery of approximately $225,000 in cash to a representative of G. i-oro and a representative of the District Court for the District of Columbia.
39. On or about March 21, 1973, at approximately 12:15 a.m. to approximately noon, Hs.RRY R. HALDEii and John IT. Dean, III, attended 2 meetings at the White House in the District of Columbia, at which there was a discussion about the fact that E. illoard Jr. had asked for approximately $20,000.

41. On or about the early afternoon of March 21, 1973, Fred C. LaRee arranged for the delivery of approximately $75,000 in cash to Willia, O. Bittlar.

(S) 011 0- about the evening of 15 arch 21, 1973, in the District of Col...bia, Fred C. LaRee arranged for the deliveroy OL approviEr.ately f:75,000 in cash to IZillia-, O. Bittlar.,

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(Title 18, Vni'cnd States Cocie, Sect.) 0wl 371. )

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